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Disaster impacts have grown significantly in the last half century. Additionally, in 2007 the 
number of urban residents surpassed that of rural populations generating a struggle for resources, 
inevitably leading to increased challenges in the achievement of reduction in both urban poverty 
and disaster vulnerability. Although the literature on disaster recovery suggests that a ‗build back 
better‘ approach is now the accepted norm, there are still many cases worldwide where the 
reconstruction process actually rebuilds rather than reduces vulnerabilities. The literature on 
disaster risk reduction provides some basic principles for sustainable hazard mitigation, however, 
evaluation criteria for effective post-disaster response and reconstruction have yet to be 
developed. 
This research will enrich the ongoing debate about what ‗sustainable hazard mitigation‘ 
entails and how it fits into broader development goals in less developed countries (LDCs). A 
case study examination of a socio-ecological system allows for the identification of the ways in 
which planning, policy, partnerships, and the like, can be used to reduce vulnerabilities in a post-
disaster setting, thus, improving outcomes in future disastrous events. In the absence of a 
framework for evaluation of disaster risk reduction effectiveness in the literature, an Assessment 
of Post-disaster Risk Reduction Effectiveness (PDARRE) was created.  Thirty three criteria were 
derived from the literature and ‗good practices‘ to address common challenges and necessary 
actions for successful post-disaster reconstruction which results in reduced vulnerability.  
The selected case study is a debris flow disaster which decimated the northern coastal state of 
Vargas, Venezuela in 1999. Torrential rainfall exceeding 900mm fell on the Sierra El Avila 
Mountains over three days. The results from the PDARRE evaluation found an overwhelmingly 
poor response to the Vargas disaster, although some positive actions were also noted. Individual 
community members were not well-informed of the risks they faced living in Vargas and have 
still not been provided adequate capacity to reduce their vulnerability, nine years after the 
disaster. The creation of new institutions immediately following the debris flows led to slow 
decision-making and weak governance as new managers struggled to adapt to their new 
positions. In addition, poor communication across government institutions, lack of enforcement 




Long-term monitoring of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction has typically been left to 
local governments that often get distracted by economic pressures and changes. To assist with 
post-disaster efforts, PDARRE was created to monitor and evaluate effectiveness. The criteria 
for this assessment were derived from many sources and were organized into categories to assist 
local governments to see which areas of their disaster response system are weakest, and enable 
effective adjustments to their activities, consequently improving the entire disaster management 
system. Though other checklists and tools for post-disaster response activities do exist, I argue 
that these over-emphasize the immediate response activities and time-frame. The post-disaster 
context provides an opportunity to harness funding that can be directed at-risk and vulnerability 
reduction efforts.  
Consistent with the perspective of prominent international NGOs, this research is based on 
the prevailing belief that disaster management can be more successful if mainstreamed into 
broader sustainable development goals and activities. Similar to other disasters, the Vargas 
debris flow disaster was a convergence of unfortunate and dangerous circumstances. As disasters 
continue to grow in magnitude and increase in frequency, the importance of strong disaster 
management plans will be reinforced the world over. With a synthesis of poverty and 
vulnerability reduction strategies, disaster-affected communities can use the post-disaster context 
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Disaster: ―a complex mix of natural hazards and human actions‖ (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & 
Davis, 2004, p. 5); ―an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a community 
experiences severe danger and disruption of its essential functions, accompanied by 
widespread human, material or environmental losses, which often exceed the ability of the 
community to cope without external assistance‖ (Smith, 2004, p. 13).  
Hazard (cause): ―a naturally occurring or human-induced process, or event, with the potential to 
create loss, that is, a general source of future danger‖ (Smith, 2004, p. 12). 
Risk (likely consequence): ―the actual exposure of something of human value to a hazard and is 
often regarded as the product of probability and loss‖ (Smith, 2004, p. 12). 
Vulnerability: ―the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their 
capacity to anticipate, cope with, and resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard 
(an extreme natural event or process)‖ (Wisner et al, 2004, p. 11). ―the pre-event, inherent 
characteristics or qualities of social systems that create the potential for harm. Vulnerability 
is a function of exposure… and sensitivity of system (Adger, 2006; Cutter, 1996 cited in 
Cutter et al. 2008, p. 599). 
Resilience: ―the ability of a social system to respond and recover from disasters [including] 
those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as 
well as post-event, adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the social system to re-
organize, change, and learn in response to a threat‖ (Cutter, et al., 2008, p. 599)  
 
Sustainability: defined as the ability to ‗‗tolerate—and overcome—damage, diminished   
productivity, and reduced quality of life from an extreme event without significant outside 
assistance‖ (Mileti, 1999, p.4 – cited in Cutter et. al. 2008, p.601). 
 
Disaster Risk Reduction: The conceptual framework of elements considered with the 
possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid 
(prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, 
within the broad context of sustainable development (ISDR, International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction, 2004). 
 
Sustainable Hazard Mitigation: This concept links wise management of natural resources with 
local economic and social resiliency, viewing hazard mitigation as an integral part of a 
much larger context which includes: Land use planning, insurance, warnings, engineering 
and building codes, new technology, & emergency preparedness and response (Mileti, 
1999). 
 
Alluvial Fan: “Fan-shaped fluvial landform at the mouth of a canyon. …The fan is produced by 
flowing water that abruptly loses velocity as it leaves the constricted channel of the canyon 
and therefore drops (sorted layers) of sediment along the base of a mountain block‖ 




Debris Flow: Debris flows are characterized by fast movements in which the displaced mass 
behaves as a highly viscous fluid (Guidicini and Nieble 1984; IPT 1991). Debris flows 
displace a significant volume of material. They reach siginficant distances, velocities, and 
transport capacities, including large boulders (Gramani and Augusto Filho 2004 cited in 







BBB – Key Propositions for Building Back Better 
CBNRM – Community-based Natural Resources Management 
CBO – Community-based Organization 
DFID – Department for International Development (United Kingdom) 
DROP – Disaster Resilience of Place Model 
DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction 
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA) 
HFA – Hyogo Framework for Action 
IDB – Inter-American Development Bank 
IDNDR – International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
IFRC/IFRCS – International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
ISDR – International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
LAC – Latin America and the Caribbean 
LDC – Less Developed Country 
MDC – More Developed Country 
MDG – Millennium Development Goals 
NGO – Non-governmental Organization 
PAR – Pressure and Release Model 
PPP – Public Private Partnerships 
SoVI – Social Vulnerability Index 
UCV – Universidad Central de Venezuela 
UN – United Nations 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
UPEL – Universidad Pedagogica Experimental Libertador 
USA – United States of America 
VCA – Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Newspapers and television programs report on disasters on almost a daily basis. Emergencies 
where thousands of people have been evacuated from their homes and images of tearful women 
and children become embedded in our minds as we contemplate the distress and sadness they 
feel from having lost literally everything. These stories come from both developed and 
developing countries since disastrous events do not discriminate. Likewise, the number of 
disasters
1
 globally has been rising exponentially for approximately four decades (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Global Trend in Natural Disasters reported 1900-2008 
Source: (CRED, Centre for Research and Epidemiology of Disasters, 2008) 
As recent severe storms such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 have 
illustrated, a strong emergency management plan is becoming increasingly more important for 
saving lives and minimizing losses.  
Disaster impacts have grown significantly in the last half century. In 1975 fewer than 100 
disasters were reported, compared to over 400 in 2005 (Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 
2006). This means that not only are hazardous events becoming more frequent, but, with the 
                                         
1
 See Terminology on p. xi for the interpretation used in this thesis. Note that no threshold number of deaths, 
costs or spatial impacts are included. However, from Figure 1, all of these impact measures must also be assumed to 
be rising when viewed at the macro level. 
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larger population on this earth, more disasters have also led to greater losses. Disaster costs from 
1990-1999 were fifteen times greater than in the decade starting in 1950 (Independent Evaluation 
Group (IEG), 2006). Greater economic impacts have social costs as well. In the ten year period 
starting in 1983, 6.1 billion people were affected by disaster. Compare that to the 290,000 
fatalities and five million displaced people in 11 countries in the Asian Tsunami and it becomes 
very clear the great potential for loss from a single disaster (Wisner & Walker, 2005). It is cases 
like these that demonstrate that disaster preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery need 
clearly defined actions, as part of an interconnected system, to successfully counteract the 
growing impacts and losses from catastrophe. 
In addition, the global population is now more urban. In 2007, the number of urban residents 
surpassed that of rural areas unleashing a struggle for resources, inevitably leading to poverty for 
some (Ahmed Obaid, 2007; Kulikowski, 2007). The concentration of people in urban areas is 
accompanied by health and sanitation problems, not to mention infrastructure challenges. 
Nevertheless, urbanization is directly correlated with economic prosperity in this industrial age. 
Sustainable development has encouraged planned growth with consideration of environmental 
features for quite some time. Uncontrolled and unplanned growth in urban areas, however, has 
led to construction of unsafe buildings in perilous landscapes. Until social, political, 
environmental and economic vulnerabilities are recognized and protected prior to disaster, these 
urban populations will continue to see losses to life and livelihood. 
1.1 Research Gap 
Theory on vulnerability is filled with methods which assist in identifying the causes and 
processes that make communities vulnerable but many of these models were created in the 
context of pre-disaster mitigation. The literature on post-disaster reconstruction is limited and 
prominent authors in the field of disaster management have agreed that ―much disaster relief and 
recovery assistance fails to take account of the need to support livelihoods and future resistance 
to hazards by reducing vulnerability as well as dealing with people‘s immediate needs‖ (Cannon, 
2003; Davis, 2003; King & MacGregor, 2000). This type of reconstruction re-creates a situation 
of vulnerability and wastes the opportunity that arises after a disaster to improve of lives and 
livelihoods. Furthermore, much of the existing literature on vulnerability was written prior to the 
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development of such influential documents as the Build Back Better philosophy (post 2004) and 
therefore requires updating.  
Despite extensive cogitation of constitutes effective response and recovery actions, an 
evaluation framework for measuring the effectiveness of post-disaster reconstruction is lacking; 
especially with regards to efforts to reduce disaster risk. After the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) in the 1990s, the International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (ISDR) developed the Yokohama Strategy and then further updated the framework in 
2005 with the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) (ISDR, 2007a). The HFA states that it is a 
―key instrument for implementing disaster risk reduction‖ yet evaluation of this instrument is 
lacking. Other international agreements have instituted evaluations - the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) have an annual review, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) issues report cards to countries determining their progress toward climate change 
goals. So far, disaster managers, government officials and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have escaped this criticism since there is no such evaluation for disaster management 
activities. Lessons are constantly being identified locally, but due to the complex, unquantifiable 
phenomena associated with risk and vulnerability, post-disaster reconstruction seems to remain 
beyond evaluation. The ‗Build Back Better‘ (BBB) framework is a step toward this type of 
evaluation as it sets out some good concepts that merit inclusion in a disaster risk reduction 
evaluation. Nonetheless, the BBB framework leaves disaster practitioners with no identifiable 
indicators of effective vulnerability reduction. 
Previous work in the United States identified ―six objectives that  must simultaneously be 
reached to mitigate hazards in a sustainable way and stop the national (United States) trend 
toward increasing catastrophic losses from natural disasters‖ (Mileti, 1999, p. 5). The objectives 
are: 
 Maintain and enhance environmental quality 
 Maintain and enhance people‘s quality of life 
 Foster local resiliency and responsibility 
 Recognize that vibrant local economies are essential 
 Ensure inter- and intra-generational equity 
 Adopt local consensus building 
(Mileti, 1999, pp. 5-6) 
These objectives apply broadly, but an elaboration on the implementation challenges that less 
developed countries (LDCs) might face is needed in order to apply these objectives, or other  
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international governance goals (e.g. MDG, BBB propositions Hyogo Priority actions), to 
contexts outside the USA.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Although the literature on disaster recovery suggests that a ‗build back better‘ approach (see 
Clinton 2006) is now the accepted norm, there are still many cases worldwide where the post-
disaster reconstruction process actually rebuilds rather than reduces vulnerabilities. The 
literature on disaster risk reduction provides some basic principles for sustainable hazard 
mitigation, however, evaluation criteria for effective response and reconstruction must be 
developed and taken into account in post-disaster activities and then maintained throughout 
future development activities in order to achieve real reductions in vulnerability and risk. 
1.3 Research Purpose 
The case study herein will be examined from a socio-ecological perspective, emphasizing 
social processes that lead to unsafe conditions. It is accepted that the natural environment has, 
and will always, pose a threat to populations located in hazardous areas. Consequently, rather 
than simply deciphering which environmental factors that contributed to the disaster itself, the 
question this thesis addresses is how to create sustainable communities that are resilient to the 
threats and impacts of natural hazards.  
It is recognized that environmental change is taking place and similarly that natural disasters 
are increasingly seen as more human-caused or ‗unnatural‘ (O'Keefe, Westgate, & Wisner, 
1976). An examination of the socio-ecological structures will allow for the identification of the 
ways in which planning, policy, partnerships, and the like, can be used to reduce vulnerabilities 
in a post-disaster setting, thus, improving outcomes in future disastrous events.  
This research will enrich the ongoing debate about what ‗sustainable hazard mitigation‘ 
entails and how it fits into broader development goals in less developed countries (LDCs). To 
demonstrate what is meant by sustainable hazard mitigation, a case study analysis will allow for 
an in-depth examination of post-disaster reconstruction. The case study to be examined is from 
Vargas State in Venezuela where an unusual meteorological event led to multiple debris flows in 
the towns along approximately forty kilometres of the northern coast of the country (Wieczorek 
et al., 2002). 
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Venezuela experienced a very wet year in 1999. Several months of higher than normal 
precipitation leading up to December saturated soils and caused unusual flooding late in the year, 
which is normally the dry season. Finally, for three days starting December 14
th
 1999, the rains 
fell relentlessly and many states across the country began to see massive damages from flooding 
and mudflows (CEPAL, 2000). Impacts from this rainfall were seen across the country but 
Vargas State was the worst hit. Towns built on alluvial fans north of the Sierra el Avila 
Mountains were inundated with debris killing upwards of 3,170 people
2
 and requiring prompt 
evacuation of an estimated 300,000 people (CEPAL, 2000, p. 15). This disaster was described as 
the worst debris flow disaster in Latin America‘s history and was certainly the most devastating 
disaster in Venezuela‘s history (Wieczorek et al., 2002). 
The disaster response was a coordinated effort between Protección Civil (Civil Protection), 
the Venezuelan military, and many international aid agencies and foreign assistance funds (field 
notes, 2008). Victims and survivors were housed in temporary shelters while the debris was 
cleared and the port and airport were returned to operation. However, delayed decision-making 
by the government led to the reoccupation of high risk properties by residents anxious to reclaim 
their homes and continue in their livelihoods. Debris flow hazards are common in this region, 
although infrequent occurrences seem to have affected the perceived risk levels. Examination of 
the post-disaster response and, more specifically the reconstruction process, will elucidate 
opportunities which surfaced through the assessment of post-disaster activities. The adequacy 
with which the response and rehabilitation phases of this disaster addressed vulnerability 
reduction is questioned and further investigation into the actions taken is the focus of this 
research. 
                                         
2
 The number of deaths was difficult to identify and many sources offered conflicting numbers between as few as 
1,000 deaths and as high as 50,000.  
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1.3.1 Research Objectives 
This research has four main objectives: 
Objective 1: Identify primary and secondary causes for the 1999 debris flow event. 
Objective 2: Develop an evaluation framework for assessing post-disaster risk reduction 
effectiveness by reviewing ‗good practices‘
3
 in disaster management, sustainable livelihoods, 
urban planning and the like. 
Objective 3: Evaluate the extent to which aspects of vulnerability and risk were reduced, 
perpetuated and/or created through the post-disaster reconstruction efforts in Vargas State 
based on the framework from objective 2: Post-disaster Assessment of Risk Reduction 
Effectiveness (PDARRE). 
Objective 4: Identify further steps (policies, actions and solutions) which could reduce 
vulnerabilities and risk in Vargas according to the PDARRE results. 
In achieving these objectives, the overall goal of this thesis is to address the need for 
improved monitoring and evaluation of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction activities so as 
to elucidate common failures and assist in identifying ways to improve disaster management. 
Through an improved understanding of threats from hazards and disaster, longer-term 
development goals can also be achieved and maintained. 
1.4 Definitions 
Before continuing, it is necessary to clarify the use of some terms because they are used 
differently in the literature on hazards as compared to other disciplines. Many terms can be used 
somewhat interchangeably in the literature, while other authors see these same terms as having 
distinct definitions. The challenge of epistemology crosses disciplines as they investigate 
vulnerability, and unfortunately this can be an obstacle in multi-disciplinary studies in general. 
Although the development of a common nomenclature would be helpful, it is beyond the scope 
of the present discussion and some scholars argue that subtle differences between definitions 
should not be lost by creating a standardized nomenclature (Davis, 2003; Wisner, 2003). 
Nonetheless, I will identify the definitions which I follow in this thesis to avoid confusion. 
                                         
3
 Due to the contextual differences across case studies, the creation of ―best practices‖ which could be applied to 
all cases near impossible, therefore, ‗good practices‘ is used in place of the usual convention. 
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For the purpose of this study, vulnerability is defined as ―the characteristics of a person or 
group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover 
from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process)‖ (Wisner et al., 2004, 
p. 11). Risk will be used interchangeably with vulnerability, however with stronger reference to 
the physical threats whereas vulnerability is used to refer to the social characteristics that 
perpetuate and enhance hazard impacts. Wisner et al. (2004) offer a set of distinct terms when 
referring to different ‗unsafe conditions‘. People, according to these authors, are vulnerable, 
whereas living and working conditions are better referred to as being unsafe. The authors 
discourage the use of ‗vulnerable‘ for buildings, livelihoods, settlement locations or 
infrastructure, suggesting that ‗fragile‘, ‗hazardous‘ or other synonyms are better suited. In this 
document, I too will follow this suggestion because it relieves uncertainties regarding the 
meaning of vulnerability.  
Other terms used in the hazards literature also have conflicting definitions in other disciplines. 
Resilience, adaptive capacity and vulnerability relate to capacities exhibited by individuals or 
communities. Definitions of vulnerability in hazards literature include elements of exposure, 
sensitivity and capacity to adapt (Adger W. N., 2006). While some global environmental change 
authors (e.g. Smit & Wandel, 2006) argue that exposure and sensitivity are inextricably linked to 
one another. Resilience, in contrast, started as an ecology concept geared at understanding 
system stability and multiple stable states (Gallopín, 2006). Movement between stable states, or 
―basins of attraction‖, is caused by ―perturbations‖ whose trajectories are limited by the 
resilience within the system (Gallopín, 2006). Therefore, resilience too involves aspects of 
―exposure‖ and ―adaptation‖ to changes. For clarification of these terms, Figure 2, below, 




Figure 2: Conceptual linkages between vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity 
Source: (Cutter, et al., 2008) 
The definitions given by Cutter et al. (2008) for vulnerability and resilience (Fig. 4f) have 
been adopted for the purpose of this thesis. Cutter et al. (2008) define resilience as ―the ability of 
a social system to respond and recover from disasters [including] those inherent conditions that 
allow the system to absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event, adaptive 
processes that facilitate the ability of the social (sic) system to re-organize, change, and learn in 
response to a threat‖ (p.599, emphasis added). It is important to note the similarity of the 
resilience and vulnerability definitions. Vulnerabilities are the characteristics which expose a 
system or individual to a given impact, whereas resilience is exhibited through the capacities to 
adapt and reorganize before, during and after an impact. Thus, there are some overlapping 
themes in each definition, but the words do not have the same meaning, nor are they opposites.  
Next, disaster risk reduction, vulnerability reduction and hazard mitigation are all concepts 
related to managing the threat of natural hazards with intent to reduce impacts on lives and 
livelihoods. These terms each have distinct connotation at times, however for the purpose of this 
study they have been assumed interchangeable due to the common end goal: to reduce the 
impacts of disaster on a community and socio-ecological system. 
Similarly, many terms have been developed to define the activities relating to catastrophe. 
‗Disaster management‘ most commonly refers to the stages of the disaster management cycle: 
preparedness, mitigation, response, reconstruction/recovery. ‗Sustainable hazard mitigation‘ also 
refers to all parts of the cycle but aims at sustainability of actions, rather than simply planning 
and organizing for disasters (Mileti, 1999). ‗Emergency response planning‘ on the other hand, 
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has more of a focus on preparatory actions which allow for a solid and organized response during 
and following a disastrous event (Quarantelli, 1995).. Literature on these cyclical, interconnected 
actions does not depict them as distinct but authors argue these conceptual definitions as 
improvements on previous thinking. For this thesis, these activities will be discussed for their 
contributions to understanding vulnerability and loss reduction. Nonetheless, disaster 
management and sustainable hazard mitigation are broadly used interchangeably because both 
the concept of a cyclical process and a need for sustainability in actions are seen as imperative to 
vulnerability reduction. 
1.5 Organization of this thesis 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. This first chapter has outlined the research question, 
objectives and the gap in the literature that will be addressed. Chapter 2 chronicles scholarship 
from a breadth of disciplines which relate to post-disaster risk reduction in less developed 
countries (LDCs). Chapter 3 describes the case study specific to this research and the methods 
used for data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 details the results of my research of this study. 
Chapter 5 is a discussion of implications identified through the analysis of the case study, 
addresses research limitations and also offers recommendations for future research and action. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarizing key findings and objectives for this 
research and placing the research within the context of mainstreaming disaster risk reduction. 
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Disasters interrupt human lives and livelihoods in a variety of ways and at multiple scales. 
Interruptions occurring in social, environmental and economic systems have stimulated research 
across many disciplines. Scholarship on disasters crosses into at least six disciplines, including: 
geography, sociology, anthropology, development studies, ecology, the physical sciences, and 
engineering (Alexander, 1993). The disruption caused by disasters often also highlights 
vulnerabilities. Vulnerability to natural hazards has also been researched in multiple disciplines 
and fields of study including political ecology, sustainability sciences and other social sciences 
that investigate the processes that perpetuate socio-ecological systems. 
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The study of livelihoods and poverty elimination developed in parallel over the past half 
century. Fundamental characteristics of livelihoods include capability, equity and sustainability, 
and similar to natural hazards, these are examined at multiple scales (Chambers & Conway, 
1992). Likewise, as urban populations have grown, urban planners have become pivotal actors in 
the evolution of disaster management and loss reduction plans. Consequently, urban-focused 
research and goals are important considerations for this research as well. All of these bodies of 
scholarship, from development and livelihood studies to urban planning and disaster risk 
reduction literature, have goals to conserve and sustain human populations and can make both 
individuals and communities more resilient to the threats in the natural environment. Although 
the methodology and research foci may differ across the above mentioned disciplines, integration 
of all resulting concepts and knowledge, as part of disaster risk reduction in lesser developed 
countries (LDCs), would serve to enhance results of disaster management activities. 
2.1 Lesser Developed Countries and Natural Hazards 
The number of disasters across the globe in recent decades has increased significantly. Rare 
disastrous events, such as the Asian tsunami, in addition to the increasing length and magnitude 
of perennial hazards, have caused major losses to life, livelihood and infrastructure in both 
developed and developing countries. An increasing number of people are being impacted by 
these events, despite the fact that the number of fatalities is decreasing (see Figure 3). Although 
Figure 1 showed an increase in the number of disasters, it is unclear if this also indicates an 
increase in natural hazard events. Natural hazard events are increasingly more disastrous likely 
due to growing human settlements which expose more lives and infrastructure to the impacts of 
these hazards. The improvements to disaster management and lessons learned from previous 
disasters can likely be linked to a reduction in fatalities, yet further improvements are needed to 
address the increasing number of people affected by disasters. 
On the contrary, without damages to infrastructure or livelihoods, is a flood defined as a 
disaster, or simply a natural process? Examination of the causal factors that lead to floods can 
bring up a debate as to whether these, and other types of events, are truly ‗natural‘ hazards. 
Increasingly, disasters are becoming more ‗unnatural‘ and the presence of human populations in 
unsafe land may well explain some of the causes of these events (Abramovitz, 2001). The greater 




Figure 3: Disaster Summary 1900-2008 (linear-interpolated smoothed lines) 
Source: (CRED, Centre for Research and Epidemiology of Disasters, 2008)
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lands as ―the worst environmental problems are found in marginalized areas of poor or middle-
ranking cities‖ where local wastes, wider urban processes (industrialization, traffic) and global 
trends (market pressures, global climate change) create a burden of environmental risk on the 
residents of those marginal areas (Pelling, 2003). The sources of this environmental risk, 
however, are increasingly more unnatural. 
The rate of growth of urban populations in LDCs outpaces that of developed countries. The 
unplanned and illegal nature of informal settlement growth of urban centres in the developing 
world exposes many people to the threats of the natural environment (Manuel-Navarrete, Javier- 
Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007; McEntire, 2004). As LDCs compete for economic wealth and 
sustainable development, the importance of citizen protection and enforcement of land use 
legislation is often ignored until a disaster strikes. Unfortunately, this creates a cycle of poverty 
as any real gains in development or economic growth are lost to disaster, especially in countries 
facing perennial hazards such as hurricanes or cyclones. In recognition of this difficulty, many 
institutions and regional development banks (e.g. The World Bank or Inter-American 
Development Bank) offer post-disaster risk reduction assistance intended to build resilience to 
hazards and increase the long-term success of domestic investments in development (Benson, 
Twigg, & Rossetto, 2007; DFID, 1999; Clinton, 2006; Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 
2006). Use of this external assistance to create ―sustainable patterns of development 
can…decrease vulnerability‖ and in turn help to overcome the challenges poverty provoked even 
before the disaster (Manuel-Navarrete, Javier-Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007, p. 210). 
2.1.1 Latin America and the Caribbean 
The case study for this thesis is taken from the region known as Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Latin America includes all the Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South 
America, including Brazil and the English-speaking countries in the north of the continent. These 
countries share comparable histories of colonization and gained independence at approximately 
the same time. Often this region also includes reference to the islands of the Caribbean because 
of their proximity, in addition to the similarities in development, climate and culture.  
Because of their geographic proximity, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) face similar natural hazards. Natural hazards may account for some of the differences in 
development across nations, as some countries face perennial damages from tropical storms (e.g. 
Cuba) while other countries remain outside the typical hazard area (e.g. Barbados). Regardless, 
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the UNDP considers LAC to be one of the most hazard-prone regions of the world, ranking as 
the second most prone to extreme flooding, landslides, earthquakes and droughts (UNDP, 2008). 
In LAC disaster occurrences have followed the global trend. The number of people affected 
by disaster has increased in recent decades while the number of deaths has decreased (see Figure 
4). While great strides have been made in the ability to save lives, the number of people 
experiencing the primary effects, loss of home or livelihood, during disaster is expected to 
continue to grow (Zapata Martí, 2006).  
 
Figure 4: Affected Population and Deaths from Disaster in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (1972-2005) 
Source: (Zapata Martí, 2006) 
In addition to the number of people affected, economic impacts are also on the rise. For the 
first decade of the millennium, average economic costs associated with disasters in LAC were 
already very close to total costs for all of the 1990s (see Figure 5). Although disasters also 
impact larger countries with greater resources for recovery, the costs and impacts seem to be 
concentrated in the insular countries and countries with coasts along the Caribbean Sea (Zapata 




Figure 5: Economic impacts of disaster in Latin America and the Caribbean - 1972-2005 
Source: (Zapata Martí, 2006) 
Meteorological hazards (e.g. hurricanes) are of disproportionate disaster management focus 
among the countries of LAC. While other hazards also threaten livelihoods and lives in the 
region, hurricanes remain the cause of the greatest absolute losses in LAC. The extreme 
hurricane events of 1998, 2004 and 2005 had devastating impacts in numerous countries of LAC. 
The causes of vulnerability in this region are diverse and complex, but their study is essential to 
achieving sustainable development (Manuel-Navarrete, Javier-Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007, p. 
210). 
From extensive disaster research and practical experience in LAC, thirteen interrelated and 
recurrent factors have been identified to explain vulnerability to hydrometeorological disasters in 
the region: (a) poverty and socio-economic marginalization, (b) institutional and democratic 
weakness, (c) rapid, unregulated, and unplanned urbanization, (d) formation of slums and 
occupation of hazardous areas, (e) population growth, (f) migration from rural to urban areas, (g) 
increasing population affected by disasters, (h) ecosystem conversion, (i) erosion, (j) increasing 
intensity of hydrometeorological events causing disasters, (k) increasing economic damage due 
to disasters, (l) failure to communicate scientific knowledge effectively, and (m) expansion of 
agriculture‖ (Manuel-Navarrete, Javier-Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007, p. 210).  These ‗symptoms‘ 
occur not only in relation to hydro-meteorological events, nor are they exclusive to LAC.  
The remainder of this chapter will chronicle prominent scholarship relating to disaster and 
hazard management. First, a review of recent international structures, including policy 
frameworks and principles, depicts the current state of experience-based knowledge. The field of 
15 
 
disaster management, especially emergency response and reconstruction, is carried out by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) who have learned many lessons and created good practices 
which anchor the current understanding of how best to manage risks and vulnerability. With an 
improved grasp on good practices the second part of this chapter reviews the historical evolution 
of vulnerability and hazards. This review will indicate some of the complementary fields of 
research and practical models which will be relevant to later discussion and analysis in this 
thesis.  
2.2 Landmark International Governance 
Natural disasters, and even non-disastrous hazard events, disrupt or distract community 
members from their regular activities and help to perpetuate poverty because they divert 
financial resources from development goals at both the community and national level. 
International governance bodies have created numerous structures which guide and assess 
performance for innumerable developmental or environmental changes. These structures offer 
decision makers achievable goals or provide a range of starting points for action on matters of 
immediate concern. A selection of these international structures will be addressed here because 
they relate to disaster risk reduction and offer insight into the administration of disaster response. 
2.2.1 Millennium Development Goals 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), designed by 192 UN member country leaders 
along with the world‘s leading development institutions to meet the needs of the world‘s poorest 
(United Nations, 2008), can be used as motivation and direction when exploring disaster risk 
reduction or loss reduction strategies. Elaborate discussion is not necessary in this chapter; 
however, there are eight targets that break down into 21 quantifiable goals, measured by 60 
indicators (UNDP, 2006). The goals are: 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development  
(United Nations, 2008) 
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These goals, designed primarily for poverty reduction, have similarities with disaster risk 
reduction objectives. In addition, disasters can greatly hinder development efforts and cause the 
loss of investment in vital development infrastructure. For that reason, it is worth recalling the 
MDGs and especially to highlight goals three, seven and eight. These goals: address the need to 
consider women and the important roles they play in various aspects of society; emphasize the 
importance of the environment for sustainable development and the environmental risks of un-
sustainable development, and; stress the need for cooperation across boundaries, organizations 
and cultures. The admission that disaster risk management should be included in development 
programs is not a new concept. Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development planning 
has been encouraged for several years. The obstacle that has yet to be overcome it is in finding a 
method through which to include these goals in development activities (Benson, Twigg, & 
Rossetto, 2007). 
2.2.2 Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction 
Hazards pose a serious threat to development investment if, prior to the project execution, 
environmental hazards are not identified and considered in the planning process. NGOs and 
development banks have become more acutely aware of the need to mainstream disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) within wider development projects and programs. Although these disaster risks 
have been acknowledged as important, governments have been slow to fully integrate DRR into 
all development activities.  
The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank have each coordinated with 
academic institutions in an effort to develop methods to integrate DRR into their own selection 
criterion for project funding (Cannon, 2003; Davis, 2003; Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 
2006). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (ISDR) have also developed strategies for DRR within their activities 
(UNDP, 2005; ISDR, 2009). The United Nations has a Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery (GFDRR)
4
; but how many international institutions, facilities and partnerships 
need to be developed independently before clear guidelines and actions can be outlined to truly 
reduce these risks? Local governments are overwhelmed with options for DRR strategies, while 
                                         
4
 For more information visit the GFDRR website www.gfdrr.org  
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standardization of action or clear principles to assist their decision-making have yet to be agreed 
upon. 
The ProVention Consortium, an informal forum for discussion and collaboration on disaster 
risk management issues, recognized the need to provide governmental ministries and NGOs 
working in disaster management with some operational guidance on how to deal with both the 
reduction of risks and common development goals (ProVention Consortium Secretariat, 2009). 
In 2007 the consortium developed thirteen guidance notes as practical briefs, and each of these 
briefs is based on the seven accepted steps for success (as shown in Figure 6) (Benson, Twigg, & 
Rossetto, 2007).  
 
Figure 6: Steps to Successful Mainstreaming 
Source: (Benson, Twigg, & Rossetto, 2007) 
These steps, along with the guidance notes
5
, support many of the themes discussed in this 
chapter. Concerns about the use of appropriate tools for measuring vulnerability and identifying 
sources of risk have been noted in practical experiences and models exist that quantify this data. 
The success of these tools depends greatly on the ―environment‖ in which decisions are made. 
The importance of good information, open communication and progress monitoring will allow 
for feedback and continued learning by all actors involved. The cyclical ―lessons learned‖ 
                                         
5
 Titles of the notes are as follows: 1) Introduction; 2) Collecting and using information on natural hazards; 3) 
Poverty reduction strategies; 4) Country Programming; 5) Project cycle management; 6) Logical and results-based 
frameworks; 7) Environmental assessment; 8) Economic analysis; 9) Vulnerability and capacity assessment; 10) 
Sustainable livelihoods approaches; 11) Social impact assessment; 12) Construction design, building standards and 
site selection; and 13) Evaluating disaster risk reduction activities (Benson, Twigg, & Rossetto, 2007). 
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component of the ProVention Consortium ―steps for successful mainstreaming‖ reiterates the 
significance of social learning that Cutter et al. (2008) and Berkes (2007) have also asserted. The 
modifications suggested under Step 5: ―Change in operational practice‖, touches on concerns 
also expressed by the World Bank in its independent assessment of program success 
(Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), 2006). Cost minimization strategies can be achieved 
when disaster risk considerations are implemented in the early stages of development (Benson, 
Twigg, & Rossetto, 2007).  
In a similar vein, security is a cross-cutting theme that arises in a range of discussions from 
land tenure to terrorism. There are obvious disaster management links when you put security 
alongside hazards, environmental concerns and (sustainable) development. Bogardi and Brauch 
(2005) identify the UN Commission on Human Security and the Human Security Network in 
relation to vulnerability by suggesting that in addition to current security objectives operating 
under the pillars of ―freedom from want‖ and ―freedom from fear‖, a third ―freedom from hazard 
impacts‖ pillar should also be included (cited in Birkmann, 2006, p. 2-3). As populations expand, 
new risk and security concerns arise. Growing human populations are increasing the land area 
they occupy, outpacing planning and development capacities in many countries. This growth has 
led to new security issues that need consideration in development planning. 
A resilient community is one that is aware of the threats and has taken precautions to 
minimize risk levels, prepare for impacts and protect against known hazards. The issues of 
human security and safety are crucial to a solid disaster management plan. When mitigation 
techniques are implemented, less money will be required for post-disaster reconstruction and 
progress will not be as easily lost. Complementary response techniques, including early warning 
and evacuation systems, also help to save lives by keeping the population safe from the natural 
hazards. Rivalry and conflict must be abated as part of sustainable hazard mitigation and 
protection of development investments. Post-disaster security issues have also been accounted 
for in a good disaster management plan if resettlement and reconstruction phases are well 
planned and people are not left destitute in a battle for limited and damaged resources.  
From this section of the chapter it is more clear that focusing on development can aid long-
term goals but this focus alone lacks detail on disaster specific concerns. There are other 
frameworks which are geared specifically to disaster concerns; the following section will 
highlight those most prominent in the field of disaster management. 
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2.2.3 International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (HFA) 
 From the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), 1990-1999, much 
was learned, but more work was needed to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and improve 
future management of communities and resources in high-risk areas. To address the residual 
impediments of the IDNDR, the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) was 
created. Since the inception of the ISDR, various documents have been created to assist 
international decision makers in reducing the vulnerability of both people and infrastructure to 
the threat of natural disasters. The most notable framework document for building resilience to 
disasters, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), was published at the World Conference on 
disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan in 2005. The HFA was created out of lessons learned to fill 
gaps from the previous Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World, which was adopted in 1994 
(ISDR, 2005). These early initiatives culminated in a broad recognition that ―development 
investments are in jeopardy unless precautionary action is taken toward reducing disaster risk‖ 
(UNEP, 2007). Therefore, five gaps and challenges are outlined as the starting point for the HFA 
framework: governance (organizational, legal and policy frameworks); risk identification, 
assessment, monitoring and early warning systems; knowledge management and education; 
reduction of underlying risk factors; and preparedness for effective response and recovery 
(ISDR, 2005). The HFA took the identified challenges and put them into more action-oriented 
priorities to assist the decision-making process:  
Priority #1: Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority 
with a strong institutional basis for implementation 
Priority #2: Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early 
warning. 
Priority #3: Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of 
safety and resilience at all levels 
Priority #4: Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
Priority #5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all 
levels.   
(ISDR, 2005) 
These priorities developed out of real life practice, tragic loss and a hopeful desire to learn from 
previous errors; the aim being to better maintain prosperous societies and also to better prepare 
these societies for the recurrent challenges that are very likely to be faced in the future. 
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Extensive elaboration of each priority is beyond the scope of this literature review, however, 
there are some key points I would like to discuss before moving forward. Priority #1 can be 
thought of as the foundation, for hazard and disaster management.  
Given that governance and institutions also play a critical role in reducing disaster 
risk,…fully engaging environmental managers in national disaster risk management 
mechanisms, and incorporating risk reduction criteria into environmental regulatory 
frameworks [are key options for improving how institutions address disaster-related 
issues] (UNEP, 2007, p. 15).  
The Hyogo Framework suggests strengthening effective and flexible institutions for enforcement 
and balancing of competing interests (UNEP, 2007)  
Priority #2 focuses on spatial planning in order to identify inappropriate development zones, 
appropriate buffer zones, land uses or building codes and the use of technology to model, 
forecast and project risks (UNEP, 2007, p. 15). The development of technology for mapping, 
data analysis, modeling and measurement of hazard information offers decision makers a much 
better understanding of the hazards throughout the decision-making process.  
Priority #3 encourages the promotion and integration of hazard education within schools to 
spread awareness of the risks and vulnerability to the individuals of at-risk communities. This 
relates to the fact of ―[ten] borrowers (who) accounted for 208 of the 528 disaster-related 
projects, (39 percent) in the (World Bank) portfolio over the 1984–2005 period‖ (IEG, 2006, p. 
ix).  This borrowing demonstrates how vulnerable countries not only have a trend of repeated 
events, but also shows that disaster mitigation is not being effectively integrated into longer-term 
development policies (IEG, Independent Evaluation Group, 2006). By educating children, hazard 
information will be transferred to adults and basic knowledge about threats and response can 
help improve community-level resilience. 
Priority #4 demands the synthesis of the previous three priorities: governance, education and 
awareness, and appropriate technologies. ―To develop and implement effective plans aimed at 
saving lives, protecting the environment and protecting property threatened by disaster, all 
relevant stakeholders must be engaged: multi-stakeholder dialogue is key to successful 
emergency response‖ (UNEP, 2007). Not only is this dialogue encouraged here; Goal 8 of the  
MDGs, along with natural resources management and planning theories (such as Mitchell, 2002; 
Arnstein, 1969) also advocate for participation and open communication.  
The final priority of the Hyogo Framework, Priority #5, is geared toward a more proactive 
plan of action, rather than the reactive method that has, in the past, failed to save lives. All the 
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disciplines mentioned herein have derived this same proactive adjustment from their research on 
disasters, however finding ways to implement and execute this plan has proven more difficult 
(Clinton, 2006). 
Despite positive efforts, the HFA policy considerations could better incorporate, and should 
further address, the different contextual issues which occur in LDCs. Academic literature is 
working to fill these gaps, however, ―most of the theory used by hazards specialists has been 
formulated for the developed world (especially the USA) and is often of doubtful validity 
elsewhere‖ (Alexander, 1993, p. 14). For example, in developed nations, insurance is used to 
protect property rights. ―Some observers (e.g., Burby and French, 1981; Platt, 1987) argue that 
[emphasis on construction standards], coupled with the availability of relatively low-cost flood 
insurance, has encouraged floodplain development [in the USA] (Burby, 1998, p. 64). Cases 
such as this are good examples of integrated methods using both structural and non-structural 
mitigation efforts. However, this method encourages a dependency on physical structures rather 
than true hazard mitigation. Not to mention, people in LDCs often have no legal right to 
property, and their limited income making insurance a difficult means of protection.  
2.2.4 Key Propositions for Building Back Better 
Another internationally acknowledged document relating to improving disaster and hazard 
management is ‗Key Propositions for Building Back Better‘ (Clinton, 2006). The 2004 Asian 
Tsunami accentuated the need for proper implementation of the HFA and prompted further work 
to assist decision makers in their disaster response efforts. For over a decade prior to 2004 the 
focus had been on other parts of the disaster management cycle: preparedness or mitigation. 
After the Asian tsunami the importance of a strong and planned response was clear. Nonetheless, 
half a century of research on the disaster management indicated that no single part of the cycle 
could be completely successful without complementary strength in the other phases.  
The ‗building back better‘ (BBB) propositions (below and also found in Appendix 1) were 
developed from the multitude of actors involved in the lengthy recovery process in the Asian 
Tsunami who conversed and shared experiences, both good and bad, and the report which 
resulted is aimed at improving humanitarian efforts in the future (Clinton, 2006). 
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Proposition 1. Governments, donors, and aid agencies must recognize that 
families and communities drive their own recovery. 
Proposition 2. Recovery must promote fairness and equity. 
Proposition 3. Governments must enhance preparedness for future disasters. 
Proposition 4. Local governments must be empowered to manage recovery 
efforts, and donors must devote greater resources to strengthening 
government recovery institutions, especially at the local level. 
Proposition 5. Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on 
good information. 
Proposition 6. The UN, World Bank, and other multilateral agencies must 
clarify their roles and relationships, especially in addressing the early 
stage of a recovery process. 
Proposition 7. The expanding role of NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
Movement carries greater responsibilities for quality in recovery efforts. 
Proposition 8. From the start of recovery operations, government and aid 
agencies must create the conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish. 
Proposition 9. Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agency partnerships that 
move beyond rivalry and unhealthy competition. 
Proposition 10. Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing 
risks and building resilience. 
(Clinton, 2006, p. 3) 
A lengthy discussion of each proposition is not the purpose of this chapter. These propositions 
are somewhat self-explanatory and have been developed from the given circumstances in the 
Asian countries affected by the tsunami and threatened by annual cyclones. However, the 
successes and failures have been openly shared and thus have improved post-disaster efforts in 
the Asian countries, and will hopefully provide improvements to many other disasters globally.  
One noteworthy point to take away from the BBB propositions is the importance of local level 
actors in maintaining long term sustainability of recovery efforts, in addition to the need for 
transparency and good information along with cooperation. The first proposition emphasizes the 
need to understand local customs and consult with the affected communities prior to distributing 
supplies and assistance – speed cannot be put ahead of local ownership. Caution must also be 
used throughout the response phase in order not to re-establish pre-existing patterns of 
vulnerability and discrimination in the affected community (Clinton, 2006). This is one of the 
main strengths of the BBB framework; it aims to use the tragedy of a disaster, whether natural or 
man-made, as an opportunity to create more equity and fairness in a society. In so doing, 
communities and all actors become better prepared for future disasters, hopefully reducing future 




LDCs often require considerations which more-developed countries (MDCs) do not and so 
contextual factors need to be the starting point of a build back better plan (Clinton, 2006). The 
BBB framework, having been derived from a major disaster that occurred in the developing 
world, seeks to incorporate contextual diversity through the empowerment of the local people. 
The local people and agencies are best suited to find context specific results that improve their 
resilience to disasters hence concomitantly assisting the advancement of development in their 
country. 
The BBB propositions can serve as the origin for recovery planning in the post-disaster time 
period and in the face of impending risk. One drawback is that a heavy focus on response and 
recovery can result due to planning challenges surrounding the uncertain magnitude and 
frequency of future natural hazards and the characteristics of populations at-risk (Pelling, 2003). 
Hesitations from governments and individuals regarding mitigation or preparedness investments 
are common, yet, without these efforts, post-disaster activities may never sufficiently improve 
broader development efforts (Pelling, 2003). Thus, although the BBB framework informs this 
thesis, it must not be taken to be an adequate, stand alone DRR tool. 
2.2.5 Governance Conclusion 
These international frameworks illustrate the interaction and overlap of literature on 
development, vulnerability, sustainable livelihoods and urban planning. For example, each list of 
objectives or goals includes a point on partnerships, the environment, equity, education and 
empowerment of local actors. Multitudes of case study research, based on real life events, have 
influenced these guiding principles. It is now well-known that common failures in development 
activities, as in disaster management, can be clearly linked to action plans which omitted these 
points. 
In response to the weaknesses of current indices and in an attempt to generate data for the 
creation of a benchmark for countries to use in their monitoring of DRR initiatives, a Post-
disaster Assessment of Risk Reduction Effectiveness (PDARRE) framework was created for this 
research. To create the evaluation framework, a review of existing international goals for disaster 
risk reduction, mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and sustainable development informed the 
criteria selection. Table 1 is organized to show the various existing priorities as suggested by the 
authors of the structures discussed in this chapter. Key words, concepts and processes have been 
highlighted for their influence on the creation of a comprehensive and specific evaluation.  
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Further discussion of the specific criteria and their justification will arise at the end of this 
chapter; first a discussion of cross-disciplinary concepts of vulnerability will serve to highlight 
related theory and models used for risk reduction and planning. 
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quality of life 
1)Use knowledge, innovation 
and education to build a 
culture of safety and 
resilience at all levels 
1)… recognize that families and 
communities drive their own 
recovery. 
 Promote gender 
equality and empower 
women 
 Foster local 
resiliency and 
responsibility 
2) Reduce the underlying risk 
factors. 
2) Recovery must promote 
fairness and equity 
 Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger 
 Ensure inter- and 
intra-generational 
equity 
3) Strengthen disaster 
preparedness for effective 
response at all levels.   
3) Good recovery must leave 
communities safer by reducing 
risks and building resilience. 
 Reduce child mortality     
 Improve maternal 
health 
    
 Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other 
diseases 





 Maintain and 
enhance 
environmental quality 
4) Identify, assess and 
monitor disaster risks and 
enhance early warning 
3) …leave communities safer... 
    2)…reduce… risk factors  
Partnering Develop a Global 
Partnership for 
Development 
2) Learning and 
experience sharing 
  4) Good recovery planning and 
effective coordination depend on 
good information 
     5) The UN, World Bank, and other 
multilateral agencies must clarify 
their roles and relationships… 
Economic 
Concerns 




 6) From the start of recovery 
operations…create the conditions 
for entrepreneurs to flourish 
     7) Beneficiaries deserve the kind 
of agency partnerships that move 









 2) Recovery must promote 
fairness and equity 
  4) Change in 
operational 
practice 
 5) Ensure that disaster risk 
reduction is a national and 
local priority with a strong 
institutional basis for 
implementation 
8) Governments must enhance 
preparedness for future disasters 
  5)Training and 
technical support 
 4)… disaster risks and 
enhance early warning 
9) Local governments must be 
empowered to manage recovery 
…donors must devote greater 
resources to strengthening 
government recovery 
institutions… 
  6)Development of 
tools 
 2)reduce… risk factors 4)… good information 
  7) Enabling 
environment 
 3) Strengthen disaster 
preparedness ….   
10)The expanding role of NGOs 
and the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
Movement carries greater 
responsibilities for quality in 
recovery efforts 
  1)Awareness …    
Table 1: Relevant International Governance Guidance Structures 
Sources: (United Nations, 2008); (Benson, Twigg, & Rossetto, 2007); (Mileti, 1999); (ISDR, 2005); (Clinton, 2006) 
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2.3 Cross-disciplinary Concepts of Vulnerability 
Natural features can be interpreted in a plethora of ways depending on the disciplinary 
perspective taken. A river can be a source of drinking water to a community development 
specialist; a host for disease to a public health policy researcher; and a source of beauty to the 
landscape ecologist. Each discipline researches a specific attribute that is more relevant to them. 
All of this research is valid, yet findings and interpretations can be quite distinct. 
Natural processes have changed landscapes by creating new features or developing new 
processes. These same features (e.g. volcanoes, earthquakes and rivers) also have great potential 
to damage a landscape and threaten life. For centuries human populations have attempted to 
avoid the harmful impacts these features cause and protect themselves against damages. 
Adaptation to the natural environment is one of the strengths of the human race and it has 
allowed populations to persist for centuries. Nonetheless, natural hazards threaten the existence 
of human populations worldwide, thus research across many disciplines has been stimulated. 
Many scholars (Smith, 2004; Adger, 2006; Hewitt and Burton, 1971; Wisner et. al., 2004; 
McEntire, 2005 etc.) have traced the literature on natural hazards back to when environmental 
engineering or ‗structural‘ approaches were the norm in the 1930s and 1940s. Prior to the 1950‘s 
the dominant view focused on such responses as dams and levees, which were thought to be 
sufficient protection from the hazards the environment generated (McEntire, 2005). However, 
―many mitigation efforts themselves degrade the environment and thus contribute to the next 
disaster‖ (Mileti, 1999, p. 3). The presence of protective structures provided the perception of 
increased safety and has encouraged a greater number of people to settle near these structures. 
After many tragic experiences, engineered solutions were observed to be inadequate and doubts 
emerged about their effectiveness in reducing disaster losses. Scholars such as White and Haas 
(1975) began to explore the human dimensions of hazards in the 1960s.  
Literature on hazards and disasters has grown ―in close association with the applied natural 
and social sciences, but has suffered from problems of fragmentation and over-specialization, as 
well as from insularity that disciplinary studies tend to foster‖ (Alexander, 1993, p. 12). Even so, 
the behavioural paradigm maintains followers in many countries still today.  
Hewitt (1983) identified three thrusts within the behavioural paradigm: i) the use of 
―environmental engineering to contain the extremes of nature‖ ; ii) the use of techniques such as 
field monitoring, modeling and prediction of damaging events aided by advanced technology, 
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such as remote sensing and telemetry, to provide scientific explanations to geophysical 
processes; iii) the prioritization of disaster plans and emergency response by military forces 
because of its benefits to organization and the authority governments achieved when reinstating 
order to damaged communities through this regime (cited in Smith, 2004, emphasis added).  
In addition, Alexander (1993) addresses six schools of thought, of which five fall into the 
behavioural perspective of vulnerability. Geographers studied, for example, human-ecological 
adaptation and adjustment to natural hazards with an emphasis on spatio-temporal distribution of 
hazards, vulnerability and impacts (Alexander, 1993). As information and technologies changed, 
so too did the views and understanding of the hazards populations faced. A third school of 
thought, originating in sociology, examines patterns of human behaviour and the effects of 
disaster on the function and organization of communities. Dynes (1970) and Quarantelli (1978), 
prominent thinkers from sociology and psychology, contend that vulnerability and impacts on 
communities stem from patterns of human behaviour, not just from poverty or environmental 
processes (Alexander, 1993, p. 13).  
Research investigating those people affected by disaster has also been the focus of disaster 
studies. ―Perhaps because of the influence of public health and social work professionals, 
‗socially vulnerable groups‘ tended to be treated as ‗special needs groups‘…passive recipients, 
‗even victims‘‖ (Hewitt, 1997, p. 167 cited in Wisner et al., 2004, p. 14). Recent studies have 
identified that those impacted by disaster are capable people who can play an active role in their 
own recovery. Thus, there is a shifting view, not only of the management actions required for 
successful resurgence after disaster, but also a new understanding of the affected populations. 
During the maturation of the behavioural paradigm critics saw their arguments as 
―materialistic and deterministic interpretations that reflect[ed] undue faith in technology and 
capitalism,‖ while ignoring wider socio-economic forces because of an invalidated focus on the 
role of individual decision-making relating to hazards (Smith, 2004, p. 5). Studies addressing 
broader time scales and wider geographic processes were included to understand the context and 
society in which individuals live and operate (Armstrong, 2000 cited in McEntire, 2005; Mileti, 
1999; Adger, 2006). Despite this criticism, each of these disciplines made contributions to 
understanding the various forces and processes which lead to disasters and have therefore been 
helpful in providing insight for future decision-making processes. Most notably, the need to 
consider contextual factors at all stages of disaster management was derived from the 
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understanding that human interactions with their environment can exacerbate hazardous 
environmental processes. 
Understanding human interactions with environmental processes is a significant part of the 
decision-making process for disaster managers. Etkin (1999) describes a society‘s response as 
having three overlapping activities of ‗response and recovery‘, ‗mitigation‘ and ‗preparedness‘ 
which together affect the community‘s vulnerability to future hazards. Also, these activities are 
part of a larger interactive system made up of the physical and social forces (cited in Pelling, 
2003, p. 75-56). An important development in the literature from the 1980s arose from the 
United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO
6
) (1982) describing disasters as a sequence of 
events. This chain of events was as follows: 
Hazard    Risk     Threat  Disaster    Aftermath 
(Alexander , 1993). 
This chain coincides very clearly to what is now the universally accepted ―disaster management 
cycle‖: 
 Preparedness  Mitigation  Response  Reconstruction/Recovery  
This cycle was first developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 
United States in the 1980s but has since been adopted by the International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (ISDR) when it was incorporated into the Yokohama Strategy and Plan for a Safer 
World in 1994 (ISDR, 2005).  
Historic management frameworks, as the FEMA name implies, focused primarily on the 
emergency response phase of the cycle. Behavioral scholars have encouraged decision makers to 
move away from a strictly response-based approach toward a process involving all stages of the 
disaster management cycle. Similarly, disaster management theory has come to include this 
integrated way of thinking to address the diversity of actors and risks which require 
consideration because ―prevention of disasters has to come from the bottom up, as well as from 
the top down‖ (Wisner, 2000). 
The disaster management cycle can be thought of as two smaller cycles which operate 
together and interact with a socio-ecological system. The success of disaster management 
activities rely heavily on a strong response and reconstruction phase (relief), however without 
                                         
6
 UNDRO is now know as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
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proper preparedness and mitigation (prevention), the relief system will be quickly overwhelmed 
(see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Relationship of Disaster Management System within Socio-ecological System 
(Developed for this research) 
In addition to the behavioural paradigm, the body of hazards scholarship also includes on-
going research in the science and engineering disciplines – this research did continue alongside 
the ―human aspects‖ school of thought. The sixth discipline, according to Alexander (1993), is 
the ―technocratic‖ school of thought. Disciplines in this body of scholarship examine, for 
example, geology, geomorphology, volcanology, and the engineering solutions that can develop 
from careful measurement of the natural processes that create disasters. New technologies and 
developments led to breakthroughs in construction techniques that continue to improve structural 
responses to disaster. The post-disaster context allows engineers to better understand the 
interactions between the built environment they have designed and the natural processes which 
provoke disasters. Although disasters result in great losses, they also provide opportunities for 
learning no matter the discipline. 
Ecology research has investigated the system dynamics which produce disaster. Systems 
ecologists (e.g. Holling, 1973; Adger, 2006; Walker & Salt, 2006) converse over similar 
concepts, dynamics, and variables as they seek to understand changes and stressors operating 
within a defined socio-ecological system.  Thresholds and stability in a changing environment as 
a result of human activities are examined within the nested hierarchies of socio-ecological 












not refer to radical changes as ‗disasters‘, the concepts are related and improved understanding 
of these systems will indeed enhance decision-making relating to natural hazard events.  
Systems thinking, especially the notions of resilience, offers an alternative perspective on the 
world and contests practices rooted in concepts which predate systems thinking. ―Resilience 
thinking challenges the widely held notions about stability and resistance to change implicit in 
risk and hazard management policies around the world‖ (Adger et. al. 2005 cited in Berkes, 
2007, p. 287). For example, fire prevention policies can increase vulnerability to large and 
disastrous fires by inhibiting natural fire cycles. Whereas, policy prescriptions from resilience 
thinking would favor creating disturbances (small fires) in order to mimic the natural fire regime 
in the fire-driven landscape mosaic, along with requiring the removal and recycling the fuel load 
accumulated on the forest floor (Berkes, 2007). This resilience thinking approach to policy is 
significantly different from the recent policy prescriptions which were based on stability and 
resistance thinking. As this example explains, resilience thinking examines the entire socio-
ecological system and seeks solutions which incorporate interacting processes thus leaving the 
entire system more resilient to stress and change. 
Scholars researching disasters in LDCs acquired a slightly different interpretation of the 
primary challenges for managers by identifying different origins of disaster. ―Human 
vulnerability – a characteristic of the poorest and the most disadvantaged people – emerged as an 
important concept‖ for these radical scholars in the late 1980s (Blaikie et al., 1994 cited in 
Smith, 2007, p. 4). Thus, the link between underdevelopment, poverty and the occurrence of 
disasters became more disconcerting. These ―structuralist‖ scholars were influenced by 
dependency theory and economists such as Marx, who ―felt that conflict-based relations among 
economic classes determined development‖ (McEntire, 2004, p. 194). As a result, it was 
acknowledged that often the impacts of disaster could be traced to much more deeply-rooted 
problems in society and, therefore, successful disaster mitigation would require a fundamental 
shift in the distribution of wealth and power (see Blaikie et al., 1994; Hoffman & Oliver-Smith, 
2002; etc). Analyses identified that disasters occurred because of characteristics inherent to 
society and disaster victims cannot be blamed for their misfortunes when effective responses are 
limited by access to resources (Smith, 2004, p. 6).  
Anthropologists also studied ‗marginalization syndrome‘ and the role of disaster in the socio-
economic development and environmental transformation. Marginalization syndrome research 
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investigates migration and settlement relocation programs (Oliver-Smith, 1991), and the need for 
the involvement of advocates for the most disadvantaged groups, including elderly, disabled, 
ethnic minorities, women and children (often worse affected by disaster than men and adults) 
(Oliver-Smith, 1991; Cutter, 1995; Peacock et. al, 1997 cited in Comfort, et al., 1999). Global 
socio-economic processes, through time, have a tendency for marginalization of communities, 
causing environmental change or overexploitation of natural resources (e.g. deforestation) 
(Batterbury et al., 1997). Poverty in LDCs can encourage marginalized groups to further exploit 
the resources which also serve as natural protection from hazards. Research on marginalized 
groups, vulnerability and environmental change now encourages a ‗hybrid‘ model of both 
sociological and physical research when seeking the sources of environmental transformation in 
LDCs (Batterbury et al., 1997). 
Similarly, entitlements theory is important to the modern understanding of vulnerability 
(Pelling, 2003). Household entitlement assets include: labour, savings, land, cattle, goods, 
housing and social support; thus the exchange value for these assets relative to the price of 
essential market goods (food, water, shelter) can help determine a household‘s level of 
vulnerability (e.g. Sen, 1981 cited in Wisner et al., 2004).  
That households can fail in spite of wider economic conditions reveals how individual 
vulnerability operates with a degree of independence from structural conditions such as 
poverty. However, poverty and vulnerability frequently overlap and it is the poor who are 
also vulnerable who will suffer the most from environmental stresses and risk (Pelling, 
2003, p. 52).  
Entitlements theory, also known as sustainable livelihoods, addresses an important factor of 
vulnerability from the perspective of poverty reduction actions; therefore, a more thorough 
dialogue about the topic follows later in this chapter. 
2.4 Disaster Risk Reduction in Practice 
The discussion thus far has summarized some of the major scholarship in the literature on 
natural hazards and vulnerability. Now practical applications of this literature will be explored. 
Scholars have developed systematic methods through which to measure vulnerability and 
identify differences in coping capacity, adaptation and adjustment in a variety of contexts. 
Several models for measuring vulnerability, risk and impacts from natural hazard events exist. 
Birkmann (2006) identifies ten such models within the first chapter of his book Measuring 
Vulnerability to Natural Hazards, and surely there are more frameworks that could be created 
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with distinct, new areas of focus. Wisner et al (2004) note that although metrics are necessary, 
―these indicators are not sufficient, and we are aware that they tend to under-emphasise the 
cultural, the psychosomatic and the subjective aspects of disaster impact‖ (Perry and Mushkatel 
1986; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Johns 1999; Tuan 1979 cited on p.15). Nonetheless, 
models offer useful decision-making tools and generate an increased understanding of possible 
outcomes by developing scenarios and elucidating trends. Elaboration of specific models for 
vulnerability analysis, ranging from the Pressure and Release Model through urban risk 
reduction planning, will identify some of the primary factors that differ across case studies and 
will enlighten points of consideration for the evaluation framework to be discussed in  the next 
chapter.  
2.4.1 Pressure and Release (PAR) Model 
The Pressure and Release Model is a frequently referenced model in vulnerability analysis 
(Few, 2006; Adger, 2006; Cannon, 2008; Turner et al., 2003; Smit & Wandel, 2006; etc.). The 
first version was created in 1994, and in 2004 a second edition updated the original by including 
criticisms and answering questions other scholars posed to the authors (Wisner, et al., 2004). The 
Pressure and Release (PAR) Model allows decision makers to identify opposing pressures that 
together create risk. On one side, the hazard pressures, both natural and human-induced are 
identified and opposing these are the causes and pressures that interact to make people 
vulnerable to these hazards (See Figure 8).  
Starting with the ‗Progression of Vulnerability‘ side of the diagram, the root causes are 
spatially or temporally distant factors and are also bound up in the ideology and beliefs within 
the local society and the world economy (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 52). Many of these root causes 
developed generations ago based on the values and beliefs of ancestral residents from the country 
in question. Despite these distant roots, historic values permeate into current cultures and affect 
present day social practices. For example, ―to understand the motors shaping trends in 
urbanization and disaster risk, it is necessary to look beyond population statistics to changes in 
the form, composition and governance of human settlements‖ (United Nations Human 





Figure 8: Pressure and Release (PAR) Model 
Source: (Wisner et al., 2004)  
The PAR model allows decision makers to investigate beyond the superficial cultural traits 
(e.g. littering or drying young trees for firewood) and better understand how the individuals 
perceive and respond to the natural threats of their environment. Undoubtedly there are a variety 
of perceptions of the natural hazards in a region as well as varying views on the severity of the 
risks. The differing opinions about the risks can vary based on the length of time a person or 
family has resided in the region or the type of livelihood activities in which one participates.  
To better understand the temporal relation between cognition of risk and mitigation efforts, 
research has been done on social memory. Berkes (2007) discusses adaptive capacity as a 
function of human agency, including the function of individuals, leaders and institutions as they 
influence outcomes (p. 287). Collectively, a community‘s capacity to manage resilience 
determines thresholds within a socio-ecological system based on their ability create a ―social 
memory‖ by learning from a society‘s response to previous crises (Adger et al. 2005 cited in 
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Berkes, 2007). Thus, root causes of disaster can be linked to a multitude of factors, many of 
which have long been accepted in a given society.  
The research done to create the PAR model determined that government decision makers, 
NGO practitioners and community leaders cannot improve vulnerability until they better 
understand the pressures that combine to create a context of risk (Wisner et al., 2004). Social 
processes, economic goals and political will independently operate in all communities, however, 
individuals within these groups can act as an obstacle to vulnerability reduction if root causes are 
not distinguished and understood. Inclusion of community members is acknowledged as an 
integral part of discerning root causes (Wisner et al., 2004). 
Similarly, ―unsafe conditions are the specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population 
is expressed in time and space in conjunction with a hazard‖ (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 55). This 
means that the types of work available to the population, food entitlements and initial level of 
well-being all combine to generate safe, or unsafe, living conditions.  
The PAR model is a simple, yet clear, model for identifying sources of risk and vulnerability 
within individual case studies. The magnifying glass in the centre of the diagram leads to further 
analysis in what the authors call the Access Model. The Access Model is an assessment tool to 
improve understanding of the dynamic social relations and structure of a community in order to 
understand household level decision-making, and is closely related to the ‗sustainable 
livelihoods‘ approach developed by the United Kingdom‘s Department for International 
Development (DFID). 
2.4.2 Sustainable Livelihoods 
Sustainable livelihoods is a concept developed in the early 1990s to better understand and 
address poverty, especially in LDCs (Chambers & Conway, 1992). Originally it focused on the 
livelihoods of the rural poor, however, in recent years research in this area has broadened and 
established applicability for analysis on poverty elimination in urban areas as well (Rakodi & 
Lloyd-Jones, 2002). The link between sustainable livelihoods and disasters is very clear with 
reference to the sustainable livelihoods framework developed by the DFID (see Figure 9). Not 
only are there similarities in the vocabulary employed by both the livelihoods and disasters 
literature (e.g. stresses/pressure, shocks, context), but the objectives, processes and pressures are 
also often parallel. The objective of the livelihoods framework is to generate resilience to the 
shocks, trends and/or seasonal shifts that deepen poverty and, thereby reduce their vulnerability 
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and work toward eliminating poverty (DFID, 1999). Disaster management theory also grapples 
with preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery from varying natural hazard ―shocks‖ and 
attempts, where possible, to achieve sustainable development goals.  
 
Figure 9: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
Source: (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 2002, p. 9) 
In practice, the sustainable livelihoods framework has some attributes that could be applied in 
the post-disaster context or to address risks. This framework has been applied by many 
international development agencies and although each agency developed the livelihoods idea 
around a different part of livelihoods, the basic concerns are the same (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 
2002). Early works on livelihoods came from a discussion paper by Chambers and Conway 
(1992) where some fundamental characteristics were proposed – equity, sustainability and 
capability. This document draws on work from several disciplines to discuss measurement of 
livelihood indicators and quantification of intergenerational equity, and questioned what could 
make rural livelihoods more sustainable.  
The central part of Figure 9 is of specific importance to the study of vulnerability to natural 
hazards. The division of ‗capital‘ into different categories allows governments or aid agencies to 
understand the areas where investment would be most helpful, and thus improves the 
effectiveness of foreign investment funding (Chambers & Conway, 1992).  This understanding 
can also be applied to the application of disaster risk reduction or disaster response funding. With 
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a greater appreciation for the weaknesses a community has (e.g. what could make them 
vulnerable) investment monies can be directed to those assets which need strengthening.  
An important part of the sustainable livelihoods framework is the involvement of local 
residents in decision-making. Public participation generates solutions which not only address the 
problems from the perspective of those affected, but also empowers those affected and ensures 
their resilience to future events (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 2002; Chambers & Conway, 1992). The 
argument for participation links to the need for an integrated approach as found in many 
development and natural resources management fields. However, the livelihoods link is 
specifically useful to the disaster management discussion because, as the PAR model discusses, 
unsafe conditions are a result of dynamic pressures which serve as catalysts for problems rooted 
in a social structure. Therefore, understanding the sources of capital, along with the contextual 
factors that make up a society will improve vulnerability assessments and post-disaster recovery 
planning efforts. This understanding is best gained in consultation with the community at-risk. 
The concept of sustainability seeks to ensure inter- and intra-generational equity. In that way, 
sustainable livelihoods can consider how disaster risk reduction efforts today impact the 
individuals and communities of the future. Discounting is one method of cost-benefit analysis, 
taken from economics. Discounting considers social costs but generally gives a lower present 
value to benefits and costs the further into the future you look (Chambers & Conway, 1992). In 
order to maintain inter-generational equity and to account for increasing population numbers and 
greater pressure and competition for livelihoods (assuming current population growth continues), 
the future present values should be higher than current costs and benefits (Chambers & Conway, 
1992). How effectively a manager measures present value in future time periods can greatly 
affect the outcome of a natural hazard event. Government decision makers are challenged to 
address current concerns and priorities, while also calculating losses from unknown future 
events. Uncertainty, limited financial resources, and corruption are the reality under which LDC 
risk reduction programs operate and result in higher present values for current time periods. The 
fundamental incongruence of economic priorities (those that advocate for future citizens and 
their livelihoods) and political priorities (where politicians aim to please and appease the current 
electorate) makes risk reduction planning a difficult balancing act. 
Hazards theorists wrestle with the management challenges that arise from a growing global 
population, especially now that the majority of people are living in urban areas. The competition 
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for livelihoods feeds a cycle of poverty for some, while assisting others, often those with a good 
supply of capital resources, to overcome the challenges of poverty (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 
2002). The link between vulnerability and capital supply is quite simple. Those with resources 
are better able to build stronger housing, have the ability to purchase land and resources, work 
together with neighbours to rebuild their homes after interruption or may simply avoid high-risk 
areas in the first place because of access to better information (Chambers & Conway, 1992). The 
research done on livelihoods has allowed disaster managers to better understand who the worst 
affected are and why they are not able to prevent losses. Although sustainable livelihoods theory 
is not specific to disasters, is readily applicable to a variety of hazards, even complex hazard 
events (those where multiple hazards impact simultaneously). 
As with other literature on sustainability, there is contention on the effective measurement of 
‗sustainable‘ livelihoods. In addition, contextual differences across case studies mean that 
individual capabilities differ, therefore, a universal prescription to improve poverty levels has 
been impossible. Despite challenges, international development agencies such as CARE 
International, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the World Bank and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have all built on the information generated from 
DFID discussion papers (such as the Chambers and Conway paper of 1992) to run programmes 
geared at creating more sustainable livelihoods in many LDCs (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 2002, p. 
xv). Sustainability, when paired with disaster management, can help to inform communities of 
their risks, strengths and overall better prepare them to deal with the many types of challenges 
they face. 
Sustainability concepts have been debated in the hazards literature as well. The resistance and 
resilience paradigms of the 1990s proved to be important for the evolution of natural hazards 
literature and the understanding of vulnerability (McEntire, 2005). The resistance paradigm was 
created in response to the concern for growing losses, but critics found it to imply that disasters 
can be eliminated and that preparedness, response and recovery would no longer be required 
(McEntire, 2005). The resilience paradigm was therefore developed to capture these 
shortcomings as it has a broader, more flexible association within hazard mitigation. However, 
some concern arose over the use of ‗resilient‘ as well. The dictionary definition of resilient 
asserts that a community has ―the ability to recover from and adjust easily‖, which implies that a 
disaster will indeed occur (Geis, 2000, p. 152 cited in McEntire, 2005, p. 209). Because of the 
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shortcomings of both these viewpoints a substantial following developed in the USA for a new 
wave of research that combines disaster studies and sustainable development. These schools of 
thought took valuable lessons from past thinking and informed the popular discourse of 
Sustainable Hazard Mitigation. 
2.4.3 Sustainable Hazard Mitigation Framework 
Sustainable Hazard Mitigation, as designed by Mileti (1999) was created out of an analysis of 
disaster response in the USA. The author‘s evaluation of current practices determined that the 
current FEMA emergency management plan was inadequate because it focused primarily on the 
capacity for a strong response in emergency situations. The Integrated Emergency Management 
plan was cyclical and responsibilities were delegated to local, state and federal actors, however, 
the Mileti questioned if this framework was truly reducing losses. Other authors (e.g 
McLoughlin, 1985; Cutter, 2003) also question the loss reduction results FEMA was achieving. 
Not surprisingly, ‗sustainability‘ came up in this evaluation, as it did in the livelihoods debate, as 
an important concept that should be part of a disaster management scheme. 
Current practice, and specifically sustainable hazard mitigation, calls attention to the early 
stages of the disaster management cycle and suggests a redirection of the focus away from ―ad 
hoc, disaster-driven, and reactive systems and policies‖ (Cutter et al., 2008, p. 601). Earlier 
assessments in the 1970s found that ―pre-disaster planning can save lives and injuries, limit 
property damage, and minimize disruptions, enabling communities to recover more quickly‖ 
(Mileti, 1999, p. 10). Along with this viewpoint came a change in the interpretation of what 
‗recovery‘ really entails. Recovery went from being a linear process of stages and products to a 
process of decision-making and interaction among stakeholders (Mileti, 1999).  
Mileti (1999) stressed that disaster risks should be considered prior to a disaster event where 
response is needed. He also questioned then-current strategies for managing hazards; which he 
referred to as ―the traditional planning model: study the problem, implement one solution, and 
move on to the next problem‖ (Mileti, 1999, p. 2). To improve on current disaster approaches, 
sustainable hazard mitigation ―links wise management of natural resources with local economic 
and social resiliency, viewing hazard mitigation as an integral part of a much larger context‖ 
(Mileti, 1999, p. 2). 
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Mileti (1999) developed the following guidelines to improve hazard mitigation: 
 Adopt a global systems perspective 
 Accept responsibility for hazards and disasters 
 Anticipate ambiguity and change 
 Reject short-term thinking 
 Account for social forces 
 Embrace sustainable development principles 
(Mileti, 1999, pp. 12-13) 
These guidelines link back to complementary literature and findings. Complex systems literature 
allows decision makers to understand multiple processes which take place within a defined 
system. Much like the PAR model‘s ability to identify opposing pressures that generate risk, the 
sustainable hazard mitigation framework chooses to use systems thinking to comprehend 
multiple processes. Concepts taken from sustainable development include equity and 
preservation to ensure acceptable quality of life in present and future generations. All of these 
fields of research are related and by integrating concepts through the above listed guidelines it 
will be possible to create a hazard mitigation planning model that is sustainable. Mileti‘s notion 
for the future will involve all actors working together to generate strong leadership from state 
and national governments while using local experts and residents to complete the planning 
process (Mileti, 1999, p. 6).  
Hazard mitigation is often done within the bureaucratic confines of a single government body 
(e.g. the ministry of environment or natural resources). Nevertheless, there are other decisions 
being made outside that entity that affect vulnerability. Recognition of natural hazards in the 
early stages of urban development, infrastructure distribution or other construction projects can 
mediate vulnerability concerns before they threaten lives. For this reason, cooperation and 
coordination, including clear roles and responsibilities, are strongly encouraged (Clinton, 2006). 
2.4.4 Urban Planning and Hazards 
While contemplating vulnerability and livelihoods in an urban setting one might question how 
and why these problems began in the first place. Many modern cities in the global South were 
developed by settlers based on perceived safety and convenient access to specific resources, as 
was the case during colonization in North America. These distant foundations now face 
economic and political pressures, as they did historically, although advantages for defense, 
transportation and political considerations often trump ecological threats (especially if only 
certain portions of the settlement are at present risk) (Hardoy, Mitlin, & Satterthwaite, 2001). As 
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populations grew larger, professional urban planners aided in the organization of such 
settlements, however, if flooding and other threats were not easily mitigated in situ, some 
communities were left at-risk. With rapid growth from rural-urban migration, the ever-pressing 
need for effective hazard planning was recognized. Furthermore, ―it is in the South that 
urbanization processes are intensifying at a really disconcerting rate‖ (Stevens, Coupe, & Mitlin, 
2006, p. 1).  
Urban planning literature recognizes that ―urbanization affects disasters just as profoundly as 
disaster can affect urbanization‖ (Pelling, 2003, p. 7). In response, there are recent efforts to 
address vulnerability concerns from the planning perspective. Nonetheless, ―for good reason, a 
physical science approach is often preferred by urban planners… [because these approaches] are 
visible and can unambiguously show the electorate and potential investors that the government is 
responding to risk‖ (Pelling, 2003, p. 49). As discussed earlier, these physical or structural 
approaches have been ineffective for loss reduction due to improper hazard risk estimates or 
changing land values associated with the construction of a protective structure. Consequently, 
new and creative methods to improve loss reduction, whilst maintaining the status quo, are 
desired. 
Formerly, piecemeal approaches to development were the standard, and inefficiencies in the 
administrative infrastructure have further exacerbated vulnerability (Pelling, 2003). The manner 
through which management of urban expansion and development has occurred has a strong 
correlation with the amount and extent of risk present, and also impacts the groups who are most 
at-risk (Hardoy, Mitlin, & Satterthwaite, 2001). Therefore, just as other disciplines acknowledge 
the need for cooperation and multi-disciplinarity, planners have conceded to the need to work 
together with other actors.  
―Most frequently, [urban] disasters are linked to a breakdown or blockage in communication 
between scientists, politicians, emergency services and the public‖ (Pelling, 2003, p. 34). 
Challenges to communication stem from the varying scales at which governments, NGO‘s and 
community-based organizations operate. NGOs often mark their ―turf‖ to receive credit and see 
the fruits of their labour in select communities (Stevens, Coupe, & Mitlin, 2006). For example, 
hazard education programs may be offered by several NGOs in one country, in addition to an 
independent government program. This redundant programming can result in uneven, 
disconnected levels of awareness within and across communities. Thus, best results occur when 
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boundaries for program delivery match an existing political boundary. Finally, efforts to reduce 
poverty and improve livelihoods achieve the best results when government support is gained in 
early stages of planning (Stevens, Coupe, & Mitlin, 2006). This discourages unhealthy 
competition for the well-being of all parties and the community. 
Hazards that threaten urban areas can differ from rural threats, in terms of exposure, scope 
and type. ―Although ‗natural‘ disasters are distinguished from ‗human-induced‘ disasters, in 
cities, most of the deaths and injuries from the natural disasters are not ‗natural‘ in that they 
occur because of inadequate attention to disaster-prevention, disaster-mitigation and disaster-
preparedness‖ (Hardoy, Mitlin, & Satterthwaite, 2001, p. 120). This is likely the case in rural 
contexts as well. Nevertheless, the wider distribution, reduced concentration and lower 
organization level of settlements and people in the rural context makes it more difficult to 
develop plans, while simultaneously leaving a greater timeframe for response in times of 
emergency. High concentrations of people in urban areas, where the landscape and threats are 
arguably more continuous, accentuates the necessity for a disaster plan which is specific to a 
mosaic of risk areas and which focuses on the prevention, mitigation and preparedness needs of a 
diverse population.  
Hardoy, Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2001) conclude with six aspects that they feel should be on 
the ―new environmental agenda for urban centres‖ (p. 384).  
1) institutional shift within governments and new roles of aid agencies  
2) a shift from improving urban management to ‗good governance‘ 
3) a more effective framework of support for citizens‘ groups and NGOs within more 
accountable and transparent government structures 
4) a more explicit linking of ‗environmental improvement‘ with poverty reduction 
5) locally driven agendas within each urban centre that respond to the specifics of each 
location, society and culture within national frameworks that reward good ‗global‘ 
practices and 
6) new professional attitudes   (Hardoy, Mitlin, & Satterthwaite, 2001, p. 384) 
These six items have a striking resemblance to the ideas found in the section Landmark 
International Structures earlier in this chapter. Concerns for ―good governance‖, changing roles 
of aid agencies to empower local governments and a need to integrate poverty reduction with 
―environmental improvement‖ strategies are some items to note (Hardoy, Mitlin, & 
Satterthwaite, 2001, p. 384). Since the beginning of this century, academics across disciplines, 
and even those dealing with distinct aspects of life in LDCs, are drawing similar conclusions 
about the way forward, demonstrates that now is the time to act and put identified lessons into 
action to start improving the lives, livelihoods and the vulnerability of our world‘s poor.  
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Sustainable livelihoods research may be criticized as being too comprehensive – solutions are 
difficult to find when myriad processes and structures are perpetuating a given circumstance. 
Integrated Urban Development complements sustainable livelihoods research because it 
recognizes that poverty in urban areas is multifaceted, but differs in that it concentrates on the 
relationship between financial, social and physical capital (Stevens, Coupe, & Mitlin, 2006). For 
example, NGO-supported income generation activities can face a range of external forces (e.g. 
market prices, economic downturn, etc.), and therefore collective activities (social capital) 
become vital to the ability of individuals to continue improving their quality of life (Stevens, 
Coupe, & Mitlin, 2006, p. 6). In the same way, one might consider risk reduction activities to 
focus on the relationship of natural, social and financial capitals. For example, when the 
exploration of the natural hazards facing a community are compared to the social and financial 
resources available to prepare, mitigate and/or respond to potential impacts.  
Thus far in this chapter, challenges for decision makers have been identified, methods for 
distinguishing and understanding the innumerable processes that generate and perpetuate 
vulnerability and, complementary fields of influence have enlightened the discussion. This 
chapter ends with a summary of the place-based model for understanding community 
vulnerability to disasters from Cutter et al. (2003) and other measurement tools for social 
vulnerability. Recognizing that substantial research attention has been devoted to understanding 
the biophysical dimensions of disaster vulnerability, Cutter et al. (2003) argue that much less 
attention has been given to the social conditions that make people and places more or less 
susceptible to environmental hazards (cited in Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008, p. 272). In 
response to that gap in the literature, this thesis will investigate the social vulnerabilities at the 
community level. Although it is recognized that wider socio-ecological systems have many 
vulnerable elements, it is the social vulnerability that truly determines the economic impacts and 
number lives lost to a disastrous event.  
2.4.5 Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) Model 
Even with decades of research on vulnerability and hazards, the creation of metrics, and 
models for vulnerability identification, significant vulnerability reduction policy commitments 
are lacking in both developed and developing countries. Cutter et al. (2008) developed the 
disaster resilience of place (DROP) model ―to improve comparative assessments of disaster 
resilience at the local or community level‖ (p. 598). 
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The DROP model has in it several implicit assumptions. First of all, it applies to both rapid 
onset and slow onset hazards and although it was primarily designed for natural hazards, it can 
be applied to other crises such as terrorism or technological hazards (Cutter et al., 2008). This 
model was designed to apply at the community level in contrast to other models which apply to 
macro, meso- or sectoral scales. Third, this model focuses on the social resilience of places with 
recognition that other sources of vulnerability are inextricably linked to social processes. This 
model has integrated resilience thinking by interpreting a community as a socio-ecological 
system with social and environmental processes inseparable (Cutter, et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 10: Schematic representation of the disaster resilience of place (DROP) model 
Source: (Cutter, et al., 2008) 
The DROP diagram begins with antecedent conditions including the internal processes at the 
local, community scale (smaller triangle) and external factors (larger triangle) that come together 
to create a given socio-ecological system (Cutter, et al., 2008). These inherent characteristics are 
then enhanced (represented by the + sign) or attenuated (- sign) based on the actions and event 
characteristics (frequency, magnitude, rate of onset etc of the hazard). When a community has 
pre-determined coping responses, the impacts can vary in intensity (i.e. be more or less 
disastrous). These pre-determined capacities also influence the ‗degree of recovery‘ because a 
stronger set of coping mechanisms will allow the community to absorb more of the impacts. 
When the absorptive capacity is exceeded the community may respond by developing adaptive 
resilience strategies. One such strategy, ‗social learning‘, can be expressed through policy 
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making and pre-event preparedness improvements which are then incorporated into the next 
event‘s ―antecedent conditions‖ and the cycle continues (Cutter, et al., 2008).  
The final section of the DROP model determines the range of recovery based on the adaptive 
capacity threshold. When the threshold is not exceeded, there is high recovery potential. When 
the absorptive capacity is exceeded, the adaptive resilience will determine whether there is a high 
or low rate of recovery. Ultimately, ―both the degree of recovery and the potential knowledge 
gained from the adaptive resilience process influence the state of the social, natural, and built 
environment systems and the resultant antecedent conditions for the next event‖ (Cutter, et al., 
2008, p. 603). There is feedback in the system as well and this is shown through the mitigation 
and preparedness modifications that occur from one event to the next. Social learning has a 
positive influence on mitigation and preparedness improvements. Cutter et al. (2008) distinguish 
between ―learning‖ in terms of social resilience and ―lessons learned‖. ―Lessons learned‖ focuses 
on what went wrong or right in the debriefings immediately following the event (i.e. 
identification of lessons), while ―learning‖ is an ongoing process of incorporating changes into a 
program or institution and includes a monitoring or performance evaluation component. 
There are some similarities between the PAR model and the DROP model because both 
analyze vulnerability. Both require collection of data in order to measure ―antecedent conditions‖ 
or ―root causes of vulnerability‖. The feedbacks in the PAR model are emphasized in the Access 
Model under the magnifying glass, but can also be applied to the community level as they are in 
the DROP model. Most notably, both models assume social, natural and built environments as 
interconnected and therefore base their analysis on a single socio-ecological system. The DROP 
model connects complex adaptive systems theory to hazards literature in order to draw 
connections between adaptation and resilience which has been lumped in with ―mitigation‖ by 
other hazards scholars. A strength of the DROP model is, consequently, that this linkage 
improves their model‘s ability to compare assessments at the local level across time and in 
similar contextual case studies. 
Although the PAR model has a longer history, the DROP model has incorporated some 
aspects which enhance its appeal. First, the diagram has no underlying parts so analysis is 
straightforward. Second, although somewhat figurative and not quantitative, the use of scales for 
absorptive capacity and degree of recovery is a helpful measure for comprehending how pre-
disaster resilience affects the post-disaster outcome. This understanding can then aid the 
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allocation of funding and direct focus in the immediate disaster recovery and for longer term 
planning. This discussion does not aim to encourage the use of one model over the others, but 
rather to demonstrate how understanding of socio-ecological systems has changed the 
interpretation of vulnerability and disaster management. 
2.5 Vulnerability Indices 
In socio-ecological systems many interacting processes take place simultaneously. Some of 
these processes are more easily quantified than others. Vulnerability is a complex phenomenon 
resulting from these interacting processes and is therefore a challenge to measure and monitor. 
Many authors (e.g. Cutter, 1996; Hewitt 1998; Oliver-Smith 1996; Wisner et al. 2004) have 
discussed the influence of social and economic stratification on vulnerability. The inclusion of 
―social vulnerability [into management regimes] encourages the framing of disasters as social 
phenomena moderated by the existing social structure‖ (Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008, p. 
273). To quantify social vulnerability, a Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) was developed by 
Cutter et al. (2003). The outcomes of this evaluation can ―facilitate an understanding of 
geographic contours of regional disasters‖ in the United States (Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 
2008, p. 273). The SoVI is a place-based model considering a range of variables and 
demographic data ranging from density of the built environment, housing stock and tenancy, 
racial and ethnic composition etc. (Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008). As previously noted, 
resources and assets influence one‘s ability to maintain their livelihoods and in the wake of 
disaster understanding the supply of those resources is ultimately helpful for discerning social 
vulnerability. 
Other indicators exist for the measurement of vulnerability; the most common being the 
vulnerability and capacity assessment (VCA) technique used in the preparation of a disaster 
response plan, and the needs assessment checklist used immediately following disaster impacts. 
Some authors feel, however, that social, economic and demographic characteristics, collected via 
VCAs and needs assessments, do not isolate appropriate variables and characteristics to 
accurately measure community-level vulnerability (King & MacGregor, 2000). The problem 
with the use of such characteristics relates to the bias in generating planning and mitigation 
strategies based on databases constructed by the very government decision makers who will then 
use them.  
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A variety of indices have been created to measure vulnerability or humanitarian response 
(Manuel-Navarrete, Javier-Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007; Hidalgo & López-Claros, 2007). While 
these indices provide a database of information that can identify ―hot spots‖ of vulnerability, 
they also have their weaknesses, 1) indicator selection is often supported by untested 
assumptions about the factors and processes leading to vulnerability; 2) it is difficult to measure 
the complexity and variability of multiple factors and stressors across places; and 3) their focus 
is often on too small a portion of the human-environment interactions (Manuel-Navarrete, Javier-
Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007). 
Additionally, caution must be taken when comparing rankings across similar indices. There 
are numerous reasons why an advantaged community according to one index is not necessarily 
the opposite of a disadvantaged one on a seemingly opposite index. Melick (1996) found this 
disconnect when comparing rankings from a vulnerability index to those of a resilience index: a 
highly vulnerable community was not necessarily lacking resilience (King & MacGregor, 2000, 
p. 53). This brings about the importance of definition – recall that Cutter et. al. (2008) defines 
vulnerability and resilience as overlapping, not opposing terms. 
Regardless which indicator is used, ―the census remains the primary source of easily available 
social indicators‖ however, even with up-to-date data, these indicators are of limited assistance. 
While some scholars have advocated for improved indicators and more appropriate use of such 
indicators, other authors suggest there is ―limited development and application of accessible 
Social Vulnerability tools and methodologies‖ (Davis, 2003, p. 5). The primary obstacle is one of 
taking the “useful” information from the literature and making it “useable” and practical by 
defining the ‗who‘, ‗when‘, ‗where‘, ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions so action can be taken to reduce 
identified vulnerability (Davis, 2003). Davis (2003) offers a list of hypotheses as to why 
governments and NGOs seem to avoid applying the SoVI that are available. Some of these 
explanations include: lack of any agreed set of indicators of social vulnerability, lack of social 
scientists to conduct assessments, or reliance on hazard mapping as the sum total of vulnerability 
assessment (p. 5-6). Consequently, social vulnerability seems to be a growing interest among 
academics and disaster managers alike. 
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2.6 Monitoring and Evaluation in Disaster Management 
Several scholars (Godschalk et al., 1999; Cutter, 2003; McLoughlin, 1985; Mileti, 1999) etc.) 
have critically assessed disaster policy in the USA. These assesments aim to improve disaster 
management, reduce losses and increase awareness about the risks of living on fragile or unsafe 
ground.  These authors tend to agree on the need to improve mitigation strategies in the USA. 
Therefore, much research has been done on the complex processes that underlie one‘s motivation 
for adopting and implementing mitigation strategies. ―The overwhelming scientific evidence 
[shows] that people typically are unaware of the hazards they face, underestimate those of which 
they are aware, overestimate their ability to cope when disaster strikes, often blame others for 
their losses, underutilize pre-impact hazard strategies, and rely heavily on emergency relief when 
the need arises‖ (Mileti, 1999, p. 136-7). Hazard managers and planners have used experimental 
methods as they developed good practices for disaster management, however, monitoring and 
evaluation of the use of these techniques is lacking in both the USA and elsewhere.  
All types of projects which have goals in the short- and the longer-term require some form of 
monitoring and evaluation to determine if the project goals have in fact been reached; disaster 
management projects are no exception. Actually, due to the dynamic nature of the natural and 
social environment in which disaster projects are executed, the project must become a continuous 
process where changes can be incorporated easily (Mileti, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004). 
Specifically in the post-disaster context, disaster risk reduction projects are very much a part of 
this dynamism and change. Structural design changes to rivers, such as dams or canals, are 
engineered to have specific effects. However, without any future review of the construction, 
there is no certainty that the desired effects will indeed result or at least be maintained.  
Social programs can also create change in the natural environment or be changed by that 
environment. Vulnerability to natural hazards, in LDCs, is often a result of ignorance or lack of 
understanding (Abramovitz, 2001; Alexander, 1993). In addition, individuals do not make 
decisions in a vacuum, but rather are exposed to others who are weighing out the same cost-
benefit analysis and become influenced by group and democratic decisions (Mileti, 1999). Thus, 
social components of a response and reconstruction program also must be considered when 
measuring successful reduction of risks. 
Similarly, the rural-urban migration that has occurred within LAC in recent years is not based 
on knowledge of the natural environmental conditions, or at least not those of the new urban 
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settlement location. Aide and Grau (2004) cite declining agricultural conditions, dwindling forest 
resources as well as the cultural and economic attraction as some prime motives for urban 
migration in LAC. Therefore, it is recommended that preparing rural migrants for the urban 
environment be part of social and conservation policies because it would promote ecosystem 
recovery in rural areas, but also because it would impact the settlement selection process of 
migrants in their new urban setting (Aide & Grau, 2004). On-going social phenomena such as 
migration create dynamic social pressures which are rarely erased by a disaster. Many studies 
have proven that people prefer to return to their familiar, yet high-risk homes, rather than 
relocate to a new, safer house elsewhere (Oliver-Smith, 1991; United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme, 2007; Myers, Slack, & Singelmann, 2008; Wisner et al., 2004). 
Therefore, monitoring and evaluation of social activities becomes just as important post-disaster, 
as it is in normal circumstances. 
The ISDR has acknowledged the need for on-going studies and research to ensure cost-
effective and sustainable reporting of progress on HFA goals and overall DRR (ISDR, 2007b). 
However, the ISDR has relieved itself of the responsibility of achieving the HFA goals by 
putting the onus on national governments to ensure they are initiating DRR programs and 
monitoring their own local and national initiatives. As is well-known, most of the countries at 
greatest risk of disaster are poor countries which have been impacted by some form of 
catastrophe recently. LDCs, whether recently impacted by disaster or not, require more concrete 
assistance than the HFA guidance provides if they are to make real and lasting progress towards 
the HFA goals. 
In summary, this chapter has reviewed literature from a breadth of disciplines and some 
concerns have repeated themselves throughout history without clear solutions. Great 
improvements have been made in disaster response due to successful warning and evacuation as 
a result of lessons learned from previous disasters. However, development in LDCs is still being 
inhibited by disaster, even in those countries with solid disaster management plans. Integration 
of the concepts of vulnerability measurement into broader development goals has been 
encouraged by NGOs working in the field and yet methods for such integration have yet to be 
initiated.  
To address this gap in the literature, a framework for evaluation of DRR effectiveness was 
created for this thesis. An Assessment of Post-disaster Risk Reduction Effectiveness (PDARRE)  
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current vulnerability and capacity assessment data for affected population?
indicators/monitoring of progress on risk reduction/sust. hazard mitigation?
standardized and inclusive community awareness programs?
community education programs geared toward the development of a culture of safety?
recovery made to benefit and improve livelihoods, quality of life and tenure concerns?
enhance and encourage community cohesion, inter/intra-generational equity and social capital?
creation of an insurance program based on vulnerability assessments?
encouragement of entrepreneurship?
creation of business continuity plans to rebuild and enhance local economy?
Instituational Concerns
availability and use of previously identified lessons for risk management (local/similar hazards)?
existence of functioning public disaster relief system?
cooperation within and across government bodies, NGOs and community?
clarity of responsibilities, roles and relationships (pre)defined?
efforts to ensure continuity and stability over time in government bodies? (redundancy)
set corresponding 'acceptable levels of risk' in all relevant ministries? (e.g. housing, planning, 
environment, natural resources, emergency management etc.)
empowerment of local governments to manage recovery?
staff retention schemes to maintain capacity through various emergency events?
inclusion of private and public sector actors?
effective use and monitoring of DRR funding and financial capital with a focus on strengthening 
government (esp. local) recovery institutions, equity and sustainability?
Biophysical Environment
use of current hazard maps in future planning and development projects?
understanding and documentation of function and change in bio-physical systems?
current models predicting/forecasting probability and severity of hazard events?
process defined/available staff to update models post-disaster?
exitence of and evaluation of early warning system?
preparation for multiple hazard/complex hazard or rare events?
efforts made to use and enhance natural barriers and protective structures?
Built Environment
appropriate use of technology and engineering for risk reduction?
response efforts aim to 'build back better' structurally and economically?
reconstruction projects address need for social housing and low-income housing needs?
redundancy in infrastructure? (e.g. evacuation routes, communication lines etc.)
existence and enforcement of building codes for reducing risks?
Legislation Concerns
zoning and enforcement of high hazard areas?
policies which foster principles of sustainable livelihoods (capacity, equity, sustainability) at local, 








Table 2: Assessment of Post-disaster Effectiveness in DRR
7
 
                                         
7
 Sources:  (Clinton, 2006; ISDR, 2005; Benson, et. al, 2007; Comfort, et al., 1999; Cutter, et al., 2008; Davis, 
2003; Manuel-Navarrete et. al 2007; UNDP, 2006; Mileti, 1999) 
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(Table 2) was created based on the literature and governance structures discussed herein (refer 
back to the summary in Table 1: Relevant International Governance Guidance Structures). The 
PDARRE framework is the tool used for analysis of the ―biggest debris flow disaster in South 
America‘s history‖ which occurred in Vargas State, Venezuela in 1999. 
2.6.1 Justification of Criteria 
Sustainable development and sustainable livelihoods theory advocate for intra- as well as 
inter-generational equity. All people have identical rights to life and therefore deserve equal 
access to information about their risks. An evaluation of disaster response must, therefore, 
consider the adequacy of the efforts made to inform, evacuate and resettle the affected 
population. The criteria in the assessment tool thus address (a) the suitability of early warning 
and evacuation plans, (b) the quality of communication with local populations in generating 
awareness and a culture of safety, (c) communication effectiveness between all agencies 
involved in the response, (d) the clarity in identification of roles and responsibilities so as to 
maintain an efficient response with sufficient redundancies to ensure quality and, (e) whether 
adequate good information is available regarding vulnerability and capacities within the 
population at-risk. 
Another source of failures in disaster risk reduction is a lack of monitoring and revision of 
policies in the years following a disaster. As mentioned, a disaster is a good opportunity to 
identify weaknesses and the recovery phase of disaster management allows for improvements to 
known areas of weakness. Other criteria in the assessment tool are included to address this need 
for monitoring and institutional or operational changes. First and foremost, the existence of a 
functioning public disaster relief system is crucial. A disaster relief system includes community 
members, local, state and national governments, local businesses, NGOs and financial 
institutions which fund disaster programs. In order for this system to be ―functioning‖, 
communication, division of labour and clarity of roles and responsibilities need to be transparent. 
A criterion addresses the need for capable staff that will transfer knowledge and skills to other 
employees and future generations. Maintenance of capable and experienced staff will allow 
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monitoring and adjustments to be made based on lessons identified in past experiences and 
prevent repeating mistakes made in the past
8
. 
Good information is fundamental to an effective disaster risk reduction plan. Collection of 
data on a regular basis and diffusion of that information to all relevant actors allows decisions to 
be made based on the most current information. The criteria used to evaluate the availability and 
use of good information are as follows: (a) understanding and documentation of function and 
change in the biophysical system, (b) use of models for the prediction and forecasting of hazards, 
(c) preparation for multi-hazard/complex hazard and rare events, (d) set of corresponding 
―acceptable levels of risk‖ in all relevant ministries and, (e) standardized and inclusive 
community awareness programs. Together these criteria ensure that information about the 
specific contextual risks and vulnerabilities, both physical and socio-economic, are known and 
shared with those living in high risk or unsafe areas. 
2.6.1 Comments regarding the PDARRE tool 
To fully understand the assessment, there are some points which demand elaboration. The 
imbalance of criteria toward a more heavily social weighting is a result of the fact that ―all 
disasters are essentially social occasions that primarily have to be dealt with by social more than 
technological means‖ (Quarantelli E. , 1994). This demands strong institutional policies and a 
staff of capable people so that many of the social vulnerabilities may be reduced in addition to 
addressing the need to identify physical hazards and protect against them. Focusing the criteria 
toward institutions and social variables makes it easier to translate the evaluation results into 
clear actions with identifiable outcomes. 
The scale chosen for assessment (poor, adequate, good) reflects the fact that most of the 
criteria will have been noted by decision makers and disaster management practitioners prior to a 
disaster. A rating of ―poor‖ indicates that there is some evidence of an attempt to address the 
criteria, although the results are insufficient. Criteria rated as ―adequate‖ demonstrate clear 
efforts are being made to improve upon the given action or output, although there is still room 
for improvement. Finally, the best ranking of ―good‖ means that action has satisfactorily met the 
                                         
8
 Use of consultants and outside help is often an effective method to find the right, experienced person to 
complete a project or assessment. However, this also leads to loss of capacity within an institution long term. Poor 
pay and lack of training opportunities at an institution will often lead to high turnover and create a perpetual lack of 
capable personnel. Thus, it is important to maintain capable staff and encourage training wherever possible. 
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minimum requirements for that criterion. The scale was designed, however, to imply that there is 
always room for improvement and that monitoring of each criterion is needed so no criterion will 
ever be without further need of attention. 
Similarly, there is no overall rating of the degree of effectiveness due to the fact that disaster 
risk reduction is an on-going, dynamic process which is not complete upon the conclusion of 
reconstruction projects. Disaster management is a cycle (recall Figure 7, p. 29) which requires 
that the focus move to preparedness and mitigation activities once the reconstruction and 
recovery phase has been completed. How well one group responds to hydrometeorological 
disasters compared to another is not what is important, nor is the concern for comparison of fixed 
time circumstances – disaster management, like socio-ecological systems, is dynamic and 
perpetually changing. Strategies for adaptation and improved resilience differ contextually as 
Wisner et al. (2004) explain, stating: 
[t]he individual, household, kinship network and larger collectivities may develop 
implicit or explicit strategies to manage risk, which themselves constitute an important 
element in well-being and provide the basis for action when vulnerability is made a 
reality by the disaster event itself (p. 15). 
Keeping that in mind, PDARRE serves as a tool for addressing weaknesses at the local, 
regional and national levels. The use of post-disaster ―checklists‖ by NGOs dealing with 
administrative chaos during relief activities oversimplify vulnerability by associating it with 
groups of people rather than comprehending ―vulnerable situations‖ as stages which people can 
move in and out of over time (Wisner et al., 2004).  
It is hoped that out of catastrophe all institutions and individuals will become better equipped 
to respond by improving upon the overall socio-ecological resilience to such hazardous events. 
Intrinsic to the improvement of the resilience of a community is an understanding of why and 
how the vulnerabilities arose in the first place. Thus, after the response and recovery phases are 
complete, a more reflective assessment of vulnerabilities and capacities must also be conducted 
as a means of updating previous data or collecting such data in preparation for any future threats. 
2.7 Conceptual Framework 
From this literature review I have developed a conceptual framework of the socio-ecological 
systems and processes, structures and institutions that mutually reinforce vulnerability or 
resilience in communities or settlements in LDCs. Figure 11 shows the intersection of the socio-
economic, biophysical and built environment as a state where both vulnerability and resilience to 
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hazards are possible. To be able to use a post-disaster setting to achieve resilience, a combination 
of priorities must be considered: Build Back Better, Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable 
Hazard Mitigation, the Hyogo Framework for Action and Mainstreaming Disaster Risk 
Reduction. The central arrows represent not only the various motivations to consider in post-
disaster response, but also the multiple actors involved. The use of these frameworks enhances 
resilience by taking advantage of the opportunities presented in the post-disaster setting to 
address deficiencies in ―capital‖ assets and livelihoods through the recognition of vulnerabilities 
that were accentuated in the hazard event. 
 
 
Figure 11: Conceptual Framework for Vulnerability within Socio-Ecological Systems 
The concentric circles of place-based vulnerability represent the uniqueness of each 
community‘s vulnerability as compared within a single case or across case studies. Common 
practice suggests the use of some form of vulnerability and capacity assessment (VCA) prior to 
disaster, however, the post-disaster context also offers an opportunity to collect or update this 
data. Consequently, as response and recovery actions are taken and the goals and propositions 
from the frameworks in the arrows are integrated into local or national policies, vulnerability can 




Additionally, communication and good information are important parts of strengthening 
resilience and reducing risks. The arrows of the frameworks point in the same direction to 
emphasize that collaboration and cooperation between actors and organizations will allow 
context-specific solutions to be derived from the diversity of actors. Inclusion and empowerment 
of the local population is known to be an important part of understanding the weaknesses of a 
place, as well as helping to ensure that the people embrace the disaster risk reduction, and 
broader development goals. 
Chapter 3: RESEARCH METHODS AND CASE STUDY CONTEXT 
This chapter will summarize the methods used to collect and analyze the data in this research 
followed by a discussion of the specific case study chosen to test the PDARRE framework. 
3.1 Research Methods 
This section describes and validates the methods used to address an apparent disconnection 
between recognized good practices in disaster risk reduction and the actions taken in preparation 
for and in response to emergency situations involving natural hazards. A case study was chosen 
to depict the disconnection because, as Yin (2003) discusses, case study analyses are effective 
for research directed at ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions, where the researcher has little control over 
events, and when the research addresses a recent issue of a practical nature. For this particular 
study, recall Objective 1, which seeks to identify the causal factors of the 1999 disaster in Vargas 
(why?). Objective 3 aims to find out ‗how‘ vulnerability was reduced, perpetuated or created 
through the hazard mitigation efforts executed post-1999. 
Case study research also has variable methods. Holistic and embedded analyses can be 
conducted as part of single or multiple case studies.  ―A single case can represent a significant 
contribution to knowledge and theory building‖ and may be preferred when the case is extreme, 
unique or representative (Yin, 1993, p. 40). ―Lessons learned from [a representative case] are 
assumed to be informative about the experiences of the average (sic) person or institution‖ (Yin, 
1993, p. 41). Commonly, in LDCs reconstruction efforts fail to generate significant vulnerability 
reduction (Clinton, 2006). For that reason, investigation of the reconstruction efforts after the 
Venezuelan debris flows demonstrates where, potentially, in the reconstruction process greater 
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attention must be paid in order to ensure risk reduction goals are met. The Venezuela case is 
‗extreme‘ for LAC and will therefore contribute to knowledge on debris flows and flash flood 
disasters. Lessons learned, however, would apply to the majority rather than the average person 
or institution because sustainable hazard mitigation is geared at saving as many lives as possible, 
not necessarily only those average persons. 
Furthermore, embedded case studies examine subunits of a larger entity; in this case the 
subunits are the reconstruction efforts executed in Vargas State in 1999. However, in order to 
provide thorough analysis and draw broader conclusions, the details of these subunits must then 
return to the larger unit of analysis. The Vargas case will be later discussed with reference to 
good practices in disaster reconstruction policies for LDCs. 
3.1.1 Research Data 
Data for this analysis was collected from key informant interviews during field work in June 
2008. Thirteen interviews
9
 were conducted with informants using the snowball sampling method. 
Primary contacts were made from published document research prior to entering the field. 
Interviews were conducted in a combination of English and Spanish, while only two 
interviewees preferred no English at all. Interviews were guided by a set of interview themes 
(Appendix 4) with two interviewers sharing the role of asking the questions and transcribing 
notes. Information gathered during interviews provided contextual data and insights into the 
causes of the Vargas disaster as well as information on the actions taken immediately after the 
1999 disaster and in the years following.  
Nine professors and one researcher at local academic institutions were interviewed because of 
their personal and research knowledge regarding the 1999 catastrophe. Of those, one interviewee 
lives and a second owns a vacation home in the communities of Vargas State impacted by the 
1999 disaster. The remaining interviewees are disaster specialists working in domestic or 
international institutions in Venezuela. One presentation made by a group of geography students 
in the class of an interviewed professor also served as a source of information for this study. 
Most interviews had duration between 30 minutes and an hour and two half-day, guided tours of 
affected communities were also part of the 2008 field work. 
                                         
9
  Interviewees are referred to as INT #1-13, while the reviewers of the completed assessment are Reviewer #1 
and 2 see Appendix 3. 
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The use of a case study allowed for the incorporation of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 
1993, p. 32; Schrank, 2006). Therefore, this project‘s data analysis involves quantitative 
aggregation of interview responses and confirmation of results based on the open-ended nature 
of interview questions used with all key informants. This data, along with secondary literature 
analysis informs the output evaluation framework for post-disaster risk reduction in LCDs 
(PDARRE in Table 2, p. 49). For accuracy, my assessment of the Vargas State post-disaster 
actions was sent electronically to a number of key informants for review. I received a poor 
response rate, although the comments and expertise of those who did respond validated and 
enhanced my analysis, allowing me to make more solid conclusions about the post-disaster status 
of vulnerability within the State. The reviewers were given the completed assessment framework 
and asked to comment on the ratings. This review provided the opportunity for discussion of the 
interpretation of the data as well as to provide an update on activities which happened over the 
year in which the thesis was being written. 
Additionally, participant observation and secondary document analysis supplements the 
interview data. Observation techniques were used to identify biophysical components, location-
related risks and social vulnerabilities which still exist in 2008, almost a decade after the disaster. 
Complementary review of secondary documents including maps, consultant reports, 
documentary video, news media reports, photos, published and grey literature allowed for 
improved understanding of the underlying causal factors which created the disaster. Numerous 
government reports and reports from lenders and partners were examined to identify Venezuelan 
policy goals relating to issues of poverty and vulnerability reduction, sustainable development 
and hazard planning. This part of the research provides information on broader development 
goals and informed discussion on mainstreaming disaster risk reduction within the Vargas case. 
The supply of research and information on disaster and hazard mitigation is continually 
growing. Yet, disaster impacts and losses are increasing each year. This thesis questions how and 
why impacts are increasing given the quantity and quality of information and good practices 
available regarding disaster risk reduction and lessons learned from previous events. The 
remainder of this chapter will therefore provide a focused examination of the history of 
development and disasters in Venezuela. Although all of the causal factors specific to Venezuela 
may not extrapolate precisely to another context, the case study analysis in this chapter will 
identify problems which could arise in other cases. 
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3.2 Case Study Context 
The previous chapter outlined literature on hazards which will inform the later discussion of 
DRR. Keeping that literature in mind, the following depiction of the Venezuelan context will 
provide background to the analysis of the 1999 Vargas disaster. As mentioned, contextual factors 
across disasters play and important role in outcomes. Therefore, using the PAR and DROP 
models as rough guides, the next sections will start to elucidate the circumstances of 
vulnerability and resilience which persist in this case study. 
3.2.1 Geography and Geology of Venezuela 
Venezuela is located on the South American continent sharing borders with Colombia, Brazil 
and Guyana, as well as shores on the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Venezuela is located in 
the tropics of the Northern Hemisphere but experiences a diversity of weather due to the 
presence of a variety of landscapes ranging from humid low-elevation plains, to glaciers and 
highland areas which are much cooler. The coastal region of the country experiences hot 
temperatures year-round. Average rainfall in the wet season, from August to October, is 
approximately 145 millimetres (Library of Congress, 2005).  
In the northern states of the country the terrain is rugged. The mountains of the Sierra el Avila 
peak between 2,000 and 2,700 metres within 6 to10 kilometres of the Caribbean Sea coast. 
Streams run down the steep mountain slopes (20-40 degrees) emerging to create alluvial fan 
deposits in a flat transition about 1.5 kilometres wide between mountains to ocean. The Sierra el 
Avila mountain range runs parallel to the coastline and acts as a constraint to inland urban 
development. Communities have, as a consequence, been built on the flood plains of river 
valleys and on the alluvial fans along the coast. 
The geology of this region consists mainly of metamorphic rock, comprised of graphitic and 
epidote schists extending approximately one kilometre inland from the ocean (Wieczorek et al., 
2002). Additionally, different geologic conditions are noted in Vargas State: a) phyllite, hilly 
slopes to the east of the Naiguatá River; b) schist and gneiss slopes (Takahashi, Nakagawa, 
Satofuka, & Kawaike, 2001). The presence of stratified rocks within the slope-face at higher 
elevations demonstrates the long-standing history of landslides and debris flows to which these 
communities have been exposed. Some of the towns have been engineered to incorporate the 
debris found in some communities, although the presence of this foreign landslide debris does 




Figure 12: Stone terrace built in 1917 from boulders deposited from upstream. 
This house, in Plaza de la Piedras on the Caraballeda fan, withstood debris flows, including a major event in 1951. 
Source: (Wieczorek et al., 2002) 
3.2.2 Socio-economic Characteristics 
Social characteristics in a country are strongly influenced by their political and economic 
systems, in addition to other factors such as religion or history. Venezuela‘s first democratically 
elected president took office in 1958 and has been succeeded by other democratically elected 
presidents, including current president Hugo Chávez (Library of Congress, 2005). 
All of the democratic leaders in Venezuela‘s history have presided over a steady income from 
the petroleum industry which allowed for significant investments in roads, cities, schools, and 
public works (Levine & Crisp, 1999). These investments transformed the country from a ―poor, 
illiterate, fragmented, sickly, and predominantly peasant society [prior to the 1970s] into a highly 
urban, mobile, literate and media soaked nation‖ (Levine & Crisp, 1999). Starting in the 1980‘s, 
this progress was impeded by currency devaluation and extreme income inequality. The 
struggles facing Venezuelans during these tough times have arguably strengthened not only the 
democratic system but also the individual members of society. Since the 19
th
 century the 
―continuous and irregular form of [political] regime change taught Venezuelans an important 
lesson about …capturing the moment and translating that moment into personal wealth, because 
tomorrow‘s moment would likely belong to someone else‖ (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003, p. 2-3).  
As part of his ―Socialism for the 21
st
 Century‖, which aims to improve equality for all 
Venezuelans, the current leftist leader has made nationalization of the petroleum industry, and 
other successful resource extraction industries a primary focus. In 2007/2008 the petroleum 
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sector alone made up approximately 90 percent of export revenues and 30 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) (CIA, 2009). Despite this, the Chávez government has yet to produce 
significant results on their agenda of major social and economic improvements for all 
Venezuelans. The 2002 coup and counter coup were evidence of discontent within the population 
for the current government‘s lack of progress; nonetheless Chávez himself remains very popular 
(Ellner & Hellinger, 2003). 
Formal, primarily resource extraction sectors – such as forestry, fisheries, petroleum, cacao, 
and coffee – provide employment to many Venezuelans. However, in comparison many more 
people are employed in the informal sector. Informal sector activities have grown in the Chavez 
years (1998 to present), accounting for roughly half of all employment from 2002 through 2004 
(Library of Congress, 2005). Informal employment includes micro and small enterprises which 
are not formally registered or are possibly illegal (Clark & Stephans, 2002). Informal 
employment can often be associated with poverty and financial struggle. Supplementation of the 
income of those with inadequate formal earnings is a common phenomenon in LDCs. 
Additionally, these activities allow people in the lowest income brackets access to many 
necessary resources sold outside their price range in the formal market (e.g. pharmacy supplies, 
fast food, repair services etc.). 
Some of Chávez‘ Socialism policies, while aiming for equality, also hinder the freedom of the 
population. Access to foreign currency by Venezuelans is limited because of a government 
policy on the sale of US dollars. The motivation for this policy is to control inflation according to 
the government; however, some suspect this policy is a means to keep Venezuelans from 
immigrating, specifically to the United States (field notes, 2008). In response to this policy 
individuals have made mutually beneficial exchanges with tourists and created a black market 
for currency. The national banks and casas de cambio (currency exchange houses) offer US 
dollar exchanges at a fixed rate. On the street, however, better rates can be negotiated with taxi 
drivers and shop owners who are willing to risk fines to access US dollars (field notes, 2008). In 
the same way, tourists want the best exchange rate possible and so, as in many LDCs, tourists 
provide locals with a source of foreign currency in addition to their willingness to purchase from 
the ‗informal‘ market. 
LDCs often use tourism to diversify their economy from traditional resource-based economic 
activities. Venezuela, with its wealth of petroleum resources, has not tapped into its full tourism 
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potential. Venezuela‘s natural environment boasts some impressive features including the largest 
lake in South America, Lake Maracaibo, and the highest waterfall in the world, Angel Falls. 
Nevertheless, poor quality services, crime and political instabilities have not yet been overcome 
in order to attract foreign tourists to sites other than the popular Margarita Island (Library of 
Congress, 2005). Because of this, much of the country‘s tourism revenues come from domestic 
tourists visiting family out of state. These domestic tourists are mostly wealthy employees of the 
international firms, academic institutions and government agencies located in the economic 
metropolis of Caracas.  
Because of the variety of natural hazards facing different parts of the country, from 
earthquakes to tropical storms, the limited tourism industry may be positive in some ways. The 
attraction of international media after a major natural disaster hits a tourism destination is almost 
always negative (e.g. Hurricane Henriette in Mexico in 2007, Asian Tsunami in 2004 etc.). Not 
to mention, the potential for infrastructure loss during or after a disaster leads to lost revenues, 
which stifles the economic gains intended with a diversification into tourism. 
In summary, Venezuela has a history fraught with challenges including safety concerns, 
political instabilities and disaster. The country has not achieved their desired level of 
development because of historic problems and the persistence of some of the above-mentioned 
threats. A good supply of natural resources offers income to this South American country but 
unequal distribution of wealth persists even under Chavez‘ Socialist regime. 
3.3 Vargas State 
Vargas State is located to the north of the capital city of Caracas and has a population of 
approximately 330,000 (CIA, 2009). The main sea and airports, linking the northern region to the 
rest of the country and the world, are in the town of Maiquetía (see Figure 13). These access 
points make Vargas State a high-traffic area for both foreign tourists and locals. The heavy flow 
of people and goods in this region has led to sprawling development along the coast (Genatios & 
Lafuente, 2003; Wieczorek et al., 2002; Rivero, 2004). It is the coastal towns and cities of 
Vargas that will be further examined herein because of the impacts they sustained in the 1999 
debris flow disaster.  
The northern coastal state of Vargas is one of the newest states in Venezuela. Vargas was 
separated from the nation‘s capital state, Distrito Federal, in 1998. The capital city is La Guaira, 
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where the main seaport is located, and the state runs narrowly along 170 km of the coast north of 
Caracas (Gobernación Bolivariana del Estado Vargas, 2009). 
Historically, the convenient location of what is now Vargas State, near the airport and capital 
city, made for a prime settlement area. Two of the protective forts have been maintained along 
with the historic and narrow cobble roads (Gobernación Bolivariana del Estado Vargas, 2009). 
The sandy beaches of El Litoral Central (the central coast), make for an attractive weekend 
escape for the residents of Caracas. Much of the development in the coastal towns has been 
second home development for Caraqueños or primary homes for those who commute to Caracas 
for work (INT #1 & 9). Because of this, the towns are primarily residential and many of those 
employed locally work in the service industry, or at one of either the airport or seaport (field 
notes, 2008). Informal housing has been constructed on the highly hazards slopes and in the river 
valleys that remained after the development of the tourism industry (Takahashi, Nakagawa, 
Satofuka, & Kawaike, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 13: Map of Vargas State, Venezuela 





3.3.1.1 Bio-physical Characteristics 
The landscape of Vargas is rugged including limited flat land between the steep mountains 
and shores of the Caribbean Sea. As mentioned earlier, development in the northern states has 
taken place on alluvial fans which formed around the river‘s mouth. Alluvial fans are fluvial 
formations generally associated with dry climates and the northern coastal region of Venezuela is 
classified as semi-arid with notably less precipitation than the Guyana highlands in the southeast 
of the country (Lyon, 2003). The wet season in Vargas generally runs from June to August when 
they receive 45 percent of the annual rainfall. These wet conditions progress into the dry season 
which occurs in the period from December to February when nine percent of annual precipitation 
is typical (Lyon, 2003). Vargas State experiences the same rainfall variability as the tropical 
Americas and this variability is related to sea surface temperatures, sea level pressure and low-
level wind anomalies in both the Pacific and Atlantic basins and the Southern Oscillation [El 
Niño/La Niña] (Lyon, 2003). 
In all, there are twenty-four watersheds along the northern part of Vargas State (INT #2). 
Each catchment of the Sierra El Avila has soils that are thin and bedrock exhibits signs of 
weathering. Historical records and geological evidence based on the towns in Vargas indicate 
that debris flow events have occurred with some regularity in this region (Wieczorek et al., 
2002). Prior to 1999, the most recent debris flow event took place in 1951 and aerial 
photography comparisons depict the event as much smaller than the 1999 event. Terracing along 
stream channels 10-20m above current stream channels indicates contemporaneous tectonic 
uplift of the coastal range. However, slightly higher elevation toward the axis (5m) than on the 
flanks of the alluvial fans in Vargas indicates that the long-term rate of delivery of material from 
the upper watersheds is greater than the removal of material by the stream flows (Wieczorek et 




Figure 14: Alluvial fan characteristics 
Source: (Unknown) 
Therefore, an increase in material in the lower reaches of the watershed during normal rainfall 
exposes larger boulders and debris while weakening the slope stability in the upper watershed. 
Together this makes for smaller, shallower channels on the alluvial fans and exposes the 
populations to greater disastrous flooding potential in greater-than-normal rainfall events.  
Before continuing, a definition of a debris flow and the conditions required for such an event 
will clarify how the 1999 event differs from simple flooding or landsliding.  
Debris flows are characterized by fast movements in which the displaced mass behaves 
as a highly viscous fluid (Guidicini and Nieble 1984; IPT 1991). Debris flows displace a 
significant volume of material. They reach siginficant distances, velocities, and transport 
capacities, including large boulders (Gramani and Augusto Filho 2004 cited in Gomez et 
al., 2008, p. 198). 
All mass movements have a critical ―shear-failure point‖ where the material begins to fall, slide, 
flow or creep based on the  size and texture of the grains of material and the amount of moisture 
(Christopherson, 2003, p.415-417) 
The regularity with which the rivers will flood their banks or carry excess sediment into the 
towns is difficult to predict. Previous hydrologic events leading to severe flooding and/or 
landslides occurred in August 1912, January 1914, November 1938, May and November 1944, 
August 1948 and February 1951 (Salcedo, 2000 cited in Wieczorek et al., 2002). None of these 
events created much damage compared to the 1999 event due to their lower magnitude and the 
presence of a much smaller population. Uncertainty, along with a relative infrequency of extreme 
flooding, therefore permitted Vargas State‘s population to grow to more than 300,000 
inhabitants. Much of this population growth has occurred since the last debris flow event in 1951 
(Wieczorek et al., 2002). Even more, the town of Maiquetía is also known as the San Sebastián 
de Maiquetía region because it is located on the San Sebastián fault line. The Boconó-San 
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Sebastián-El Pilar fault system registers an annual movement of 1 cm (Audemard, 2002 cited in 
Altez, 2005). Despite slow, steady movement earthquakes in this region have not recently caused 
any events with mass casualties (USGS, 2009). The last major disaster as a result of an 
earthquake on the San Sebastián fault was in 1812, when 26,000 people were killed in Caracas 
(USGS, 2009). Nonetheless, these informal developments would easily be damaged in an 
earthquake of moderate strength; an additional threat facing the population of Vargas State. 
3.3.1.2 Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics 
The attraction of Vargas is both financial as well as one of security and beauty. Employment 
in informal activities such as selling empanadas, can earn more than double that of a basic job 
ironing clothes in Caracas (Rivero, 2004). In addition, the large populations living in slums in 
Caracas have created several dangerous neighbourhoods where in a single weekend up to 20 
people may be killed (INT #1). This combination of increased safety and the potential to earn a 
better income are logical motivators that have drawn a growing number of people to Vargas, 
despite the unsafe natural environment of much of the settlement locations. 
The population is spread across the state with the largest populations concentrated in the 
towns of Catia la Mar, Maiquetía and Caraballeda. The pre-disaster population included a mix of 
demographic groups. This included 43 percent of households with female heads and the general 
population was composed of 51.4 percent males and 48.6 percent females (CEPAL, 2000). 
Major sectors of employment are warehousing, the National Guard, immigration, tourism and 
pig farming. Vargas has received major real estate investment and therefore growth in spas, 
hotels, restaurants and recreational facilities has also been on the rise (RENa, 2008).  
Development of the service industry offers employment opportunities and has thus also 
created some informal residential development. While these communities are not planned, they 
do have access to infrastructure services such as water and electricity (field notes, 2008). 
Housing appears to be self-constructed and the location along the slopes of the river valleys 
makes the residents innately vulnerable to slope failures, landslides and the effects of debris 
flows.  
With an improved knowledge of the characteristics of Venezuela and, more specifically 
Vargas State, this case study investigates the debris flow catastrophe that affected the Caribbean 
Sea coast of Venezuela in December, 1999. The flooding and debris flows from this event led to 
one of the largest such disasters documented worldwide (Wieczorek et al., 2002).  
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3.4 Events of December 1999 
Beginning in early December, the interaction of a cold front with moist south-westerly flow 
from the Pacific Ocean towards the Caribbean Sea created unusually high precipitation over 
North Vargas and the northern coast of Venezuela (Wieczorek et al., 2002). Torrential rainfall 
starting Tuesday December 14
th 
1999, caused major flooding and  debris flows in various states 
across the country including Miranda, Vargas, the Federal District, Yaracuy, Táchira, Nueva 
Esparta, Zulia, Trujillo and Falcón (CEPAL, 2000). The Maiquetía meteorological station, in 




 (380.7 and 410.4mm respectively) 
which exceeded the 1000 year probability rainfall event for this location (Martinez, 2000 cited in 
Wieczorek et al., 2002) (see Figure 15). 
Vargas State received the worst of the damages after three days of extreme rainfall totaling 
more than 900 mm of precipitation (Genatios & Lafuente, 2003). On December 16
th
 several flash 
floods and debris flows occurred simultaneously, resulting in debris that poured through towns, 
burying 2-storey houses in several meters of mud and knocking the support from parts of high-
rise buildings (Wieczorek et al., 2002) (see Figure 16). On Wednesday December 15
th
, the 
second day of torrential rains, the National Government issued Decree 577 declaring a ―state of 
national emergency‖ as a consequence of ―unusual rainfall that cause[d] material damage‖ across 





Figure 15: Rainfall Data from Maiquetía Meteorological Station 




    
Figure 16: Images of Damage to Vargas State from Debris Flow Disaster 1999 
Damage to buildings in Vargas State          High water levels caused during December 1999 
(Photos courtesy of Altez) 
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Three key causes of the disaster were mentioned repeatedly by interviewees and in secondary 
literature: 1) a 16 day low intensity rainfall which saturated soils across the State  followed by a 
three day extreme rainfall event producing over 900 mm of rain in the upper catchments (Lopez 
et al. 2003); 2) rapid and relatively unplanned urbanization (both formal and informal) on the 
multiple alluvial fans found in coastal Vargas State (INT #9, 10, 11 & 13) and; 3) poorly 
designed and executed emergency preparedness and mitigation plans (INT #1, 2, 6, 13; Altez, 
2005). 
Although this data is only from one meteorological station, similar rainfall patterns were 
experienced across the state. NOAA (the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 
also reported higher than normal rainfall over the year throughout the entire Caribbean region 
(cited in Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). The rapid urbanization in Vargas State is a result of 
wealth which originated in Caracas and led to the construction of second and vacation homes 
along the coast (INT #6 & 8). This unplanned development made the creation of a fully 
functioning emergency management/response plan of secondary importance after the supply of 
infrastructure services for the new residents (INT #6).  
3.4.1 Losses and Impacts in Vargas 
The losses from the debris flows and flooding were extraordinary. The El Avila Mountains 
drain dozens of streams northward into steep river valleys. In December 1999, twenty-four of 
these streams simultaneously flooded into their respective channels, while thousands of 




/second at their fastest on to 
the towns along the coast (INT #2 & 3; Wieczorek et al., 2002; Takahashi, Nakagawa, Satofuka 
& Kawaike, 2001). Most of the debris flows commenced overnight on December 15
th
 and lasted 
only thirty minutes (Takahashi, Nakagawa, Satofuka & Kawaike, 2001). The debris flows were 





         Maiquetía-  La Guaira- Punta de Mulatos- Macuto-  El Cojo- Camurí Chico- Los Corales  Caraballeda -     Tanaguarena -        Carmen de Uria 
Figure 17: Alluvial Fans of Vargas State 
Note: The alluvial fans are the funnel shapes along the coast, only some of the fans are shown in this diagram 
Source: (Genatios & Lafuente 2003) 
Although the rains had been continuous for weeks, there was very little time to warn the 
residents of the rushing debris which surged from the mountains in the flash floods of December 
16th. The flows were so strong that boulders measuring 11.3m by 5m by 3.5m were dislodged 
from the slope face and carried down to sea level (see Figure 18). 
  
Figure 18: Massive boulders transported during 1999 debris flows 
Source: (Wieczorek, Larsen, Eaton, Morgan, & Blair, 2002) 
Many lives were lost and livelihoods were interrupted or destroyed during the catastrophe. 
The death toll is estimated between 1,000 and 50,000 people who were either taken out to sea or 
buried in the mud (Larsen et al., 2001; CEPAL, 2000; INT #1-13). Much debate exists regarding 
the accuracy of the casualty figures. Some researchers contend that the method used to estimate 
the population of the state was flawed. It is argued that flying helicopters over the communities 
does not tell you whether all the homes were occupied at the time of the catastrophe and thus 
cannot be the only measurement tool employed and also should be verified throughout the 
response period (CEPAL, 2000; Altez, 2007; INT #1). Other authors point to the lack of census 




Satofuka, & Kawaike, 2001). Nonetheless, even at the lowest estimates of 1000 killed, all of the 
300,000 residents of Vargas State were affected in some way by the meteorological event in 
December 1999.  
The diverse socio-economic composition of Vargas State led to differing levels of impacts. 
Children between the ages of 0 and 14 were particularly severely affected and also more female 
victims were found than male victims, at 52 and 46 percent respectively (CEPAL, 2000). 
Because of the recreational nature of the State, there were many vacation or weekend homes and 
public recreational facilities affected. However, the majority of fatalities occurred in low-income 
areas where a significant proportion of precarious and informal structures were located (CEPAL, 
2000). 
Impacts were seen along the entire coastline. Plumes of sediment were visible in aerial 
photography and shorelines extended metres further into the sea (Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). 
The limited road infrastructure in the state made it difficult to escape the disaster. Just one 
highway connects the towns and it links these communities in a parallel manner along the length 
of the coast. Similarly, a single highway crosses over the mountains to Caracas, which meant that 
some communities were nearly 50km from the final evacuation route. Additionally, very little 
advanced warning meant very few residents were able to attempt an evacuation prior to facing 
congestion problems and the torrent flows which quickly blocked all passage. As a result, 
damages to infrastructure and housing totaled some US$3.2 billion and affected thousands of 
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 8000 homes 
destroyed 
 5 health care 
facilities damaged 
 85% of roadways 
destroyed 
 30% of education 
infrastructure 
affected 
Table 3: Summary of 1999 Event Impacts and Projects11 
The poorly designed and incomplete system of early warning played a major role in the 
number of deaths and damage caused by the debris flows. The existence of a fully functioning 
early warning system would have better enabled the preparatory and response capacities of 
residents in the most unsafe neighbourhoods. Signals such as sirens or radio announcements 
which direct residents to keep out of the streets are simple methods through which to 
communicate with the population which can improve the response as well. In the absence of 
good information about the vulnerabilities, residents made decisions about when to leave, where 
to go and how to get there based on the perceived urgency of the threats in each community. This 
would have made for a monumentally difficult recovery in the north coastal region as 
communities in each catchment derived their own response. 
Cooperation and coordinated efforts across the country with national and international 
partners played an important role in the immediate response. Nevertheless, the disaster occurred 
at a time of ―total political conflict nationally‖ (translated from Altez, 2005, p. 318) because 
regional elections were being held. This political instability and the relative inexperience of 
government workers in Vargas inhibited the post-debris flow response and also resulted in some 
residents remaining in their flooded homes (INT #10). Of the more than 300,000 affected, an 
estimated 70,000 survivors were housed in temporary shelters, such as schools, churches, sports 
centres and the airport (CEPAL, 2000). In addition to this, many people found accommodation 
with family (exact numbers are unknown).  
                                         
10
 Which is still not fully operational in 2008 (INT #2, 3 & 4) 
11
 (Genatios & Lafuente, 2003); (CEPAL, 2000); (INT # 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 & 13). 
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Decision-making within Venezuela is disproportionately focused on Caracas, especially with 
relation to matters of safety and vulnerability. The large number of residents in informal 
settlements, in combination with the levels of risk from landslides, seismic activities and 
flooding, have taken priority over other regions of the country. For example, Venezuela has 
adopted a New Housing Policy that prioritizes the identification of informal settlements for 
colsolidation, improvement and integration into the formal urban areas (CEPAL, 2000, p. 97). 
Additionally, in areas of high geologic risk in Caracas the priority is to invest in a) programming 
accessible to female-headed households and b) offering land titles to single-mothers or co-titles 
when both male and female are living together (CEPAL, 2000, p. 96). Other documents (e.g. 
Altez et al, 2002) regarding policies and governance of hazards lump Vargas State in with 
Caracas and although the authors do not explicitly explain why, it seems there is greater support 
for research relating to Caracas. Another power struggle facing Vargas relates to water supply. 
All of Vargas‘ water comes in from Caracas along the highway connecting the coastal state to 
the capital city (Vranes & Czuchlewski, 2003). Although Vargas now has autonomy there are 
still many ways in which Caracas controls decisions made in the coastal State. In some ways 
Vargas may be able to capitalize on the tight links it has with Caracas since the main sea and 
airports in Vargas State the primary access points for international trade and tourism. 
Nevertheless, at present many disaster management concerns and funding are geared toward the 
―higher risks levels‖ (Vranes & Czuchlewski, 2003) in Caracas. 
It is obvious that the damages and disruption caused by the hydrometeorological event of 
1999 indeed created a great disaster in Vargas State, regardless of the metric for damages 
employed. Some argue that the response and reconstruction efforts were insufficient or poorly 
executed. In order to measure the effectiveness of the post-disaster efforts taken by the 
Venezuelan government, other governments and international NGOs, an assessment tool was 
developed. The PDARRE tool was generated to reveal whether the post-disaster reconstruction 
and rehabilitation efforts effectively reduce disaster risks. 
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Chapter 4: CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
The previous chapters have discussed good practices in disaster mitigation and risk reduction 
and highlighted the typical lack of monitoring and evaluation of such activities over a longer-
term timescale. The post-disaster setting has been identified as a valuable opportunity for 
vulnerability identification and reduction through proactive approaches to response and 
reconstruction.  
This chapter will analyze the results of interviews and field observations conducted in 2008 - 
nine years after the Vargas State debris flow disaster. These results are a summary of post-
disaster activities in the region, and a measurement of the effectiveness of reconstruction efforts 
in reducing vulnerabilities.  
The ratings for each criterion in the PDARRE tool were derived from literature published 
about the 1999 Vargas disaster, as well as interviews with experts familiar with post-disaster 
responses. The completed assessment was then sent to key informants for verification and 
comment. The beginning of this chapter will discuss the initial findings, followed by a review of 
adjustments made to the assessment post-verification, and then a discussion of other issues that 
arose from interviews and site observations that were not addressed in the assessment. 
4.1 Findings from Assessment Tool 
The following sections break down the assessment framework into tables the three realms of 
the conceptual framework and two subcategories as chosen for this thesis: socio-economic 
system, built environment, biophysical system, institutional and legislation concerns. Each 
criterion will be discussed with regards to the activities and perceptions that influenced the 
selected rating. Implications may be identified, although discussion of these and the 
opportunities for future work will be discussed in later chapters. 
4.2 Socio-economic System 
The first set of criteria evaluated post disaster activities which addressed socio-economic 




The type of data necessary for this part of the assessment includes: a) physical/material, b) 
social/organizational and, c) motivational/attitudinal data on vulnerabilities or capacities 
(Benson, Twigg, & Rossetto, 2007, p. 107).  




































current vulnerability and capacity assessment data for affected population? N
indicators/monitoring of progress on risk reduction/sust. hazard mitigation? -
standardized and inclusive community awareness programs? -
community education programs geared toward the development of a culture of safety? *
recovery made to benefit and improve livelihoods, quality of life and tenure concerns? -
enhance and encourage community cohesion, inter/intra-generational equity and social capital? -
creation of an insurance program based on vulnerability assessments? x
encouragement of entrepreneurship? -
creation of business continuity plans to rebuild and enhance local economy? N  
Table 4: Completed Assessment of Socio-economic Criteria
12
 
One of the first results in this part of the assessment was that no data were found indicating 
that a vulnerability and capacity assessment (VCA) was conducted for any of the disaster-
affected communities in North Vargas State, either before or after the disaster. The lack of 
mention of such data during interviews causes me to conclude that prior to 1999 such data were 
not collected or at least not frequently updated. Therefore VCA data were likely not satisfactorily 
considered in any disaster management or urban planning activities and remain out of date still 
nine years after the disaster. 
Although flooding of disastrous proportion does not occur frequently in Vargas State, 
previous flooding events influenced the need for an improved disaster reduction/sustainable 
hazard mitigation plan after 1999. One interviewee (#6) indicated that the government acted 
without really understanding what mitigation meant and categorized preparedness and response 
activities under mitigation projects. The criterion for monitoring of risk reduction progress is 
rated as poor, given that interviewees commented on the deficient understanding which led to 
―patches of government response‖ and inhibited coordination within what should be an 
integrated system. 
                                         
12
 Sources: (INT #1-13; Field notes, 2008; CEPAL, 2000; Challa, 2000; Wieczorek et. al, 2002; Larsen et. al, 
2001; Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). 
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Community capacity building programs executed post-1999 were mentioned when discussing 
mitigation efforts. The programs in Vargas were found to be effective and appropriate, however, 
not all communities were offered such programs and therefore the ability of these programs to 
reduce vulnerability and improve community capacities at the state level was limited (INT 1, 2, 
6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12). The generation of standardized programming, offered by numerous groups, 
whether governmental, academic or non-governmental agencies, is required to improve the 
rating to good. A ‗divide and conquer‘ plan would allow for education and capacity training in 
all communities, thus strengthening the ability of the whole state to react in the face of the next 
threat.  
The creation of a ‗culture of safety‘ is mentioned throughout the literature on disaster 
management. A culture of safety is defined in the HFA as ―[requiring] the collection, 
compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities 
and capacities‖ and involves information management and exchange, education and training, 
research, and public awareness (ISDR, 2005, p. 10). The culture of Vargas prior to the disaster 
was considered more ‗unsafe‘ than ‗safe‘ by all interviewees. For example, evacuation routes 
identified by community members followed roadways but they had ignored the probability of the 
rivers flood waters also taking this route (INT #11). Community-level training and adaptation 
techniques also need improvement to create a safer Vargas. Interviewees recognized that current 
knowledge about the vulnerabilities and hazards residents face on a day-to-day basis was poor, 
and human created threats were not well understood by individuals living in Vargas (INT #6, 
11). The ‗culture‘ in Vargas, prior to the disaster, was conditioned by years of relatively ‗safe‘ 
life. Years of urban planning and resident behaviour which did not consider debris flow hazards 
will indeed be difficult to reverse (INT #1, 5, 6 & 7). Some interviewees offered a positive 
perspective on post-disaster community education programs suggesting that these were 
successful in changing perspectives of both school children and their parents (INT # 10, 12). 
Overall, the efforts made to generate a ‗culture of safety‘
13
, although sporadic, were successful 
where executed; and the recollection of the impacts/threats by the survivors, or the social 
memory of the event, factored into the adequate rating given to this criterion. 
                                         
13
 ‗Culture of disaster resilience‘ may be a more encompassing term than ‗safety‘ implies however, safety is 
more quantitative than resilience and was thus chosen to increase ease of measurement. 
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The next criterion looks at the impacts of recovery efforts on livelihoods, tenure and quality 
of life. General observation of communities in Vargas indicated that restoration of the pre-
disaster state was the objective. Homes had been dug out from under rubble and sediment and 
properties claimed for reconstruction when financial capital allowed (see Figure 19), while other 
homes were rebuilt in situ. Drastic changes to the organization of communities were not obvious 
in the present-day towns (field notes, 2008).  
 
Figure 19: Housing still buried in 2008 after debris flows of 1999 
Exterior walls have been painted by the owner to demarcate property boundary and intent to return to this home. 
                        Photo sources: (Stager, 2008) 
Tenure concerns surfaced in various interviews and were indicated to have been given limited 
consideration. Government housing projects built post-disaster were sold on the market rather 
than given to disaster survivors, which led to price speculation and eventual high prices as 
wealthy Venezuelans purchased and resold the homes (INT #1). The construction of limited 
―social housing‖
14
 along a stream channel that flooded in 1999 is evidence of the limited 
forward-thinking and vulnerability-reduction ability of the government. Not only was the social 
housing inadequate to accommodate all of the people left without homes, but it was built slowly, 
located in unsafe land, and offered on the market where speculators purchased units making 
them unaffordable to those most in need (INT #1, 8 & 9). Quality of life concerns appeared to be 
the responsibility of the individuals themselves. Government projects geared at enhancement of 
                                         
14
 Technically the housing in question is not ‗social housing‘ as it was sold on the market at high rates. 
Interviewees referred to these units as social housing nonetheless, so their convention is maintained for accuracy. 
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quality of life, such as waste management, sanitation or utility distribution, were limited to times 
when votes were needed rather than concern for the personal health and welfare of citizens (INT 
#1, 8 & 9). Together, the minimal livelihood, quality of life and tenure efforts led to a rating of 
poor. Successful reconstruction of a community with these traits was not executed despite the 
opportunity presented in the post-disaster timeframe. 
Understanding how to enhance and encourage community cohesion, inter/intra-generational 
equity and social capital helps ensure the effective reduction of vulnerability. Most interviewees 
suggested that recovery efforts were not planned with sufficient consideration for future risks 
and impacts (INT 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 & 11). The level of community cohesion actually seems to 
have decreased since the 1999 disaster: during a similar flooding and debris flow event in 2005, 
rivalry and competition between individuals was much greater than the cooperation and 
assistance demonstrated in 1999 (INT #10). This reduction of social capital led to a poor rating 
for this criterion. 
Insurance programs are designed to spread the loss and cost of unforeseen impacts over a 
greater time span and over a larger pool of individuals (e.g. other insurees of the same company). 
Insurance is common in developed countries where incomes are generally high enough to 
provide disposable income for indeterminate risks (Burby, 1998). However, residents of 
Venezuela, like in many other LDCs, do not view insurance as a priority or it is seen as 
unaffordable. It is likely that there is no program of insurance available in the country to protect 
belongings and property from the risks found in North Vargas State (INT #6, 8). Not 
surprisingly, the lack of VCA data would limit the ability of an insurance program to actually 
reduce known vulnerabilities. Insurance may not be an effective tool for use in very low-income 
areas of LDCs, but Vargas has a mix of wealth and could benefit from such a program. 
Regardless, in order for any insurance program to be beneficial, accurate vulnerability 
assessments of the areas to be insured are essential. Until VCA data is available or collected by 
insurance providers, and insurance is made available to residents, this criterion will continue to 
be rated poor. 
The BBB philosophy for disaster response posits encouragement of entrepreneurship in post-
disaster settings enhances recovery (Clinton, 2006). Entrepreneurs can flourish in the post-
disaster setting if new businesses can take market share and build a reputation in the newly 
emerging economy. Interviews conducted in Vargas State indicated very limited encouragement 
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of entrepreneurial endeavors. One could argue that entrepreneurship was encouraged by the 
government in their attempt to resettle survivors in a new community 400 kilometres away from 
North Vargas; putting people in a new environment challenges them to seek out new 
opportunities and skills. However, in reality, entrepreneurship was stifled because of the 
persecution and suspicion survivors experienced in the new settlement locations (INT #5, 6, 7 & 
8). As well, the settlement locations were quite different from the context of Vargas, therefore, 
the skills and expertise of the relocated individuals did not easily match the type of skills needed 
for entrepreneurial activity in the new communities (INT #6, 8 & 10). 
It is important to have business continuity plans in addition to the regional and national 
disaster management system. A business continuity plan enables the individual enterprise to 
maintain function, or return to normal operations quickly in the event of a disaster. Although no 
individual business owners were interviewed, no interviewees made mention of business-related 
assistance coming from the government. 
4.2.1 Institutional Concerns 
In addition to the socio-economic criteria, consideration of specific institutional practices and 
policies at various levels will impact the outcome of post-disaster risk reduction activities. These 
next criteria are geared at learning, cooperation, monitoring and capacity development within 
and across institutions. 
Identification of lessons learned during crisis situations allows not only the personnel to gain 
insight into their actions, but also enhances the function of the institution as a whole. 
Interviewees agreed that institutional learning after the Vargas disaster was minimal. The 
creation of two entirely new governmental agencies, CorpoVargas and Autoridad Unica, to 
manage parts of the reconstruction process, was a primary factor which stifled learning (INT # 1, 
6, 8, 9, 10 & 11). This new agency did not necessarily have access to the lessons learned during 
past flooding or debris flow events, nor was the knowledge and capacity of employees involved 
in previous responses accessible (INT # 1 & 6). Current records of lessons learned from the 1999 
disaster are now available and have been transferred by the Autoridad Única
15
 (Unique 
Authority) to CorpoVargas (INT #12). Thus, it is predicted that local management is now better 
                                         
15
 The full name is the Unique Area Authority for Vargas State and this government body was put in charge of 
planning and coordination of the plans and programs of territorial organization  (Corporación para la Recuperación y 
Desarrollo del Estado Vargas, 2006). 
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prepared for similar hazards. Because of these newly documented lessons, a rating of adequate 
was given to this criterion. 
































availability and use of previously identified lessons for risk management (local/similar hazards)? *
existence of functioning public disaster relief system? *
cooperation within and across government bodies, NGOs and community? -
clarity of responsibilities, roles and relationships (pre)defined? *
efforts to ensure continuity and stability over time in government bodies? (redundancy) *
set corresponding 'acceptable levels of risk' in all relevant ministries? (e.g. housing, planning, environment, 
natural resources, emergency management etc.) -
empowerment of local governments to manage recovery? +
staff retention schemes to maintain capacity through various emergency events? -
inclusion of private and public sector actors? *
effective use and monitoring of DRR funding and financial capital with a focus on strengthening government 
(esp. local) recovery institutions, equity and sustainability? *  
Table 5: Completed Assessment of Institutional Criteria
16
 
More broadly, the existence of a functioning disaster relief system allows for a separation of 
duties and increased efficiency due to specialization. In the immediate post-disaster period, the 
Venezuelan Protección Civil was quickly deployed and temporary hospitals and shelters were 
erected to house the victims and survivors (INT #1, 6 &10). International aid was requested and 
a ‗state of emergency‘ was declared because the extent and magnitude of the disaster was 
quickly recognized as beyond the national capacity (CEPAL, 2000; INT #1, 10 & 12). Although 
the disaster relief system did have its strengths, the absence of an early warning system had a 
significant impact on the number of fatalities and marooned victims (INT #1-13). In addition, the 
monitoring of hazards, meteorological factors and planning of the reconstruction were also 
viewed as ongoing shortfalls in the relief system (INT #1-13; Murria, 2005). Finally, the poor 
education programs have not significantly improved the general knowledge of the residents at-
risk in Vargas State since the 1999 event, as was evidenced during a smaller debris flow and 
flooding event in 2005 (INT #1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12). All of these factors indicate good 
attempts at making a functioning disaster relief system but more work is needed to generate a 
rating of good. 
                                         
16
 Sources: (INT #1-13; Field notes, 2008; CEPAL, 2000; Challa, 2000; Wieczorek et. al, 2002; Larsen et. al, 
2001; Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). 
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Cooperation and information sharing are recommended for successful vulnerability reduction 
efforts. The number of governmental, community and non-governmental organizations seeking 
to assist in a disaster response requires there to be a clear division of labour and open sharing of 
data between all actors. In Vargas State, governmental organizations were said to have poor 
communication, which restrained productivity during the immediate response and also during the 
reconstruction and recovery phases of the disaster cycle (INT #1, 6, & 11). Again, the creation of 
new government bodies added to the challenge of who to get information from: these included 
the new entities of Autoridad Única (charged with the urban planning and studies after 1999 
disaster) and CorpoVargas (in charge of structural responses) (INT # 6, 10, 11, 12). In 
consideration of these points, this criterion was rated as doing a poor job of reducing 
vulnerability.  
The related issue of identifying roles and responsibilities was done somewhat more 
effectively. As was discussed, new agencies were created to deal with urban planning and 
reconstruction in addition to the roles already defined for legislation, resources management and 
search and rescue, to name a few. The lack of standardization within the delivery of community 
awareness programs was one weakness identified post-disaster (INT #10). New agencies meant 
some roles had to be renounced by previous agencies, this surely caused confusion, conflict and 
maybe greater efficiency, still continuity efforts and identification of roles and responsibilities 
are rated as adequate. 
The determination of ‗acceptable levels of risk‘ is a concept used within environmental 
change literature, and in practice, assists ministries to work together on management issues that 
overlap various bodies. In Venezuela there was no evidence of this type of cooperative 
management across the ministries working in disaster management (INT #1, 2, 6, 9 & 11). 
Collaboration across ministries was viewed by interviewees as stopping with the division of 
responsibilities and minimal level of communication (INT #6); therefore the rating for this 
criterion in post-disaster Vargas is poor. 
Empowerment of local actors during the post-disaster phase is generally seen as a ‗good 
practice‘. The research demonstrated that empowerment of local actors was a strength of the 
response and reconstruction efforts within Vargas. Non-Venezuelan assistance was limited to 
financial contributions for both structural projects (e.g. dam and canal construction) and non-
structural responses (e.g. funding of education projects) (INT # 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 
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13). CorpoVargas and the Autoridad Unica were staffed by Venezuelans and each institution was 
permitted authority over the post-disaster urban planning and reconstruction efforts respectively 
(INT # 6, 11 & 12). The absence of foreign agencies meant that more capacity and knowledge 
was kept and developed within the region, hence the rating of good for empowerment of local 
governments. 
Weaknesses in institutional capacity are often highlighted during a catastrophe. Therefore, 
training programs, geared at building the individual employee‘s skills before a disaster, can 
improve the response to the next crisis situation. After the 1999 debris flows, the PREDERES 
project had the objective of ―empowering the organizations directly or indirectly involved in risk 
management in this area, namely the Vargas Municipal Services, the Ministry of Environment, 
the Ministry of Education, the Maritime Caribbean University and the Central University of 
Venezuela, in order to improve personal (sic) capacities and favor information and experiences 
exchange between these organizations‖ (Lopez & Courtel, 2007, p. 11). Despite this training 
program, a poor rating is given because the eventual dissolution of Autoridad Unica inevitably 
led to the loss of capacity in the state apparatus as employees went on to new jobs (INT #12). 
The use of temporary consultants for data collection and re-development planning also 
contributed to the poor maintenance of capacities and knowledge (INT #1, 6, 8, 9, 10 & 11). 
Consultants bring expertise and experience that is very valuable in determining a good solution, 
however, after the contract is finished, that knowledge and experience is not available within the 
permanent institution. 
Private and public sector cooperation, also known as public-private partnerships or PPP, can 
greatly affect the outcome of decision-making on projects that affect an entire socio-ecological 
system. In Vargas State, the inclusion of private sector experts for engineering and structural 
mitigation efforts, and the creation of CorpoVargas to manage the reconstruction activities, is an 
example of the type of cooperation attempted (INT #2, 6 & 12). The coordination and 
management of diverse actors, and the formation of PPPs, allowed for a stronger response than 
would have been possible if only public sector organizations were involved. 
Global disaster risk reduction funding is usually available, as discussed in an earlier chapter, 
from a variety of sources. The terms of use for this funding are generally broad, and do not 
require monitoring of results as long as the principle is repaid to the donor agency. However, in 
order for real change and reduction of risk to result, monitoring of the funds is important. In the 
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case in question, monitoring of risk reduction progress since 1999 seems to be limited to 
academic reports (e.g., Altez, 2005; Cardenas & Jiménez, 2005). The Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) reported repayment of loans and grants given to the Venezuelan 
government for reconstruction and disaster risk reduction projects (IDB, 2009). Despite 
repayment, there is no indication that the projects funded by the IDB have had any further 
monitoring or maintenance in the literature or from interviews. In light of the use of DRR 
funding without adequate monitoring, a good rating cannot be offered. Ergo, Vargas is rated as 
making adequate efforts on this criterion. 
4.3 Biophysical System 
The availability of up-to-date information on the biophysical system informs a successful 
response and recovery from catastrophe. Hazard maps can provide an overview of areas of 
lowest and highest risk and can inform the prioritization of evacuation routes, zoning changes, 
and urban design concerns. In Vargas, hazard maps were available to decision makers prior to 
the 1999 disaster, although the integration of such maps into the broader planning and response 
system was, and continues to be insufficient to reduce vulnerability in the state (INT #1, 3, 6, 8, 
9, 10 & 11). Broad, watershed-level maps were created as part of the UCV project to create a 
comprehensive monitoring network (INT #2), yet further use of those maps was not divulged 
throughout interviews. There has been much discussion about changes to urban zoning based on 
hazard maps since 1999, although there are ―still no decisions‖ nine years after the catastrophe 
(INT #2). 
Hazard maps can also be used to inform community members of the risks in their 
neighbourhood. It was discovered during a community education program directed at school age 
children that neither the children, nor their parents, were able to interpret such maps (INT #10). 
Thus, it can be concluded that although hazard maps for Vargas State were created, these were 
not well used for planning or education purposes and because of this, this criterion must be rated 
only as adequate. 
82 
 
































use of current hazard maps in future planning and development projects? *
understanding and documentation of function and change in bio-physical systems? *
current models predicting/forecasting probability and severity of hazard events? *
process defined/available staff to update models post-disaster? *
exitence and evaluation of early warning system? *
preparation for multiple hazard/complex hazard or rare events? -
efforts made to use and enhance natural barriers and protective structures? +  
Table 6: Completed Assessment of Biophysical System
17
 
The Central Venezuelan University (UCV) has developed a system to monitor meteorological 
and climate data in each of the flooded stream catchments as part of the recovery after the debris 
flows (INT # 2, 3, 4, 8 & 12). Studies were conducted with experts from the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) to determine the current and historical geomorphology and geology 
of the El Avila Mountain range (INT #2, 3 & 4; Wieczorek et al., 2002). Together these 
experiments provided adequate data and documentation of the changes, both real and potential, 
to the bio-physical system. 
Additionally, the UCV has integrated the climatology and meteorology data into 11 
monitoring stations to measure rainfall in real time for monitoring and measurement across the 
state (INT #2). Together with the hazard maps, this data was input into a FLO-2D model to 
simulate mud and debris flows (Lopez & Courtel, 2007). This type of mathematical model 
allows for the delineation of highly hazardous zones and can inform urban planning in the 
region. The UCV has worked closely with the local government to make this model and data 
available for use in the years following the tragedy (INT # 2, 3 & 4). The researchers from UCV 
are limited in their ability to influence policy changes; however, their willingness to cooperate 
with and inform policy makers will allow for maintenance of the models and a supply of current 
data which meets the model‘s requirements. Cooperation across institutions is good, however 
having trained staff within the government body making policy changes, whether CorpoVargas 
or another ministry, would improve the speed of decision-making and provide a more frequent 
maintenance to the model. Positive efforts for the use and updating of predictive models was 
                                         
17
 Sources: (INT #1-13; Field notes, 2008; CEPAL, 2000; Challa, 2000; Wieczorek et. al, 2002; Larsen et. al, 
2001; Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). 
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found in this research, however, the abovementioned challenges prevented a rating higher than 
adequate. 
A typical flash-flood or debris flow early warning system is comprised of hazard maps, 
evacuation plans, monitoring of relevant data (depending on the hazard), and is completed with a 
means of communicating impending danger to citizens, either through sirens or some form of 
message transfer (e.g. radio or telephone). The early warning system in Vargas State remains 
incomplete nine years after the disaster (INT #1-13). As mentioned, parts of the system are 
functioning, yet misleading information can be found throughout the communities (see Figure 
20). 
  a)  b)  
Figure 20: Signage as part of early warning system 
         
Although sirens are depicted on signs posted in some communities, no sirens have been erected, 
nor have comprehensive programs explaining the warning system been conducted within 
communities (INT #2 & 12). Some communities may have attempted their own neighbourhood 
warning systems (INT #1 &10), but without standardization and full community coverage, this 
will do little to reduce vulnerabilities regionally.  
A partial early warning system which currently sends data to monitoring staff at the UCV and 
the Caribbean Maritime University in Vargas State (INT #2) now exists, yet this system is not 
yet connected to community-level sirens, and without full involvement of all actors the program 
Text on sign b):  
WARNING 
Discontinuous siren will sound before 
flood 
Continuous siren, evacuate risk zones 
SIRENS 
 
Text on sign a):  
EVACUATION ROUTE 
Follow the evacuation route to safety  




will not be successful in reducing vulnerabilities. Figure 21, below, shows the system proposed 
by the UCV and Maritime University. Missing components and some actors who were not able 
to be interviewed during field work in 2008 are marked on the diagram. As is described through 
the diagram and the above paragraphs, the criterion related to early warning systems has been 
partially addressed by numerous initiatives in Vargas. Nevertheless, the system remains 
incomplete and therefore is rated only as adequate. 
 
Figure 21: Proposed Early Warning System (from UCV) 
Source: (INT #2, 3 & 4, 2008). 
A debris flow can be classified as a complex hazard because it starts as a flood and with 
increasing precipitation causes mudflows and debris movement of varying sizes and 
consistencies. Preparation for this kind of complex hazard demands a management system which 
is both flexible and redundant. Redundancies in evacuation routes, shelter locations, warning 
systems, command agencies and response teams create a relief system which can adjust to 
unforeseen damages and impacts. The 1999 debris flows caught residents and government bodies 
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off-guard since no one had predicted that a debris flow of that size was possible in Vargas (INT 
#1, 5, & 7). Post-disaster, channels and dams were built on each alluvial fan in an effort to 
prevent damages to housing; however, their size is thought to be wholly inadequate to eliminate 
or control damages from debris flow events (i.e. they are not thought to  have sufficient capacity 
to capture all sediments accompanying a flood event) (INT #2 & 3). As evidence of this, a 
relatively smaller debris flow event in 2005 completely filled up one of the largest dams built 
after 1999 (Field notes, 2008 – see Figure 22). Structural responses can successfully prevent 
future damage when built to accommodate significant material, however, one interviewee (#1) 
questioned whether the dams would help, or would actually supply additional material to the 
flows because of their insufficient size. The complexity of any disaster cannot be easily 
predicted, however, use of knowledge about past events, along with biophysical data, can help 
inform management plans.  
 
Figure 22: Sedimentation in Dams and Channels in 2008 
Dam on right is in Macuto and measures approximately 7m high and has been filled since before the 2005 flooding 
event.          Source: (Doberstein, 2008) 
Rare events, disasters which are infrequent or extreme in their magnitude of scope, also need 
special consideration by disaster practitioners. Swine flu, H1N1 virus, and other pandemics are 
the types of hazards which can quickly become unmanageable if proper contingency plans are 
not considered because of low statistical likelihood. Interviewees indicated that the national, state 
and municipal governments are inadequately prepared for both rare and complex disasters (INT 
#1, 6 & 12). 
Several methods to enhance ‗natural‘ protection from debris flows were found in Vargas. As 
mentioned, channelization of streams in each valley has been completed in an attempt to 
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preserve the natural flow patterns and protect homes (INT #2). The creation of the El Avila 
National Park, early in the 1950s, has served to protect the natural forests and limit development 
and forestry activities on the steep slopes of the mountain range (INT #2, 3, & 6; CEPAL, 2000). 
The presence of vegetation on the slopes in the upper watershed increased the absorption of 
precipitation and slope stability in the weeks leading up to the debris flows and, whether an 
intentional mitigation effort or not, has been acknowledge as important for post-disaster risk 
reduction (INT #6). Similarly, the use of straight channels may work to prevent damaging 
impacts during average rainfall events, but in extreme events, the river naturally wants to wander 
and the channel size is inadequate to accommodate this pattern (INT #8). Previous understanding 
of the physical geography on the part of urban planners needs updating to incorporate new 
perspectives on the river‘s direction and flow potential, nevertheless current efforts are deemed 
to be good. 
4.4 Built Environment  
A common flaw, or misconception in disaster management is that technology and engineering 
are always effective in reducing risks. Engineering solutions have improved safety in some cases 
(e.g. earthquake-proof buildings in Japan or the western USA), although engineered solutions 
have also created problems in other cases (e.g. the Yangtze River Three Gorges Dam and floods 
in China). 
































appropriate use of technology and engineering for risk reduction? -
response efforts aim to 'build back better' structurally and economically? -
reconstruction projects address need for social housing and low-income housing needs? -
redundancy in infrastructure? (e.g. evacuation routes, communication lines etc.) -
existence and enforcement of building codes for reducing risks? -  
Table 7: Completed Assessment of Built Environment
18
 
In Vargas, a reliance on structural responses has been the trend as demonstrated by the 
numerous channels and dams built, and limited use of land use zoning and building codes (INT 
                                         
18
 Sources: (INT #1-13; Field notes, 2008; CEPAL, 2000; Challa, 2000; Wieczorek et. al, 2002; Larsen et. al, 
2001; Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). 
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#1, 2, 6 & 8). It is difficult to say that these engineering and technological solutions have only 
had negative impacts on risk reduction efforts; yet, the magnitude of the 1999 debris flow event 
was much larger than structures built post-1999 are designed to trap, hence the new structures 
will do little to minimize risks from similar future events (INT #2, 3 & 4). Therefore, the 
appropriateness of the design standards and use of small structural responses must be rated as 
poor. One interviewee estimated that the 35 dams in 18 channels constructed after the 1999 
debris flows ―cannot trap more than ten percent (10%) of the sediment produced in 1999‖ (INT 
#2). These dams have been built to protect against a one in 100 year flood, but were filled up 
between 2001 and 2005 by much smaller meteorological events (INT #2). Poor planning of dam 
sites and maintenance activities has made most dams inaccessible for the removal of this 
sediment, thus rendering the dams ineffective in their role of trapping sediment in a major debris 
flow event (INT #1, 2, 6, & 8). 
The BBB propositions suggest there are numerous structural and non-structural mitigation 
techniques which can build resilience and reduce risks. Interviewees unanimously suggested that 
there had been little, if any, attempt made to ‗build back better‘ during the reconstruction 
process. Community participation occurred only during education projects and inclusion of the 
public in planning and reconstruction efforts did not occur (INT # 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12). The 
most notable failure to ‗build back better‘ was a result of slow decision-making in the immediate 
post-disaster timeframe (INT #1, 2, 5, 6, 7 & 8). The delay by the local government in deciding 
how to proceed with recovery, resettlement and reconstruction led to the reoccupation of homes 
in hazardous lands and prevented successful implementation of appropriate building design and 
hazard zonation. The second failure to ‗build back better‘ was the location of ‗social housing‘ on 
land which flooded in both the 1999 and 2005 extreme rainfall events (INT #1 & 9). 
Construction of housing for those who lost their homes is an important part of reconstruction, but 
safe location choice is the key to rebuilding a more resilient housing stock. The size of housing 
projects was also thought to be inadequate to accommodate all of the low-income families who 
lost their homes in the disaster (INT #1, 6 & 10). Because of this, the rating for ‗building back 
better‘ and addressing housing need for the lowest income segment of the population were both 
rated as poor. 
Evacuation was a difficult task for many survivors of the 1999 disaster. The flood waters 
quickly rose to flow through the streets of communities, damaging or blocking routes which lead 
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to safety (CEPAL, 2000). Poor communication of pending threats and the need to evacuate, 
along with limited awareness of how best to react, compounded vulnerabilities in many 
communities across the state (INT #10). Positive features, such as redundancies in evacuation 
routes and means of communication during danger, could not be confirmed by any interviewee 
as existing prior to 1999, nor was there any indication of these redundancies emerging post-
disaster. Two community education programs, one implemented by an academic NGO from 
UPEL
19
 called Campaña Educativa Comunidad, and the other by CorpoVargas, have been 
executed since 1999 in fewer than ten communities across the state (INT #10 & 12; Barrientos 
Ch., 2005). These programs aim at helping the communities identify their own evacuation routes 
and also to interpret signs of danger (INT #10 & 12). Although these are a positive start, the 
limited scope of these programs led to a rating of poor for this criterion. 
Building codes are often used to enhance the resilience and resistance of structures at-risk. It 
is unclear from this research whether Venezuela has newly legislated any such codes for the 
disaster-affected North Vargas State. The Campaña Educativa
20
 found that some educational 
buildings were indeed lacking emergency preparedness codes. Bars on the windows of schools 
prevented exit from alternate openings and the close location of neighbouring buildings also 
impeded evacuation (INT #10). In addition, fallen electrical poles caused electrocution and 
safety equipment was only required under government regulation in private schools; therefore, 
public schools are poorly equipped for any type of emergency (INT #10). Although information 
on building codes beyond school buildings was not identified in this research, the lack of proper 
emergency exits and equipment in schools is enough to suggest that building codes need 
increased enforcement. Because of this, and due to the construction of a community centre 
within a marked ‗limit of the flooding event from the 1999‘, this criterion on the use of building 
codes to reduce risks is also rated as poor. 
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Figure 23: Community centre built inside the 1999 flood zone 
Text on sign reads: ‗Limit of the area flooded in the 1999 event‘ – river is located behind the basketball 
court to the left, placing the community centre in a high-hazard zone. 
4.4.1 Legislation Concerns 
Legislation is a significant factor for successful implementation of any kind of program 
affecting a community, state or country. Previous criteria have already indicated the need for 
some legislation (e.g. building codes or housing policy) and to complete the assessment of post-
disaster vulnerability reduction effectiveness there are two other legislation issues to consider. In 
Vargas State, the use of urban land use zoning to protect high hazard areas was acknowledged by 
interviewees as non-existent post-disaster. Interviewee #12 confirmed that permits are issued for 
all proposed construction within the state and posited that CorpoVargas will not issue permits for 
uses which are contrary to the land use zoning designation. However, the town of Macuto, for 
example, has been identified on hazard maps as 95 percent ―high hazard‖, yet this town still has 
both commercial and residential buildings throughout (INT #2). Therefore, the integration of 
known hazard areas has yet to impact land use decisions. Other interviews also indicated a lack 




































zoning and enforcement of high hazard areas? -
policies which foster principles of sustainable livelihoods (capacity, equity, sustainability) at local, and national 
levels as well as at all stages of disaster cycle? N  
Table 8: Completed Assessment of Legislative Concerns
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Broader consequences that can result from legislation include a more sustainable economy 
and improved employment opportunities. Literature on sustainable livelihoods advocates for 
policies which ensure capacity, equity and sustainability within the workforce and amongst firms 
(Chambers & Conway, 1992). Interviews did not address sustainable livelihoods directly, thus a 
definitive rating on this criteria is not possible. However, further document analysis and 
consultation with key informants leads me to believe that the principles of sustainable 
livelihoods have not been incorporated into policies relating to disaster management or broader 
development in Venezuela (Altez, 2005; CEPAL, 2000; Lopez & Courtel, 2007; Jiménez Díaz, 
1992). One interviewee did mention that community consultation is ―not sustainable‖ because of 
the absence of any further consultation after the end of a project (INT #6). Another interviewee 
proposed that training and education would be more sustainable if delivered at local, small scale 
and if individuals were taught to incorporate risk into their everyday life due to the belief that 
relocating thousands of people is not feasible (INT #11). Only one program, PREDERES, was 
referred to as strengthening the capacity of municipalities in civil protection and other non-
disaster areas (e.g. waste management, sewage treatment). Although the success of this program 
in achieving its goals was not indicated by the interviewee, the program sounds like an initial 
attempt to improve capacity and sustainability. 
4.5 Adjustments to Assessment 
After completing PDARRE, I consulted several key informants again and asked these 
individuals to review and comment on my assessment of post-disaster responses in Vargas State. 
This process was more difficult to accomplish than expected, and it was not possible to obtain 
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 Sources: (INT #1-13; Field notes, 2008; CEPAL, 2000; Challa, 2000; Wieczorek et. al, 2002; Larsen et. al, 
2001; Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). 
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the desired response rate. Nevertheless, two key informants did review my assessment, and there 
was general consensus from both informants on all but four criteria. These four are reviewed 
next.  
The first criterion to be revised is under the heading Institutional Concerns and is 
―empowerment of local governments to manage recovery‖. The first reviewer suggested that 
although the Venezuelan government was in charge of much of the response and recovery 
process, power has not been spread broadly enough since CorpoVargas was the only institution 
granted the power and resources for reconstruction (Reviewer #1). The second reviewer 
concurred, suggesting that municipalities and regional government also should have been 
included in this process as they could enhance the use of resources and share in the project 
execution (Reviewer #2). Despite these reviewer hesitations, I feel the initial rating or good is 
still warranted. The purpose of the criterion is to rate the degree to which a local institution 
commands response activities, and therefore a reduction in the rating would reflect a situation 
where, for example, distinct efforts have been made by central government to keep power from 
local hands, or where there is no local involvement whatsoever. Although a rating of good is the 
highest, there is still room for improvement and as CorpoVargas gains more experience and 
knowledge, there is potential for continued success in this area. 
Second, after reviewer‘s comments, I agree that three criteria under Biophysical Systems 
should be revised. The ―use of hazard maps in future planning and development projects‖ is 
questioned. Although hazard maps do exist, reviewers suggested that they are not used 
sufficiently in planning and development (Reviewer #1, 2). For example, the presence of maps 
within the UCV does not necessarily mean that those maps are used by government planning 
authorities. The example of land use zoning provided for Macuto is but one clear example where 
the omission of hazard maps in zoning decisions has perpetuated vulnerabilities. Therefore this 
research cannot conclusively defend a rating of adequate, and as a result I reduced the rating to 
poor. 
―Existence and evaluation of early warning system‖ is the next criterion which needs a 
revision in its rating. The rating was reduced to poor because the system is still yet to become 
fully functioning across the state (INT #2, 4, 12, Reviewer #1 & 2). One interviewee initially 
indicated that the siren was the only missing part of the system during 2008 field work (INT 
#12). However, a reviewer reinforced that education programs within communities would also 
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need to be conducted in order for the system to work as designed (Reviewer #2). Initially the 
presence of all the necessary pieces of the system was evaluated to be a good attempt, although 
upon reconsideration, without the education of the individuals in the community on how to 
respond to the ringing of the siren, the system will never significantly reduce vulnerability. 
Finally, until I was able to read further documents and ask informants specifically about 
―preparation for multiple hazard/complex hazard or rare events‖, my evaluation of that criterion 
would have been speculative. I am confident now that a rating of poor is accurate. 
Consideration for climate change and El Niño are mentioned in a document discussing the 
effects of the 1999 debris flows and produced in part by the Venezuelan government and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC in English or CEPAL in 
Spanish) (CEPAL, 2000, p. 89). The mention of these processes is an acknowledgement of 
their potential impact on future disasters, although there is no commitment to the inclusion of 
rare events or complex hazards in preparedness activities. Other reports refer to social 
complexity as a factor in disaster management (Genatios & Lafuente, 2003), yet there is no 
reference to steps needed in order to improve policies to account for this complexity. Actually, 
the extraordinary nature of the 1999 event seems to be used as evidence not to include 
consideration for ‗rare events‘ because of the low likelihood of such an event to reoccur. 
Reviewers corroborated this evidence by suggesting that consideration of multiple or complex 
hazards and rare events are not likely currently part of policy and planning in Vargas State 
(Reviewer #1, 2). 
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current vulnerability and capacity assessment data for affected population? N
indicators/monitoring of progress on risk reduction/sust. hazard mitigation? -
standardized and inclusive community awareness programs? -
community education programs geared toward the development of a culture of safety? *
recovery made to benefit and improve livelihoods, quality of life and tenure concerns? -
enhance and encourage community cohesion, inter/intra-generational equity and social capital? -
creation of an insurance program based on vulnerability assessments? x
encouragement of entrepreneurship? -
creation of business continuity plans to rebuild and enhance local economy? N
Instituational Concerns
availability and use of previously identified lessons for risk management (local/similar hazards)? *
existence of functioning public disaster relief system? *
cooperation within and across government bodies, NGOs and community? -
clarity of responsibilities, roles and relationships (pre)defined? *
efforts to ensure continuity and stability over time in government bodies? (redundancy) *
set corresponding 'acceptable levels of risk' in all relevant ministries? (e.g. housing, planning, environment, 
natural resources, emergency management etc.) -
empowerment of local governments to manage recovery? +
staff retention schemes to maintain capacity through various emergency events? -
inclusion of private and public sector actors? *
effective use and monitoring of DRR funding and financial capital with a focus on strengthening government 
(esp. local) recovery institutions, equity and sustainability? *
Biophysical Environment
use of current hazard maps in future planning and development projects? -
understanding and documentation of function and change in bio-physical systems? *
current models predicting/forecasting probability and severity of hazard events? *
process defined/available staff to update models post-disaster? *
exitence of and evaluation of early warning system? -
preparation for multiple hazard/complex hazard or rare events? -
efforts made to use and enhance natural barriers and protective structures? +
Built Environment
appropriate use of technology and engineering for risk reduction? -
response efforts aim to 'build back better' structurally and economically? -
reconstruction projects address need for social housing and low-income housing needs? -
redundancy in infrastructure? (e.g. evacuation routes, communication lines etc.) -
existence and enforcement of building codes for reducing risks? -
Legislation Concerns
zoning and enforcement of high hazard areas? -
policies which foster principles of sustainable livelihoods (capacity, equity, sustainability) at local, and national 
levels as well as at all stages of disaster cycle? N  
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2001; Larsen & Torres-Sierra, 2006). 
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4.6 Summary of Findings 
 The Venezuelan government dealt with the Vargas debris flows in a manner which is fairly 
typical of developing country governments. The Venezuelan military played a primary role in the 
search and rescue of both survivors, and later, bodies (Stambouli, 2000; INT 1 & 3). Foreign 
assistance was requested immediately after the disaster and over the subsequent years. The 
national government was allocated nearly US$200 million by the IDB ―to restore basic services 
and avert additional losses in the central littoral of the country‖ (IDB, 2009). International aid 
and disaster assistance totaled ‗several hundreds of millions of dollars‘
23
 for reconstruction and 
vulnerability reduction efforts in Vargas State. Despite this funding, efforts were summarized by 
interviewees as very slow, and ‗largely rebuilding the conditions of risk and vulnerability that 
existed prior to the 1999 event‘ (INT #1, 6 & 8).  
Slow governmental and aid decision-making after the disaster left many survivors ‗in limbo‘: 
compensation for damaged housing was not paid out quickly and many survivors lacked the 
financial resources to rebuild in other less risky locations. Primary obstacles included: 1) a lack 
of financial capital to fund the purchase of land and building materials; 2) deteriorating social 
and human capital resources from the emotional distress and loss of life caused by the disaster 
and; 3) high competition for damaged physical and natural capital. In addition, the lack of timely 
decision-making about urban rezoning (e.g. identification of allowable reconstruction zones and 
‗no development‘ zones) was seen as a key component to the resettlement of residents in the 
damaged housing along the northern coast of Venezuela (INT #2, 6).  
Additional evidence of the largely ineffective response to the 1999 disaster came in the form 
of a failed government relocation scheme for survivors. As time passed, the government made an 
attempt to get people out of shelters and into permanent homes by relocating them to other areas 
of the country (Doberstein & Stager, 2008).  Some of the resettlement communities include 
Maracaibo, Guanare, Los Andes (Trujillo), and Ciudad Bolivar, none of which is less than 400 
km from Vargas State (see map in Appendix 2) (INT #7 & 8). Although housing was judged to 
be adequate by most interviewees, relocated families soon abandoned their new homes, and 
many returned to the disaster-affected zone (Doberstein & Stager, 2008). Interviewees offered a 
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 Two reports which collectively confirm over $122 million USD of aid are found at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/46927.pdf & in (Challa, 2000). 
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number of reasons for the failure of the relocation scheme: the culture and way of life in the 
relocation areas was too different (INT #8), relocated people did not have an affinity for the new 
land/community or surrounding region (INT #6), relocatees could not practice customary 
livelihoods such as fishing, tourism and dock work (INT #7); educational and medical facilities 
were inadequate (INT #12), and ―relocatees faced persecution and suspicion by locals in the 
relocation communities‖ (INT #5). Cardenas and Jimenez (2005) summarized the failure of the 
relocation scheme as follows: 
After the disaster, the government tried to offer housing solutions outside the 
State of Vargas, but at the end of two years most of the population returned 
to the site. The slowness in the response of the government to the 
reconstruction and recovery of housing forced people to rebuild their houses 
(by themselves), many of them in the same high-risk area (pg. 5). 
Again, speed, or more accurately, the relative lack of speed on the part of the Venezuelan 
government, appears to have been a key component to the failure of this part of the recovery 
process (Doberstein & Stager, 2008). As is very common with relocation programmes which do 
not involve community consultation (see Oliver-Smith, 1991), the ties to family, customs and 
social cohesion were not so easily transferred to the new locations. Many people were 
dissatisfied with the government‘s offer and opted to return to their previous land and face the 
known risks rather than overcoming the challenges in the new community (CEPAL, 2000; INT 
#1, 6 & 11). By one estimate, within two years at least 80% of relocated people had returned to 
Vargas State (INT #6). 
There is an emerging consensus in the global hazard mitigation community that actions taken 
during post-disaster reconstruction should aim to reduce the vulnerability of surviving residents 
(Wisner 1995; Clinton 2006). In the ‗build back better‘ approach there is now an understanding 
that ―good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing risks and building resilience‖ 
(Clinton, 2006, p.1). To do so, these reconstruction actions must be planned with the 
incorporation of longer-term results and executed to consider future implications and changes in 
variables such as demographics, economics and social structure.  
The results discussed in this chapter identify several weaknesses in the response and 
reconstruction phases of Vargas State‘s disaster management system. Many of the basic tools 
and capacities are attainable for an improved response to the next disaster, yet the 2005 flooding 
event was evidence that little had changed within the system (INT #1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10 & 11). 




damages were much less (INT #1). Nevertheless, in light of the weaknesses identified through 
the Assessment of Post-disaster Risk Reduction Effectiveness (PDARRE), the next chapter will 
identify further steps (policies, actions and solutions) which could reduce vulnerabilities in 
Vargas as part of broader development goals for Venezuela in order to achieve Objective 4. 
Chapter 5: DISCUSSION 
In Chapter two, vulnerability was defined as ―the characteristics of a person or group and their 
situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact 
of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process)‖ (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 11). Thus, in 
order to effectively reduce vulnerability, these characteristics of the socio-ecological system 
must be understood. Research on the Vargas State disaster of 1999 revealed several inherent 
characteristics which make the residents vulnerable, including: a) the rapid and unplanned 
development of urban settlements on alluvial fans; b) an incomplete disaster relief system and 
limited preventative strategies implemented prior to 1999; c) a population which is not fully 
informed or allowed to participate in risk reduction activities; and d) a socio-economic system 
which created an unequal division of wealth between Caracas and the northern coastal 
communities of Vargas State. In addition to these characteristics, the creation of CorpoVargas, a 
new government institution, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster inhibited decision-making 
by stifling communication and creating unnecessary uncertainty. The following chapter will 
discuss opportunities and concerns regarding vulnerabilities and urban settlement development. 
Following this, implications for a few significant groups will be discussed based on the 
PDARRE framework created for this research.  Finally, the chapter will conclude with some 
recommendations. 
5.1 Why Have Vulnerabilities Persisted? 
To begin with, real progress was inhibited by post-disaster changes to the power structure as 
new institutions struggled to become effective in their new roles. This type of response to 
disaster has been discouraged in the build back better literature, which suggests: ―the aftermath 
of a crisis is the wrong time to create new institutions, establish new policies and legal 
frameworks, and recruit new staff, as (this can create) major bottlenecks and delays, not to 
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mention uncertainty‖ (Clinton, 2006, p. 8). Regardless of the poor timing of its creation, 
CorpoVargas was created as a specialized institution that must be accountable for reconstruction 
into the future. Delays and uncertainty in decision-making were found to motivate residents to 
rebuild their homes in situ (see Figure 24) and can also be linked to the poor communication 
across institutions which arose as part of this research. 
 
Figure 24: Individual rebuilding his home and property markers using rocks 
transported by the 1999 debris flows 
Source: Doberstein, 2008 
Secondly, the case study herein provides an example where public consultation was not 
effectively incorporated into response or reconstruction decisions. The failure of the survivor 
relocation programs should come as no surprise given the lack of public consultation which led 
to resettlement located some 400km away and in distinctly different socio-economic 
environments. Often reconstruction authorities have been said to lack sensitivity to the 
consequences of resettlement and may ignore the social cohesion which results from re-
emergence from the rubble of a disaster (Oliver-Smith, 1991). Resettlement decisions may be 
able to capitalize on the strong social capital that is often revealed in the post-disaster setting, 
and use this to develop an advantageous and socially-acceptable relocation plan as well. In 
Vargas State, this opportunity was missed and resettlement locations were not accepted because 
the survivors were not involved in the selection of the location. 
A more successful approach would have included aspects of theory from sustainable 
livelihoods, sustainable hazard mitigation or the PAR model since these frameworks offer 
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solutions to some of the challenges faced in Vargas. The sustainable livelihoods‘ conceptual 
framework is based on analyzing, understanding and managing the complexity of livelihoods 
while enabling trade-offs to provide potential policy interventions (Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 2002, 
p. 4). Likewise, sustainable hazard mitigation theory promotes accounting for social forces and 
would have enabled similar interventions. These social forces are also the ‗dynamic pressures‘ 
which Wisner et al. (2004) mention in their PAR model. Incorporation of public input in the 
recovery, reconstruction and resettlement activities post-disaster would have identified the causal 
factors which perpetuate vulnerability and created policy interventions geared at the creation of a 
sustainable, resilient and less vulnerable community. Good practices suggest that in order for 
these forces to be truly be accounted for, all of the members of the society must have a voice that 
is heard.  
This research revealed that some positive attempts were made to carry out hazard mapping 
post-disaster, but that there was an over-reliance on consultants and little long-term institutional 
learning. Further use of hazard maps in urban planning and design would require that more than 
the academic consultants from the UCV learn to use and interpret the data from the predictive 2D 
models created after the 1999 tragedy. An over-reliance on external consultants is common 
among government institutions of many LDCs. Project-oriented agencies habitually hire staff 
with project management skills and then outsource work to expert consultants in order to 
maintain an unspecialized core staff and flexibility in their operations. This method for project 
completion, although it provides high quality results, leaves the institution with little knowledge 
about the failures and possibly a list of ‗lessons identified‘ but no real institutional learning. 
An early warning system is a key part of the relief system, but on its own, an early warning 
system will create limited long-term benefits for development and vulnerability reduction goals. 
The creation of a solid early warning system allows people to escape disastrous natural events, 
yet saving lives while repeatedly losing property and infrastructure still perpetuates cycles of 
vulnerability and poverty. Countries such as Cuba are very good at safely evacuating vulnerable 
people from unsafe land whenever hurricanes are likely, often, several times each year. 
However, damages from hurricanes could be argued as one of the primary contributors to Cuba‘s 
continued lack of advancement. Re-investment by individuals and institutions into rebuilding 
damaged infrastructure and housing is a wasteful use of financial capital which inhibits 
development progress on both the local and national scale. Moreover, structural designs are 
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difficult to improve upon because limited financial capital can be accumulated between hurricane 
strikes. This research revealed that in the absence of early warning systems, evacuation of a large 
number of people is possible. However, Vargas also shows how a response which is not planned 
or well-monitored beyond the evacuation stage can leave survivors vulnerable to the same 
threats. 
The means through which to improve future disaster response are numerous, but the following 
actions would generate a stronger system. CorpoVargas must prioritize the completion of the 
early warning system. This means the creation of community education programs associated 
with understanding the signals and actions for evacuation and protection. CorpoVargas may not 
be the proper institution to deliver community education program, but as they are closely linked 
to the system of early warning, CorpoVargas must find a means for presenting the completed 
system to ALL of the at-risk communities.  
In addition to the early warning system, the creation and enforcement of building codes and 
building design assistance will help to protect valuable infrastructure. The failure of the survivor 
resettlement programs resulted in as much as 80 percent of people returning to their home to 
rebuild (INT #6). Financial or guidance assistance from CorpoVargas or NGOs to the returning 
residents would allow them to create structures that can withstand some level of flooding and 
debris flow. Again, community education programs can serve as the manner through which to 
communicate these design requirements and suggestions to those who remain at-risk to the 
hazards in Vargas State. 
Post-disaster, the inappropriate structural responses (e.g. incomplete dam network and lack of 
maintenance access) and lack of partnerships or community inputs to reconstruction plans raises 
questions about CorpoVargas‘ ability to achieve their stated purpose. Had CorpoVargas properly 
monitored the construction of the dams, with qualified staff to evaluate the completion, then the 
dams would have been accessible for sediment removal. Engineers from UCV became aware of 
this failure following flooding in 2005, considered a typical one in 500 year event, which caused 
the dams to fill to their limits (INT #2-4). The relevance of the BBB propositions is epitomized 
in this failure of ―good information‖ and the need for ―partnerships that move beyond rivalry and 
unhealthy competition‖. All actors working on the reconstruction, whether for research or 
construction purposes, should be communicating, yet, like many cases globally:  
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―…individuals, organizations, businesses, and governments tend not to adopt or 
implement on any large scale the mix of sustainable mitigation precautions that would 
enable them to avoid long-term losses from hazards. Thus, making mitigation a reality 
will require overcoming many human behaviours along with financial, political and 
social obstacles‖ (Mileti, 1999, p. 136).  
 
Maskrey (1989) advocates the post-disaster use of community based organizations  (CBOs) ―at 
the local level to reinforce organisation, build up political consciousness and reduce long term 
vulnerability … [to] attack the causes and not just the symptoms … through a strategy for 
immediate action‖ (p. 46). In this way, communities are able to reduce their risk level on a day-
to-day basis by demanding more capable management of vulnerabilities from their government, 
developing long term resilience to hazards locally, and achieving development progress. There 
was no evidence to suggest that CBOs played a significant role in Vargas State post-disaster 
reconstruction. 
The lack of information sharing and strong partnerships built on trust and respect also became 
apparent in the structural responses to the tragedy of 1999. For example, the use of a number of 
different types of dams, from gabions to a Swiss technology known as ‗flexible ring net 
barriers‘
24
, is an indication of a lack of research or knowledge of the best technologies and/or 
physical composition of the region. Lopez and Courtel (2007) suggest ―interception and retention 
dams in the middle and lower part of the catchments (canyons) and channel works tend to limit 
or suppress the consequences of the [debris flows]‖ (2007, p. 3). However, the authors never 
explain why multiple types of dams were subsequently constructed in those catchments. 
Actually, the geology in North Vargas is cited by other researchers as fairly consistent across 
catchments. One example refers to the soils as being ―found frequently as [clayey colluvial 
deposits] overlying partially-to-deeply weathered, strongly foliated bedrock‖ (Wieczorek et al., 
2002). Therefore, the use of more than one type of dam suggests a lack of confidence in the 
research from either the geologists or the structural engineers.  
Trust and cooperation are key characteristics for success when working on such a complex 
issue as vulnerability reduction in a socio-ecological system. This study found these 
characteristics to be lacking in the post-disaster setting. Interviewees revealed problems 
including: i) poor communication between government agencies (INT #11); ii) pre-disaster 
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ideological concerns including a lack of public participation and a non-comprehensive response 
ability (INT #1); iii) government priority for rapid rather than planned reconstruction (INT #6); 
iv) government fears of changing or upsetting the current socio-ecological system (INT #6 & 
10); and v) the creation of CorpoVargas which resulted in two bodies having responsibility over 
the same land (INT #8). These issues affected the ability of decision makers to foster a trusting 
and cooperative environment, in turn impacting how well they were able to address and reduce 
the dynamic pressures which imbedded vulnerability in the region prior to 1999. Most of these 
pressures remain problematic, following the post-disaster response. 
Overall, this case study analysis has shown the complexities which arise in managing disaster 
in LDCs. This next section will look more specifically at hazards in urban centres and identify 
further dynamic pressures which affect urban areas specifically. 
5.2 Socio-economic Factors in Urban Settlements 
Globally, many major disasters have occurred in large urban centres. The complexity of each 
disaster varies along a socio-economic spectrum, but also in relation to the size and type of 
hazard because ―not all large urban centres have similar vulnerability profiles‖ (United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme, 2007, p. 184). In many developing country urban centres, the 
pressure to achieve or maintain economic development can detract attention from urban planning 
and create uncontrolled growth leading to further vulnerability and informal settlements. Finding 
a balance between managing DRR goals and economic growth is a challenge that LDCs around 
the globe still struggle with. Unfortunately, the infrequency of disasters often means DRR 
continues to take a back seat in development goals. However, this thesis has offered a prime 
example of the negative impacts which hazards can have on development when risk reduction is 
minimal, or separated from broader development efforts. 
Hazard risks are not limited to Vargas State, but have also increased in Caracas because of 
economic pressures and urban growth. As Venezuela increased its international trade revenues, 
the investments from foreign companies caused urban expansion in Caracas and in the 
communities surrounding the main air and sea ports in North Vargas State. This expansion 
outpaced urban development planning, resulting in the formation of informal settlements on 
unsafe lands ringing Caracas Valley (e.g. ravines, steep slopes, river edges). Landslides and flash 
floods in the informal settlements of Caracas have caused deaths. In addition, utility 
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infrastructure and highways systems have also been classified as at-risk from hazards (Vranes & 
Czuchlewski, 2003).  
Vargas faces similar challenges because of the history of post-1950s explosive urban growth 
on either side of the Sierra El Avila
25
 (Jiménez Díaz, 1992). Yet the Venezuelan government has 
recently divided decision-making for Caracas and Vargas State, and now cooperation between 
levels of government has been identified as a challenge (INT #1, 6 & 11). Additionally, the 
location of the Sierra El Avila between Vargas and Caracas detracts some attention from hazard 
risks in Vargas. The larger population in informal settlements in Caracas have a lengthy history 
of landslides and were also damaged by rainfall in 1999, thus national efforts have become more 
focused on those citizens as time has progressed (INT #11). This disproportionate focus is not 
justified given the persistent threats in Vargas and the continued growth of the population on the 
alluvial fans there. 
Not only has Vargas taken second place to Caracas in DRR, but risk reduction solutions for 
Caracas cannot easily be applied to Vargas‘ smaller urban areas mainly due to differences in 
livelihood assets. However, information sharing and collaborative discussion of risks would be 
logical in the Venezuelan context. Similarities in the physical environment mean that at least 
some structural responses, such as building design improvement, from Caracas could be applied 
in Vargas. In reality, several interviewees suggested that funding and resources have been 
focused on the maintenance of popular votes, rather than the reduction of risks. In both Caracas 
and Vargas, the delivery of utility infrastructure to barrios and housing in high risk zones has 
been endorsed by government officials to rally support for political campaigns (INT #1, 6 & 8; 
Jiménez Díaz, 1992). This encourages permanence in risky settlements as households invest 
financial resources into their homes, however unsafe their location may be. 
Vargas State exemplified how hazard vulnerability can develop through urban and economic 
growth linked to industrial and recreational development pressures originating from its proximity 
to the capital of Caracas. The coastal communities have grown in recent decades because the 
industrial and recreation sectors provide employment opportunities. As a result, Vargas has two 
main types of housing: 1) permanent low-income or middle-class housing occupying marginal 
lands such as river beds or steep slopes and 2) vacation/second homes for middle-class 
                                         
25
 This growth, by chance, also closely corresponds with the last major debris flow event in Vargas State (1951). 
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Caraqueños (INT #3). Housing theory suggests that social housing and/or various forms of 
subsidies are required in order to provide good quality/adequate housing with services for 
residents who cannot afford market rate housing or assist residents to improve and/or expand 
their homes. This was not the case in Vargas where post-disaster housing intended for the low-
income survivors was sold on the market. With housing on safe lands being sold at higher prices, 
the lower-income segment of the population has been forced to more marginal lands where 
vulnerabilities are higher. Even government-built housing intended as ‗social housing‘ has been 
located on flood plains, next to rivers. 
In summary, many of the post-disaster actions taken by the Venezuelan government were 
missed opportunities which have generated and perpetuated, rather than reduced, vulnerabilities. 
There does not appear to be a sophisticated governmental understanding that:  
Holistic disaster recovery is really ―sustainable redevelopment,‖ … Disaster recovery 
provides an opportunity to correct the unsustainable mistakes of the past. Disaster 
recovery is not, however, the driving force behind implementation of sustainability, nor 
should it be. Disasters are simply catalysts for change. The post-disaster ―window of 
opportunity‖ is a time when past mistakes can be assessed, and drawing upon experience, 
try to demonstrate the way for the future (Natural Hazards Research and Applications 
Information Center, 2001, p. 2.13).  
Although to date Venezuela has yet to capitalize on the post-disaster ―window of opportunity‖, 
analysis of this case can certainly inform future disaster management decisions both in 
Venezuela and elsewhere. 
5.3 Implications 
Objective 4 of this thesis was to identify further steps which could reduce vulnerability and 
risk in Vargas as part of broader development programs in Venezuela. Accordingly, the 
following pages will discuss possible future polices, actions and DRR solutions. The format for 
this discussion will direct implications toward selected actors while following the categorization 
of the criteria in the PDARRE framework from Chapter 4. 
5.3.1 Implications for Venezuela 
5.3.1.1 Socio-economic System 
This section of criteria received mixed results, although overall the rating for risk reduction is 
poor. The function of the socio-economic system depends on the interactions of people at 
different levels. The poor execution of community capacity building programs has resulted in a 
104 
 
mosaic of preparedness levels across the State. Additionally, the poor communication across 
organizations offering programs meant that some communities never received such capacity 
building attention. Greater coordination, attention to livelihoods concerns and encouragement of 
a ―culture of safety‖ are criteria that all need further attention from government and NGOs. The 
BBB propositions also encourage the use of insurance programs which demands business owners 
and residents understand their risks and value their safety. Through this research the realities in 
Vargas were depicted and many of these socio-economic criteria were not adequately addressed 
in post-disaster actions, although DRR could still benefit from improvement in a variety of these 
areas.  
Interviewees were not able to answer all questions relating to the socio-economic questions, 
thus my efforts made to find definitive answers to all criteria were unsuccessful. I would 
speculate however, that VCA are not frequently updated for Vargas State. It is also likely that the 
responsibility for such assessments was not reallocated after the creation of CorpoVargas.  With 
the more recent dissolution of Autoridad Unica, and the transfer of some responsibilities to 
CorpoVargas, it is probable that uncertainties have resulted in discontinuous flows of 
information across the State. Business continuity planning is also unlikely to rate highly on the 
priority list for business owners as they attempt to generate financial capital for their families and 
to rebuild their homes and businesses. It is not too late to institute continuity plans or VCA in 
Vargas. The on-going risks and vulnerabilities actually make it prudent and practical to look at 
incorporating these practices, along with insurance on capital assets so that losses from the next 
disaster are spread over a longer time period. 
Successful disaster reconstruction is linked to economic development through the 
maintenance of foreign investments and relations. Since many LDCs depend on foreign 
investment for their economic well-being, disaster impacts can affect those investments through 
damage to infrastructure or lost productivity and the effectiveness of the disaster response also 
affects the impacted country‘s image. The case study herein demonstrates how foreign 
investment led to urban growth in at-risk lands as jobs were created in sectors such as tourism 
and import/export industries. The importance of cooperation, including honest and open 
communication amongst all actors post-disaster resulted in economic implications that impacted 
livelihoods, politics and the health of those living in Vargas. Interviewees noted that major 
international hotels were not rebuilt after the 1999 disaster (INT #1 & 9).  The major damages to 
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the hotel structures could be one reason the owners withdrew their investments in Vargas. 
However, ineffective disaster response can have impacts on more than just infrastructure and 
survival rates, links to foreign investments are additional motivations for the creation of a 
functioning disaster relief system which protects those investments. 
The complexity of the Vargas debris flow disaster is a result of a mix of socio-economic 
factors, including the strength of social capital and diversity of livelihoods. Vargas State is home 
to many non-permanent residents who own second or vacation homes which creates pockets of 
strong social cohesion, interspersed with communities who have limited interaction. Special 
consideration of how to educate this mixed group of people on the threats they face, therefore, 
must also be part of the broader disaster recovery plan. In addition, employment in sectors such 
as import/export, tourism and fisheries creates a community with different, unique interactions 
with the social-ecological environment of the State. These factors do add complexity to the post-
disaster recovery activities, especially with the goal of creating a ―culture of safety‖, but once 
acknowledged these factors can be managed. Mixed methods of communication with at-risk 
communities in Vargas will provide multiple opportunities for education and awareness-raising 
and result in a more resilient socio-ecological system. 
5.3.1.2 Institutional Concerns 
The post-disaster response effectiveness of the institutions in Vargas State rated slightly 
higher than the socio-economic criteria, although some specific institutional criteria still require 
attention from local governmental institutions and NGOs alike. The institutional strengths are 
largely a result of good identification of roles and responsibilities. Despite the poor timing of the 
creation of Autoridad Unica and CorpoVargas, these institutions had specific responsibilities that 
interviewees believed were well known.  Access, coordination and monitoring of DRR funding 
allowed the response team to act quickly and plan future DRR actions. Inclusion of public and 
private actors during the immediate disaster response phase was another manner through which 
CorpoVargas followed good practice. However, greater public participation in decision-making 
considerations for the future was needed, and improved oversight and control of the 
reconstruction will create stronger decisions that are embraced by the local residents. 
Poor cooperation, integration, and lack of standardization of acceptable levels of risk were 
also noted by interviewees as institutional weaknesses in the post-disaster response. The research 
revealed poor staff capacities and high turnover rates within local government organizations as 
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well. According to interviewees and secondary data, the Venezuelan government‘s standard 
practice when new issues relating to governance arise is to create new institutions. Therefore, 
challenges with the quality and supply of human capital will continue to plague all institutions 
and affect overall cooperation. The importance of cooperation is noted in literature on Integrated 
Emergency Management (see McLoughlin, 1985). Integration of activites from the local to the 
national level is advocated because it clarifies roles at each level of institution. Additionally, by 
integrating emergency management across all levels, standardization of practices and acceptable 
levels of risk can result. The USA‘s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has a 
strong, integrated system and although its capacity can still be overwhelmed (e.g. during 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005), the benefits of coordination and cooperation can be seen in most 
other events. The PDARRE framework revealed that Venezuela has a well organized immediate 
response plan, which can be improved upon over the longer term through further integration and 
thoughtful observation of weaknesses that have emerged since 1999. 
The Venezuelan institutions scored adequately on some criteria, yet overall their response 
needs improvement in some areas. By empowering local institutions to manage the recovery, 
lessons were more readily identified through the recollection of past events and their impacts on 
decision-making. However, since new institutions were responsible for managing the response, 
inefficiencies were evident as slow decision-making delayed important, vulnerability-reduction 
actions (most notably relocation of survivors and revisions to land use zoning). Maintenance of 
the status quo is recommended, including roles and responsibilities, because this will 
undoubtedly reduce inefficiencies in future emergency situations. Future additions or changes to 
the chain of disaster response command would only further delay decisions, and create losses of 
capacity across the disaster management system as personnel are moved or effective teams are 
interrupted. 
5.3.1.3 Biophysical Environment 
DRR action relating to the biophysical environment also received mixed results in PDARRE. 
Venezuela faces hazards in a diversity of geographic regions across the country. The 1999 
disaster caused landslides and flooding in other states and yet Vargas was the worst affected. A 
critical reflection of which factors were different in the surrounding states is an important part of 
the planning and coordination as advocated in the key propositions for BBB. 
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The improvement of the biophysical environment‘s ability to absorb and adapt to major hydo-
meteorological events would involve post-disaster actions such as reforestation and upper 
watershed protection. The existence of the El Avila National Park provides a solid means through 
which to protect and ensure upper watershed stability, but poor enforcement of the regulations 
within the park boundaries has limited their effectiveness.  
Further recovery of the biophysical environment could include river monitoring, sediment 
traps and channelization of streams. These activities have been incorporated into the post-
disaster activities in Vargas but with minimal results. The sediment trapping abilities of the dams 
constructed after 1999 are inadequate for the on-going sediment deposition that occurs in these 
streams during regular rainfall. The channels were also not built wide enough or in the proper 
locations to provide real protection from debris flows (Lopez & Courtel, 2007). Consideration of 
the location and direction of roadways could enhance channel function by allowing flood waters 
to use roads as secondary channels. The natural barriers, forested slopes and stream channels, 
serve a very important purpose in preventing land-slides and debris flows, but can protection can 
be enhanced using well-devised structural responses. CorpoVargas, in conjunction with experts 
from engineering and ecology, must seek to better understand the processes in the natural 
environment to improve the use of these inherently protective and stabilizing features. 
General knowledge of processes which occur in the biophysical environment in Vargas is 
visible from the 1999 response activities. Researchers have recognized that systems such as the 
cold front that stalled over the Southern US in December 1999 could recur and cause extreme 
rainfall if extratropical circulation features reach the deep tropics during the dry season (Lyon, 
2003). An El Niño event occurred in 1997-98 followed by a La Niña event in 1999-2000, these 
events cause changes in sea-surface temperatures which also affect climate (Vitelli, 2000). In 
addition, socio-ecological systems are known as dynamic systems which require not only 
knowledge of the environment, but also on-going monitoring and modeling. Competent, trained 
staff with an awareness of the connections between processes will allow decision-making 
institutions to derive solutions based on current data and then subsequently reduce vulnerability 
with minimal interruption of the normal function of the socio-ecological system. Staff training 
programs will improve risk reduction efforts because the staff will have the proper knowledge to 
make decisions, but also because of the added loyalty and value a person feels when they are 
offered additional educational opportunities. 
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5.3.1.4 Built Environment 
A basic concern in the immediate post-disaster setting is the return of basic infrastructure, 
safety and sanitation. Physical infrastructure, including roadways, utilities and public buildings, 
can significantly affect vulnerability and livelihoods. Through careful evaluation, reconstruction 
of these structures can allow for effective improvements to the resilience of the structures, which 
will have ripple effects on, for example, evacuation during the next disaster. The PDARRE 
indicates that Vargas institutions need to make changes to their current practices post-disaster to 
make better use of built structures. 
Furthermore, land-use planning determines what type of construction is allowed, or not 
allowed, in a given location. The long decision-making delays with regards to changes in land-
use have resulted in the reconstruction of risks in many parts of Vargas State. Even in 2008, nine 
years after the disaster, there are structures which have been rebuilt on high-risk lands because 
no new zoning plan has been developed. To create a reduction of risk, land-use zoning must be 
implemented and enforced so that high-hazard areas are demarcated and development of fragile 
buildings does not continue. CorpoVargas, as the institution in charge of reconstruction, must 
work to create these new land-use plans and make certain that they are followed as the 
reconstruction continues. 
Post-disaster reconstruction in Vargas had several weaknesses. The delay in land-use and 
community design decision-making allowed survivors to return to their homes and rebuild the 
structures in the same risky locations with the resources available to them (see Figure 24, p.97) 
CorpoVargas failed to offer building design assistance which would have created stronger, more 
resilient homes for the survivors. Individual houses that need to be rebuilt can benefit from 
design changes such as building homes to direct the flow around the structure – for example, 
build the widest side of the house parallel to the flow direction so that there is as little resistance 
as possible on for the debris flow (Doberstein & Stager, 2008). In Vargas, the use of retention 
walls around homes (see Figure 19, p. 75) can also create problems. This type of property marker 
is common in many Latin American countries, however these walls can also block people inside 
or cause sudden and intense flows. Building codes in Vargas must therefore change to consider 
this architectural feature and the safety implications it raises. 
The construction of dams provided evidence that CorpoVargas was indeed working to rebuild 
the State; what is questionable is how well that reconstruction has reduced risks in the 
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communities. The ability to remove sediment from debris flow dams is essential to the dam‘s 
ability to withhold material in a future debris flow. Literature on dams and their maintenance 
advises that ‗sand pockets‘ and sediment removal is necessary (Takahashi et al., 2001). Since 
CorpoVargas has yet to make provisions for sediment removal, and the 2005 event demonstrated 
the limited holding capacities of the dams, it is questionable whether the agency comprehends 
fully the function the dams should serve, or the scale needed to adequately protect downstream 
communities.  
5.3.1.5 Legislation Concerns 
This research did not reveal any post-1999 changes to disaster risk reduction legislation in 
Vargas State, nor in Venezuela. Changes to land-use zoning were not identified to be part of the 
response by the local government, Autoridad Unica or CorpoVargas. In the absence of such 
legislation the northern coast has continued development on all but one alluvial fan. The 
Venezuelan armed forces have taken possession of Carmen de Uria and thus residential 
development has been stopped there (INT #9). The military was able to claim possession of this 
area because of the severe debris coverage, although a change in land-use designation was not 
indicated by interviewees. 
Legislation issues surround and are inextricably linked to many of the above-mentioned 
weaknesses in the post-disaster actions. Strong legislation must be accompanied by clear 
communication of the laws and regulations as they are created and deliberate enforcement of the 
legislation is also needed. CorpoVargas is in charge of the reconstruction but has the authority to 
approve construction permits as well (INT #12). Decisions about construction are made on the 
basis of out-of-date information on threats since no changes were made after 1999. Additionally, 
cooperation with municipal governments, local law enforcement and other ministries including, 
housing and the environment is needed for effective maintenance of safe and resilient structures. 
The decisions made by these other institutions must be based on current information, and their 
operations could also inform future changes to land-use zoning changes to be made by 
CorpoVargas. 
All of the criteria of PDARRE are important, but in this case a few key criteria could lead to 
significant improvements in preparation for the next disaster and hopefully even result in a 
reduction of impacts in these inherently unsafe communities. The importance of cooperation, 
communication, trust and good information has repeatedly been identified within the categories 
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of the post-disaster assessment. Competent, knowledgeable staff to foster these qualities is also 
needed to improve the DDR effectiveness in Vargas, as in other cases. The discussion will now 
progress to implications for other actors and academia and will be followed by a short list of 
recommendations for specific criteria that will have important effects on future success in 
Vargas.  
5.3.2 Implications for Humanitarian Aid and Relief Agencies 
The assessment tool created in this study provides useful information not only to governments 
but to aid agencies as well. International humanitarian organizations offer great support to local 
governments after a disaster. The BBB propositions identify that these organizations must act to 
assist and empower local governments, and in Vargas after the debris flows, this did occur. The 
1999 debris flows offer a good example of the local government maintaining control of the 
immediate response and recovery. But the overall failure to significantly reduce vulnerabilities 
indicates that NGOs and donors did not meet their responsibility, as defined in the BBB 
approach, of strengthening local government recovery institutions and ensuring quality 
responses. The take away message for humanitarian relief and aid agencies is to seek out 
methods through which their expertise from previous disasters can be used to further improve 
vulnerability reduction in the context in which they are currently working. 
Another implication of this research is that the impacts from disaster response activities must 
also be measured and considered, in addition to those impacts from the actual, physical event. 
This lesson has been learned in other global disasters, including the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
where it was recognized that ―the ecological costs of cleanup and reconstruction following the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami will compete with or even exceed environmental losses caused by the 
wave‖ (IFRC, 2003 cited in United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2007, p. 178). As 
part of the disaster management cycle, all sources of impact need to be factored in so that 
activities at one stage of the cycle do not impede efforts in another, or likewise that the actions of 
one institution do not create work for another. This was particularly evident in the failed Vargas 
State resettlement plan which saw people forced to relocate twice – once away from the disaster 
zone and later on back to the disaster zone. Use of a complex systems approach to understanding 
the interconnections between processes within the socio-ecological system can assist long-term 
planning and risk reduction programs. This also brings about the need to make deliberate 
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decisions based on good information which very likely will require the development of 
partnerships between NGOs and local governments. 
This research has generated a new tool for monitoring and evaluating post-disaster 
reconstruction activities. Relief and aid agencies may be able to enhance and test this framework 
and use it to complement current practices and tools. The BBB propositions and the PDARRE 
evaluation resulted from specific cultural settings but when applied in other settings still have 
relevance. Testing PDARRE in other contexts would improve the robustness of the tool and 
identify whether criteria need adjustment for different settings.  
Theoretical knowledge about disaster management is important, but practical application of 
that theory is the only way to validate research. Currently, the use of checklists and tools such as 
rapid needs assessment are commonly used for management of immediate response activities. 
After the immediate response is complete, the NGOs commonly move to another disaster and the 
communities are left to complete reconstruction and prepare for the next disaster on their own. It 
is hoped that this evaluation framework will encourage NGOs, governments and communities to 
think about vulnerability reduction as a part of disaster response, longer-term planning, and 
sustainable development decision-making. 
5.3.3 Implications for Disaster Stricken Communities 
The communities in Vargas illustrate how people who are poorly-informed about their 
vulnerabilities and who have few resources can overcome severe disastrous events where lives 
are interrupted and whole cities are buried in sediment. Although the Vargas communities are 
not the first to endure this kind of disaster, their ability to carry on despite some serious 
weaknesses in the post-disaster response is remarkable. The weaknesses in the post-disaster 
response activities have allowed identifiable vulnerabilities to persist and will thus need to be 
addressed if the Vargas communities do not wish to relive such tragedy again. 
Educating local residents and building social capital through knowledge and empowerment is 
suggested in the literature on public/stakeholder participation as necessary for success. Simple 
participation would fall on rung three of Arnstein‘s Ladder, which is an improvement upon the 
1999 situation, where no participation existed. However, as the public and local organizations 
become better informed, efforts to achieve more than tokenism would result in better 
vulnerability reduction (Arnstein, 1969). Empowerment of communities through education is 
also known to promote CBOs that take action to improve livelihoods and security. 
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Unfortunately, one interviewee (INT #10) indicated a decline in social cohesion because 
neighbours did not help each other as much after the 2005 debris flows. Over time, this cohesion 
may return as residents realize that they too may require assistance in emergency situations, but 
active fostering of community cooperation by local government representatives and NGOs can 
also assist the maintenance of social cohesion. If cohesion cannot be encouraged, at least 
individuals will have the knowledge to act, or react to the threats and hazards through the 
continuation of capacity building programs. 
Housing implications for the disaster-stricken communities were also exposed from this 
research. Social housing responses by government were almost absent, and what housing was 
available at lower rates was located in unsafe lands which interviewees identified as having 
flooded in both 1999 and 2005. The inadequate housing for the poorest segment of the 
population led to a housing supply which was built long after residents had made alternate 
arrangements to rebuild on previous sites, or new housing was purchased by the wealthy. The 
supervision of the housing market and construction locations was the responsibility of 
CorpoVargas, which was evidently unable to ensure housing to those who needed the most 
assistance. Proposition #2 of the BBB framework posits equity as one of its main facets. In 
Vargas the housing reconstruction remains inequitable. 
 
Figure 25: Flooding and 'Social Housing' constructed in Camuri Chico 
Source: Altez, 2005; Doberstein, 2008 
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The final implication to be discussed in this section relates to vulnerability assessments and 
monitoring of changes. The towns of Vargas State are built on alluvial fans. Geologists and 
scientists assert that flooding and debris flows recur periodically on alluvial fans. Although the 
recurrence cannot be predicted, careful monitoring of changes can ensure some level of safety 
for those living on these formations. Up-to-date and publically disseminated information about 
the socio-economic and biophysical systems was lacking in Vargas, but this information is 
essential to an effective response and recovery from disastrous events on alluvial fans. In the 
literature, VCAs are used to assist in land-use planning and for disaster response planning. 
Technological advancements are also improving the ability of planners to integrate indicators of 
both social vulnerability and biophysical risk (Cutter, 2003). Technologies may be expensive and 
beyond the budget of LDC governments normally, however, the post-disaster context offers the 
opportunity for investment in longer-term management through the use of post-disaster funding.  
5.3.4 Implications for Academia 
Literature on disaster management and post-disaster reconstruction is not lacking, although 
there is still much that can be learned. Case study investigations of post-disaster responses can 
reveal some of the problems that require further study, or identify successful methods used for 
DRR. The Vargas case does offer some positive actions that others can learn from, but mostly 
the weaknesses in their post-disaster response identify challenges faced by LDCs that may be 
improved by academic studies. 
First, institutional learning was not achieved in the Venezuelan institutions. Although 
interviewees offered some insights into the reasons for this, further research would be needed to 
identify the internal pressures which affected institutional learning in Vargas. This is not a 
phenomenon limited to Venezuela: ―There is a marked inability by the scientific community to 
adequately convey the results of their research to communities, governments, and the private 
sector, which consequently remain poorly equipped to interact with decision makers to address 
vulnerability‖ (Manuel-Navarrete, Javier-Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007, p. 212). From interviews 
with engineers and scientists at UCV in Caracas, there did not seem to be any lack of evidence 
regarding the biophysical characteristics and thresholds of the watersheds in Vargas State. Yet 
based on the decisions taken by CorpoVargas, relating to the construction of dams for example, a 
problem in understanding the scientific knowledge available to them is obvious. Investigation 
into the relationship between engineers and scientists at UCV and decision makers would 
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indicate the source of the communication challenge and potentially also offer solutions to the 
problem of poor institutional learning. 
Next, the research for this study indicates that vulnerability has not been significantly reduced 
in the nine years that have passed since the 1999 debris flows along the northern coast of 
Venezuela. What is also relevant is understanding how the vulnerabilities are perceived by the 
communities at present. Future research, including focus groups with community leaders and 
interviews with new and long-term residents of the State would provide useful additional 
information regarding vulnerability. Additional interviews with key informants could better 
address uncertainties regarding insurance plans, business continuity planning and the integration 
of sustainable livelihoods into policies. Social memory length is known to vary across contexts 
and based on numerous variables. In North Vargas it would be relevant to know if the 2005 
floods, where people lost further property and family members, served to reinforce the unsafe 
nature of this location in the social memory. Studies of community cooperation and cohesion 
would also indicate how social memory and vulnerability are impacted in communities with high 
quality capital assets as compared to those with poor quality capital assets. Finally, investigations 
which seek to determine whether community or household level activities to reduce vulnerability 
have been more or less successful than the government actions could uncover alternatives to 
policy solutions. 
The ‗build back better‘ approach is relatively new but has received credibility and popularity 
since the 2004 Asian Tsunami. The ten propositions (see Appendix 1) offer good practices that 
are applicable to diverse contextual circumstances. From this research, timing of decision-
making has been a notable challenge. The need for an estimated timeline or deadline for actions 
may improve the BBB approach. How best to derive such a timing estimate is beyond the scope 
of this research, but possible research areas include: the amount of time NGOs are willing to 
dedicate to any one recovery, how long survivors are content in shelters, or how long aid 
agencies should remain before community dependency sets in. These and other, long-term 
studies can assist in improving the BBB approach. 
PDARRE, the evaluation framework herein, was derived from good practices in disaster 
management, sustainable livelihoods and vulnerability reduction. Complementary case study 
evaluations using this assessment tool would also enable improvements to the list of criteria and 
allow other vulnerable communities to improve upon their reconstruction efforts. Repeat 
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assessments in Vargas in ten or twenty years are also recommended. Future data showing 
changes in policies, practices and the socio-ecological system will serve to monitor disaster 
management activities at different stages of the cycle. Future assessments will help indicate 
whether disaster management remains a priority in the absence of disastrous events, or the future 
assessments may be performed more promptly after the next disaster where it may be used to 
guide CorpoVargas and its partners to a more successful reduction of risk.  
5.3.4.1 Limitations of this Research 
Some of the limitations of this research have implications for future researchers interested in 
Venezuela. My original plan was to use the June 2008 field work as a scoping exercise to be 
followed up with a return visit to Vargas State sometime after September 2008. Safety concerns 
were not considered to be particularly significant in the initial planning of research in Venezuela. 
However, I was warned numerous times, by several people not to return without a field assistant, 
preferably male. Additionally, as much of the literature on communities suggests, finding 
someone from the local area would have been even more appropriate for building trust with the 
communities and would have assisted me in revealing the necessary information. My personal 
financial restrictions and a lack of additional funding limited my ability to cover my own flight 
and accommodations, not to mention the additional time needed in the field and the costs 
associated with finding an appropriate assistant. Therefore, the research was completed with 
reference to secondary documents and reports (approximately 30) and the idea of consulting key 
informants to review the assessment was derived. Making contact with more key informants 
prior to arrival in Venezuela would have been useful and could have saved the limited time I had 
in the country for the collection of data. All of the people interviewed were incredibly helpful 
and generous with their time, thus to make better use of that assistance through more detailed 
contact prior to field work is recommended for the next study. 
5.4 Summary of Implications  
This section has highlighted the many implications revealed through this study. Local level 
governmental agencies have many actions that can be taken now and into the future that will 
improve their ability to reduce vulnerabilities. NGOs and communities can also learn from the 
events of 1999 and the response since then. 
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Academia has offered valuable tools and knowledge to assist with post-disaster risk reduction, 
but the outcome of the response and reconstruction efforts after the Vargas State debris flows re-
emphasizes many problems facing the developing world. For instance, recall the thirteen 
interrelated and recurrent factors used to explain vulnerability to hydrometeorological disasters 
in Latin America and the Caribbean:  
(a) poverty and socio-economic marginalization,  
(b) institutional and democratic weakness,  
(c) rapid, unregulated, and unplanned urbanization,  
(d) formation of slums and occupation of hazardous areas,  
(e) population growth,  
(f) migration from rural to urban areas,  
(g) increasing population affected by disasters,  
(h) ecosystem conversion,  
(i) erosion,  
(j) increasing intensity of hydrometeorological events causing disasters,  
(k) increasing economic damage due to disasters,  
(l) failure to communicate scientific knowledge effectively, and  
(m) expansion of agriculture  
(Manuel-Navarrete, Javier-Gómez, & Gallopín, 2007, p. 210) 
Many of these factors were evident in this analysis of the 1999 disaster and still persist in 
Venezuela today. The discussion herein offers insight into solutions and adjustments to the 
disaster management system in Venezuela that can initiate actions aimed at reducing 
vulnerability. Such actions will create change over time and will require on-going re-assessment. 
It is only from critical reflection and proactive adjustments based on identified 
weaknesses/obstacles that learning can happen and resilience can be embodied by institutions 
and communities alike. 
5.5 Recommendations 
The following list prioritizes some recommended actions which address the weaknesses and 
obstacles identified in Vargas State through this research: 
1. Complete the early warning system 
The severity of the risks in Vargas is great and the speed at which the 1999 debris flows 
inundated the community makes it essential that CorpoVargas complete a functioning system of 
early warning with the help of the local scientists and engineers. CorpoVargas must identify a 
team to maintain the system and ensure communities are aware of the signals and procedures in 
this system. Community training programs regarding the early warning system will also serve to 
reinforce that there are on-going threats to the socio-ecological system in Vargas. 
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2. Increase public participation in decision-making 
Inclusion of citizens in planning will result in acceptance of disaster management decisions 
and protocols. Active participation will also lead to successful preparedness, mitigation, response 
and recovery in future disasters as all actors are aware of their individual roles and can act 
promptly and effectively to ensure safety and reduce risks. 
3. Immediately enforce land-use zoning and building codes for all development 
Land-use planning is an important tool for identification of high-hazard zones and allowable 
uses of land, whereas building codes are used for the construction and maintenance of safe and 
resilient structures. Vargas State currently lacks both of these safety mechanisms and its 
residents thus face undue risk. Through proper implementation and enforcement of land-use 
zoning and building codes, vulnerability will be reduced. 
4. Regularly monitor and evaluate project goals and progress 
CorpoVargas and the municipal government unnecessarily failed to oversee reconstruction 
projects and ensure their full and proper completion. Through the use of monitoring and 
evaluation of projects with vulnerability reduction in mind, both during execution and post-
completion, objectives and goals will be successfully achieved. 
5. Maintain institutional organization and encourage capacity building and staff 
training programs within government institutions 
The institutional organization in Venezuela has traditionally been added to when new 
governance issues arise. I recommend that Venezuela maintain the current status quo in order to 
keep clarity of roles and responsibilities and prevent undue confusion within the system. In 
addition, staff at all institutions should be offered training related to their job responsibilities 
(e.g. community capacity building techniques, biophysical modeling and reading of hazard maps 
etc.) to maintain a core staff of competent and dedicated workers. 
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this thesis was the development and field testing of a tool to address 
the need for improved monitoring and evaluation of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction 
activities. The Venezuelan debris flow disaster of 1999 was used in this study because it was the 
largest disaster in Venezuela‘s history and also because, as one of the largest debris flow 
disasters in Latin American history, the case findings can be used to elucidate some common 
failures in LDCs. To be able to assess reconstruction efforts sufficient time must have passed to 
allow recovery and risk reduction projects to be executed. This evaluation of the major Vargas 
State debris flows was conducted nine years following the disaster; in a smaller disaster the 
PDARRE evaluation could have been conducted sooner. 
Consistent with the perspective of prominent international NGOs, this research is based on the 
prevailing belief that disaster management can be more successful if mainstreamed into broader 
sustainable development goals and activities. The discussion in Chapter 5 served to summarize 
the implications of this study and now these final pages will recall the objectives and make 
concluding remarks about the links between disaster management and development in LDCs. 
6.1 Revisiting the Research Objectives 
Objective 1: To identify the causes of the 1999 debris flow disaster 
Several root causes were identified, including the distinct socio-economic division within 
Venezuelan society, where wealth is concentrated in a small portion of the population, mainly 
located in the capital city. However, the most significant contributor to the occurrence of debris 
flows in the northern coastal State of Vargas comes from the region‘s biophysical characteristics. 
The steep slopes of the Sierra El Avila, which peak a short distance from the Caribbean Sea, and 
the intensity of rainfall in December 1999 resulted in extensive flooding of cities built on alluvial 
fans. Massive sediment loads were carried by numerous rivers through the steep river valleys, 
causing channels to overflow and two-storey houses to become buried. Neither of these root 
causes, the socio-economic division nor the biophysical characteristics, could have 
independently caused a disaster. The dynamic pressures which generated unsafe conditions are 
more appropriately attributed this credit. Relatively uncontrolled and poorly-planned urban 
development in recent decades exposed a large population to the volatile debris flows. The long 
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time period since the last disaster (1951) also resulted in a population of people unable to 
imagine the extent of the hazard threatening their homes and livelihoods. Pre-disaster 
institutional weaknesses, revealed in the research, further contributed to the tragedy of December 
1999. 
As with many disasters, the Vargas debris flow disaster was a convergence of unfortunate and 
dangerous circumstances. Prominent minds studying hazards and vulnerability have argued for 
decades that governments need to have solid understanding of their socio-economic and 
biophysical systems as well as well-planned disaster recovery actions. As disasters continue to 
grow in magnitude and increase in frequency, the importance of strong disaster management 
plans will be reinforced the world over. LDCs face a complex array of pressures. By integrating 
disaster risk reduction into broader development goals and objectives, and strengthening disaster 
preparedness and response, catastrophes will no longer impede advancement to the same extent. 
 Objective 2: To review „good practices‟ in DRR and develop an evaluation framework for 
post-disaster risk reduction effectiveness 
The literature on hazard mitigation has a long history, marked by changes encouraged and 
influenced by authors such as Gilbert White, Piers Blaikie and Dennis Mileti. Structural and non-
structural response techniques have been tested and validated, along with the definition of the 
disaster management cycle: preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. Long-term 
monitoring of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction has typically been left to local 
governments that often get distracted by economic pressures and changes. Recent work by the 
ProVention Consortium and other authors advocate for the ‗Mainstreaming Disaster Risk 
Reduction‘ which would aid disaster practitioners with their on-going efforts to mitigate and 
prevent serious disaster impacts. As part of these efforts, the Post-disaster Assessment of Risk 
Reduction Effectiveness (PDARRE) was created to monitor and evaluate post-disaster actions. 
The criteria for this assessment were derived from many sources and were organized into 
categories according to the three realms of a socio-ecological system: socio-economic, built 
environment and biophysical systems. These categorized criteria will assist local governments to 
see which areas of their disaster response system are weakest, and enable effective adjustments 
to their activities, consequently improving the entire disaster management system. 
Other checklists and tools for post-disaster response activities do exist, however, I argue that 
these over-emphasize the immediate response activities and time-frame. Although, the first few 
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days after a disaster offer significant DRR opportunities, longer-term planning and monitoring is 
needed for governments and NGOs to ensure their DRR efforts are maintained and weaknesses 
in the disaster management cycle are promptly addressed. PDARRE can serve this purpose by 
providing a list of criteria which can be evaluated at any time, whether immediately following a 
disaster, several years later, and even over a generation. This extended application, if properly 
integrated in an adaptive management approach, can also act as a reminder of past events and 
ensure continuous institutional and community learning. 
Objective 3: Evaluate the extent to which vulnerabilities and risks were reduced, 
perpetuated or created through the post-disaster reconstruction efforts in Vargas State 
The PDARRE assessment allowed for the evaluation of data collected from interviews and 
field observations in June 2008. In order to determine whether vulnerabilities and risks were 
reduced, perpetuated or created, this data was evaluated according to the PDARRE criteria. 
In the case of Vargas, many vulnerabilities and risks were perpetuated or created, with very 
few post-disaster actions leading to a reduction in risk or vulnerability. Despite empowerment of 
local agencies, assistance from international NGOs and compliance with some of the guidelines 
offered for disaster management (BBB/HFA etc.), vulnerability reduction was not expressly 
integrated into response and recovery in Vargas after the debris flows in 1999. Slow government 
decision-making and reconstruction efforts aimed at visible action rather than effective response 
are among the causes for limited reduction of risk or vulnerability. The continued vulnerability 
was exposed in 2005 when excessive rainfall and flash flooding/debris flows again inundated the 
coastal cities causing further damage. Although early actions taken to reduce vulnerabilities are 
ideal, it is not too late to address the shortcoming in Venezuela‘s disaster management system. 
The perpetual nature of flooding and debris flows in Vargas indicates and requires that DRR 
actions are taken otherwise continued losses are a certainty. 
Objective 4: Identify further steps (policies, actions and solutions) which could reduce 
vulnerabilities in Vargas according to the PDARRE results. 
The discussion and recommendations from Chapter 5 offer possible actions that CorpoVargas, 
NGOs, local communities and other government agencies could take. Many of these actions 
would serve to improve the local disaster relief system for the next disaster. However, because of 
the cyclical nature of disaster management, recommended actions also serve to better prepare the 
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residents and government bodies, with the intention of mitigating the impacts and losses of 
subsequent disasters. 
This research revealed that much work is still needed to achieve real vulnerability reduction in 
the communities of the northern coast of Venezuela, and through on-going monitoring of risks 
and collection of biophysical and socio-economic data the underlying causes of this disaster can 
be addressed. Documentation of lessons identified and communication between actors are some 
of the important factors to learning from the events of December 1999.  
6.2 Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction 
Given that disastrous events are often the first indication a community gets of their 
vulnerability, it is important not only to have an effective disaster management system in place, 
but also to have a well-informed population.  ―While extensive risk would appear to not 
contribute significantly to either global disaster mortality or economic loss, [risk] is increasing 
rapidly and poses a considerable threat to the livelihoods of poor rural and marginal urban 
communities. Current progress in local-level disaster preparedness can potentially reduce the 
mortality associated with extensive risk‖ (ISDR, 2007b). But local-level post-disaster response 
and recovery activities still represent an obstacle to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods 
and the MDGs in less-developed and developing countries. Therefore, as this thesis has 
demonstrated, the best method for protecting survivors in disaster-affected communities is to 
reduce disaster risks through well-planned post-disaster reconstruction and recovery efforts. In 
that way, more sustained development progress will also result so that losses and mortality 
associated with disasters will also decline. 
Over time, disaster management has drawn from complementary fields because of the noted 
successes of a more participatory management style. Historic practice used top-down, expert-
driven decision-making for disaster mitigation (Maskrey, 1989). In recent decades an 
appreciation for local ecological/traditional knowledge and public input have been integrated 
into the decision-making process for disaster management. Public participation allows for the 
development of mitigation strategies which generate lasting resiliency and, also result in reduced 
vulnerability. Local residents have been given a voice on matters which affect their lives and 
livelihoods because of a recognition that a community is more likely to embrace strategies which 
they helped develop.  
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Major recent disasters have highlighted the vulnerability of urban settlements in the 
developed and developing world alike. The post-disaster context provides an opportunity to 
harness funding that can be directed at-risk and vulnerability reduction efforts. The post-disaster 
context presents an opportunity for local governments to mainstream DRR into development 
activities because of access to funding which is not available in normal circumstances. With a 
synthesis of poverty and vulnerability reduction strategies, disaster-affected communities can use 
the post-disaster context as an opportunity to achieve more sustainable livelihoods, increased 
equity and improved safety. In so doing, at-risk communities will be ready to face the increasing 
number of hazard events that have been predicted and hopefully this resilience will lead to a 





Appendix 1: Key Propositions for Building Back Better 
Proposition 1. Governments, donors, and aid agencies must recognize that 
families and communities drive their own recovery. 
Proposition 2. Recovery must promote fairness and equity. 
Proposition 3. Governments must enhance preparedness for future disasters. 
Proposition 4. Local governments must be empowered to manage recovery 
efforts, and donors must devote greater resources to strengthening 
government recovery institutions, especially at the local level. 
Proposition 5. Good recovery planning and effective coordination depend on 
good information. 
Proposition 6. The UN, World Bank, and other multilateral agencies must 
clarify their roles and relationships, especially in addressing the early 
stage of a recovery process. 
Proposition 7. The expanding role of NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent 
Movement carries greater responsibilities for quality in recovery efforts. 
Proposition 8. From the start of recovery operations, government and aid 
agencies must create the conditions for entrepreneurs to flourish. 
Proposition 9. Beneficiaries deserve the kind of agency partnerships that 
move beyond rivalry and unhealthy competition. 
Proposition 10. Good recovery must leave communities safer by reducing 
risks and building resilience. 
(Clinton, 2006, p. 3) 
Appendix 2: Resettlement Locations for Survivors from Vargas State 
 
Source: adapted from Google Maps 
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Appendix 3: Interviewees from 2008 Field Work 
Interviewee #1: June 9, 2008. Professor of Anthropology, Universidad Central de Venezuela 
(UCV) 
Interviewee #2: June 10, 2008. Professor from the Institute of Fluid Mechanics, UCV 
Interviewee #3: June 10, 2008. Professor from Institute of Fluid Mechanics, UCV 
Interviewee #4: June 10, 2008. Professor from Institute of Fluid Mechanics, UCV 
Interviewee #5: June 12, 2008. Researcher from Geography department, Universidad 
Pedagogica Experimental Libertador (UPEL) 
Interviewee #6: June 12, 2008. Professor in Geography, UCV 
Interviewee #7: June 13, 2008. Disaster Specialist, UNDP, Caracas 
Interviewee #8: June 13, 2008. Professor of Geography, UCV. 
Interviewee #9: June 13, 2008. Professor and Researcher of Geography, UPEL 
Interviewee #10: June 16, 2008. Professor and Researcher of Science, UPEL 
Interviewee #11: June 17, 2008. Professor at Andean University in Merida and Policy 
Consultant 
Interviewee #12: June 18, 2008. Specialist in Environmental and Risk Management, 
CorpoVargas. 
Interviewee #13: June 13, 2008. Presentation from Geography students, UCV 
Reviewer #1: June 26, 2009. Professor in Geography, UCV 




Appendix 4: Interview Themes 
Disaster Cause(s) 
 Could you explain in your own words what you understand to be the cause(s) of the December 
1999 flash flood (debris flow) disaster? 
 What do you think is the most important cause of the disaster? 
o What role did human management of natural resources (e.g. forests, water resources) play 
in this disaster? 
o How much of the original forest remains in the area near the disaster zone, and how 
adequate is forest management? 
o What role did human settlement location play in this disaster? 
o What role did poverty play in this disaster? 
o What role did corruption play in this disaster? 
 Do you feel this was a ‗natural‘ or human-created disaster? Why? 
  
Resource Management: institutions and programs in the disaster zone (pre-disaster) 
 What government agencies were active in the area where the disaster happened? 
 What NGOs and aid agencies were active in the disaster zone? 
 Were there any resource protection or management programs carried out in the last 10 years? 
(e.g. reforestation, watershed management) 
  
Post-disaster learning and adaptive hazard mitigation 
 Could you describe how government agencies, NGOs and/or aid agencies have responded to the 
disaster? 
 Can you identify some of the hazard mitigation (or ‗risk reduction‘) activities that have gone on 
since 1999? 
 How have communities and individuals in the area responded? [Probe for changes …housing 
design, forest use, changes in human settlement location, etc] 
 Have there been any changes to resource protection or management following the disaster? 
[Probe for details: Policies, development programs, resource management practices, community-
level programmes, etc] 
 Can you summarize what has been the impact of the disaster on land use in the affected areas? 
 What learning has occurred as a result of the disaster? [Probe for specifics] 
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